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WITHIN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD:
THE FACTOR OF PARENTAL STATUS IN
CUSTODY DISPUTES ARISING FROM
SURROGACY CONTRACTS
By Irma S. Russell*
I. INTRODUCTION
The primary issue to be determined by this litigation is what are the best
interests of a child until now called "Baby M." All other concerns raised by
counsel constitute commentary.'
The state court trial in In re Baby "M"2 is the first case in this
country that terminated parental rights of a mother and awarded
custody of a child to the genetic fathers based on a surrogacy
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, Memphis State Univer-
sity. I gratefully acknowledge the support of the law school generally, and particularly the faculty
members who read and commented on the article, including Professor William P. Kratzke, Profes-
sor John C. Carter, and Professor Janet L. Richards. I also wish to thank Rachel H. Blumenfeld,
Stephen C. Bush, Jerrilyn J. Ramsey, and David V. Smith, my research assistants on this project,
and Journal editor Barbara Young for their valuable contributions to this work.
In re Baby "M," 217 N.J. Super. 313, 323, 525 A.2d 1128, 1132 (Ch. Div. 1987), rev'd in
part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988)[hereinafter Baby M 1].
2 Id. In this much publicized case, the Superior Court of New Jersey's Chancery Division
granted specific performance of the surrogacy contract, awarding custody of a baby girl, Melissa,
to her genetic father, William Stern, and terminating the parental rights of the child's genetic
mother, Mary Beth Whitehead-Gould. (Mrs. Whitehead-Gould will be referred to here as Mary
Beth Whitehead, her name at the time of trial.) The trial court also based the termination of Ms.
Whitehead's parental rights on specific performance of the contract through the court's parens
patriae power. Id. at 399, 525 A.2d at 1172.
3 This article refers to the party seeking custody based on a surrogate agreement as the
purchasing father, or simply as the commissioning party. The term "genetic father" is also used,
although the genetic relationship does not appear to be essential to surrogacy. See infra Part II A.
I have avoided the terms "sponsoring party" and "sponsoring husband," used elsewhere. See, e.g.,
Note, Litigation, Legislation, and Limelight: Obstacles to Commercial Surrogate Mother Ar-
rangements, 72 IOWA L. REv. 415, 424 (1987)[hereinafter Note, Litigation], because they are
unclear. The commissioning party is not sponsoring the child to join a club. Further, the party
often referred to as a "father" could be of either gender. The commissioning party could be a
career woman-or an unemployed woman-who desires to have another bear a child for her to
raise. In the process of in vitro fertilization, an egg-which could be either that of the surrogate
or the wife of the commissioning party or of some other woman-is removed from the body of a
woman and fertilized with sperm in a petri dish. Thus, the surrogate could be genetically related
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contract" with the child's mother.5 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
or unrelated to the child. See Comment, In Vitro Fertilization: Third Party Motherhood and the
Changing Definition of Legal Parent, 17 PAc. L.J. 231, 231-32 (1985); Annas & Elias, In Vitro
Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Medicolegal Aspects of a New Technique to Create a Fam-
ily, 17 FAM. L.Q. 199 n.I, 216-17 (1983). See also Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Chal-
lenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REv. 465, 473-74 (1983).
4 The type of contract involved in Baby M has become known as a "surrogate" or "surro-
gacy" contract or agreement. See In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 410-11, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234
(1988) [hereinafter Baby M I1]. In Baby M, the parties labeled the contract a "Surrogate Parent-
ing Agreement." Id. at 472, 537 A.2d 1265, app. A. The procreative and parenting functions are
bifurcated in surrogacy, allotting the procreative function to the inevitably female promisor and
the parenting function to the typically male promisor and his wife. In the surrogacy contract, a
woman agrees to conceive and bear a child for another. When her promise is made in exchange
for a promise of payment, the arrangement is called a "commercial surrogacy." Surrogacy is
frequently defined as an agreement between "a married couple which is unable to have a child
because of the wife's sterility and a fertile woman who agrees to conceive the husband's child
through artificial insemination .. " Black, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 16 NEw
ENG. L. REV. 373, 374 (1981); see also Katz, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws,
20 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROs. 1, 2 (1986); Note, Surrogate Mothers: The Legal Issues, 7 AM. J.
LAW & MED. 323 (1981). Although infertility in married partners now appears to be the typical
impetus for surrogacy, it is by no means the only possible setting for the transaction. As the trial
court noted in Baby M I, the factors recited in the above definition need not be present to consti-
tute a surrogacy contract: "Use of a surrogate calls for the gestator to ... relinquish all parental
rights and give the child to its natural father who was, of course, the sperm donor. (In some
variations of alternative reproduction even this basic assumption need not be so.)" Baby M 1, 217
N.J. Super. at 333, 525 A.2d at 1137 (emphasis added). See also O'Brien, Commercial Concep-
tions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 65 N.C.L. REV. 127, 130-32 (1986); Note, Litigation,
supra note 3, at 417-18; G. COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION TO ARTIFICIAL WOMBS 216-17 (1985); Wadlington, supra note 3, at
.474-75.
' The woman who promises to bear a child for another and relinquish parental rights is
referred to as a "surrogate mother" or simply as a "surrogate." But as the New Jersey Supreme
Court noted, this designation is inappropriate. Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1234.
"Surrogate" is a misnomer because the woman who bears the child pursuant to a contract is not a
fake or substitute mother. She is the biological and, typically, the genetic mother of the child. See
Robertson, Surrogate Mothers: Not So Novel After All, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 28 (Oct.
1983) [hereinafter Robertson, Surrogate Mothers]. ("[I]t is the adoptive mother who is the surro-
gate mother for the child since she parents a child borne by another.") In her book, The Mother
Machine, Gena Corea described the women who promise to bear a child for the purpose of relin-
quishing it to another as "breeders." G. CORA, supra note 4, passim. Although this term may be
a more accurate description, this writer rejects it as demeaning to women and employs the term
"surrogate" because of its widespread use.
Through the use of in vitro fertilization (IVF), it is possible for a woman to give birth to a
child that is genetically unrelated to her. See Annas & Elias, supra note 3, at 199 n.l; Comment,
supra note 3, at 231-32. Even in such a case, "surrogate" may be a misleading term since the
birth mother is the biological-though not the genetic-mother of the child she has borne. See
Annas & Elias, supra note 3, at 222. But see Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation
Rights of the Unmarried 98 HARV. L. REV. 669, 674 n.29 (198 5)(suggesting that the assumption
of parental status for the surrogate may be defeated-when she is not genetically related to the
child); Comment, supra note 3, at 232 and passim (using the term "IVF carrier" to describe the
woman who enters this arrangement and arguing that it presents a stronger case for preserving the
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reversed this decision, however, on the grounds that (1) commercial
surrogacy is "illegal, perhaps criminal, and potentially degrading to
women, ' ' 6 and (2) the irrevocable surrender of custody of a child prior
to birth is contrary to public policy.' Likewise, in Yates v. Keane, a
Michigan court held that surrogacy for compensation is illegal' and
reaffirmed that state's rejection of commercial surrogacy.1 Moreover,
some states have recently enacted legislation providing that surrogacy
contracts violate public policy.10 Other states deal with surrogacy
interests of the commissioning party). For a thorough outline of the possible combinations of
methods of artificial conception, see Wadlington, supra note 3, at 488-96.
' The supreme court's literal statement is that the "payment of money to a 'surrogate'
mother [is] illegal .... Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1234 (emphasis added). The
opinion leaves no doubt, however, that the entire contract is invalid not merely the act of paying
money. See id. at 462, 537 A.2d at 1261 ("[Tihe surrogacy contract is unenforceable and ille-
gal."). Specifically, the court invalidated the surrogacy contract, the termination of Mary Beth
Whitehead's parental rights, and the adoption by Mrs. Stern. But despite its rejection of the
surrogacy contract, the supreme court substantially affirmed the trial court's award of custody to
the commissioning father.
Id. at 411, 537 A.2d 1235. "Under the contract, the natural mother is irrevocably commit-
ted before she knows the strength of her bond with her child." Id. at 437, 537 A.2d at 1248.
8 Yates v. Keane, Mich. Cir. Ct. Gratiot Cty., Nos. 9758 & 9772, 1/21/87 [14 Fam. L.
Rptr. 1160 (1988)]. In Yates, as in Baby M, the court afforded the genetic father status as a
natural parent and decided the question of custody as a typical custody dispute between parents.
See Yates v. Keane, Mich. Cir. Ct. Gratiot Cty., Nos. 9758 & 9772, 1/21/87 [14 Fain. L. Rptr.
1161 (1988)]. The tendency of courts to treat custody disputes involving children born of alterna-
tive reproductive methods like custody disputes in divorce has been discussed in the context of use
of artificial insemination by donor (AID) by lesbian women. See O'Rourke, Family Law in a
Brave New World: Private Ordering of Parental Rights and Responsibilities for Donor Insemina-
tion, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 140 (1985). In this article, Ms. O'Rourke notes that in a Califor-
nia case, J.C. v. M.K. (Id. at 141 (cite withheld to protect confidentially of parties)), a man
secured visitation rights and was declared the legal father of a child produced as a result of his
semen donated to a lesbian who wished to bear and raise a child.
[T]he decision of who should be the legal parents of the child was left to the discretion
of a family court judge. The parties' use of an alternative method of reproduction and
their intention to create an alternative family by choice were not recognized by the trial
court. Instead, the judge treated the case as if it were an ordinary custody dispute
between a divorcing couple who had conceived their child through their marital
relationship.
Id. at 142.
' See Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981).
10 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-8-2-1 (Burns Supp. 1988); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West
1987); 1988 Mich. Pub. Acts 199.
LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West 1987), which became effective September 1, 1987, provides
in toto:
Contract for surrogate motherhood; nullity.
A. A contract for surrogate motherhood as defined herein shall be absolutely null and
shall be void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy.
B. "Contract for surrogate motherhood" means any agreement whereby a person not
married to the contributor of the sperm agrees for valuable consideration to be insemi-
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obliquely.11 Many other state legislatures are currently considering bills
nated, to carry any resulting fetus to birth, and then to relinquish to the contributor of
the sperm the custody and all rights and obligations to the child.
The literal language of this provision includes neither artificial insemination by donor (AID) when
a person other than the commissioning party donates the sperm nor use of a surrogate to carry a
child resulting from fertilization outside her body (by in vitro fertilization). The purpose of the
statutory prohibition seems to include such variations on the typical surrogacy technique, however.
No justification exists for prefering contracts for the creation of children unrelated to the commis-
sioning party. Indeed, the genetic link often found in the surrogacy setting has been offered as a
factor that distinguishes surrogacy from baby selling. See, e.g., Black, supra note 4, at 382. It
seems unlikely that the Louisiana legislature intended to nullify surrogacy contracts in which the
commissioning party is the genetic father of the child while allowing such contracts when the
sperm of someone other than the commissioning party is used. Similarly, fertilization of the
egg--either that of the surrogate or that of another--outside the surrogate's body does not allevi-
ate the danger at issue. The effect of invalidation of the contract is unclear in the Louisiana
statute. Probably, legislative nullification of contract will have the same effect as judicial nullifica-
tion had in Baby M: The genetic father of the child born as a result of surrogacy can seek custody
of the child based on a comparison of himself and the surrogate. Further, the surrogate may have
no ground for asking a court to compare her with the genetic commissioning father if she submit-
ted to an in vitro process in which her egg was not used.
The Indiana statute defines surrogacy agreements more broadly than does Louisiana; it in-
cludes agreements where the child to be produced is genetically related or unrelated to the surro-
gate. The Indiana statute declares that "a court may not base a decision concerning the best
interest of a child" solely on evidence that the child was produced pursuant to the surrogate
contract unless the contract was the result of duress, fraud, or misrepresentation.
Michigan's legislation makes commercial surrogacy a crime and prohibits intermediaries
from facilitating surrogacy arrangements. See 1988 Mich. Pub. Acts 199. The law, which went
into effect in September of 1988, punishes brokering of surrogacy contracts as a felony, subject to
up to five years imprisonment and a $50,000 fine. It also provides for misdemeanor penalties for
those who contract to bear a child for money, setting a misdemeanor penalty of up to 90 days in
jail and a fine of up to $10,000 as the punishment for this offense. See Paid Surrogacy Banned,
Memphis Commercial Appeal, June 28, 1988.
" See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-114 (1986). The Tennessee statute requires that sur-
render of a child by its parent to another party for adoption be made in the presence of a judge in
chambers. The judge must privately interview the surrendering parent, asking whether the parent
has paid or received any money or other remuneration in connection with the birth of the child or
placement of the child for adoption, and if so, to or from whom, the specific amount, and the
purpose for which it was paid or received. The statute expressly exempts payment of fees to a
surrogate as a basis for denying an adoption. "[I]f consideration is given in the case of a surrogate
birth, such consideration, or the amount thereof, shall not be used to deny the adoption." Id.
(emphasis added)(some exceptions to the requirement not relevant here are included in the stat-
ute). The Tennessee Department of Human Services sponsored the bill that was codified as § 36-
1-114. According to attorney Louise Fontecchio, general counsel of the Department at the time
the bill was passed, the Department had no intention of approving surrogacy by this bill. The
purpose of the bill containing this provision was to make clear that attorneys could not charge a
fee other than the customary fee for actual legal services rendered for facilitating an adoption of a
child. The proviso on surrogacy was offered as an amendment in committee hearing by a senator
not on the committee with the stated purpose of clarifying that the bill in no way addressed
surrogacy.
See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 1986)(The New Jersey statute apparently recog-
nizes the legal status of a man who provides semen for artificial insemination pursuant to a writ-
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that would either reject or regulate surrogacy."
These judicial and legislative decisions do not spell the end of com-
mercial surrogacy in the United States.'3 States that have not invali-
dated the practice of surrogacy will face the question of the enforce-
ability of such contracts. All states will decide custody disputes
involving children born as a result of surrogacy. Custody disputes will
inevitably arise even in states, like New Jersey and Indiana, that have
invalidated commercial surrogacy."'
The opinions of both the trial court and the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Baby M present a valuable exploration of two bases for
awarding custody of a child born of surrogacy: contract rights and pa-
rental status. The opinions provide a testing ground for the policy
choices that courts and legislatures will make in deciding the future of
surrogacy in this country." The two opinions in Baby M represent the
ten contract as the "natural father of a child thereby conceived."); In re Baby Girl L.J., 132 N.Y.
Misc. 2d 972, 978, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 818 (Sup. Ct. 1988)(holding that § 374(6) of New York
Social Services Law prohibits payment in connection with adoption but "does not expressly fore-
close the use of surrogate mothers or the paying of compensation to them under parenting
agreements").
11 In 1987, 27 states and the District of Columbia considered bills dealing with surrogacy.
See Adams, An Examination of Bill Introductions During the 1987 Legislative Session Relating
to Surrogacy Contracts. 13 (2) State Legislative Report 1 (Jan. 1988).
"S Several states are currently considering legislation that would regulate surrogacy. See, e.g.,
Nev. Sen. Bill No. 272. The Nevada bill would exclude surrogate births from the prohibition
against payment to a natural parent in return for placement of a child for adoption. The bill treats
a release or consent to adoption given prior to birth or within 72 hours of birth as inva-
lid-whether given in the case of surrogacy or adoptions. The opinion of the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Baby M H acknowledged the possibility of future surrogacy arrangements in that state.
The opinion acknowledges the possibility of legislative empowerment of surrogacy arrangements.
See Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 452-53, 537 A.2d at 1255 n.16. Moreover, by prohibiting ex parte
orders to transfer custody to the commissioning party absent proven unfitness of the surrogate, the
supreme court acknowledged that surrogacy may continue despite the court's rejection of judicial
enforcement. Id. at 462-63, 537 A.2d at 1261.
" These disputes are likely to arise in two contexts: (1) contracts entered outside the jurisdic-
tion that has invalidated surrogacy; and (2) contracts entered by residents of a state that has
invalidated surrogacy. The disputes arising under the first category will present conflict of law
problems regarding whether the state that has disaffirmed the practice must enforce contracts
entered into in other states. In the second category, courts will face the issue presented in Baby M.
The only difference will be that parties entering surrogacy agreements after judicial or legislative
declaration of the invalidity of the contract have notice of the invalidity of the contract.
" The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that Baby M will "highlight many [of surrogacy's]
potential harms" for the consideration of state legislatures. See Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 469, 537
A.2d at 1264. Whether the legality of surrogacy contracts will be the subject of federal legislation
or federal oversight by use of doctrines such as the full faith and credit clause is an open question.
For a general discussion of the best interests standard in child custody cases, see Case Comment,
Ford v. Ford: Full Faith and Credit to Child Custody Decrees? 73 YALE L.J. 134, 140-42 (1963).
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extremes in reactions to surrogacy. The trial court regarded surrogacy
as a valuable option for obtaining children.16 It empathized with the
commissioning father's anguish at the prospect of being childless or los-
ing the child 17 and refused to attach any significance to the surrogate's
loss of the child. 8 By contrast, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected
surrogacy, holding the contract invalid and unenforceable because of
the public policy against commercial transactions in children. 9 Al-
though the supreme court rejected the contract basis for enforcement
of the surrogate parenting agreement, it accepted without inquiry the
status of William Stern as "natural parent" of the child born as a re-
sult of the contract. Finally, the court assumed that public policy con-
siderations have no role in determining who is a natural parent. This
Article explores the significance of parental status in the determination
of custody and the question of whether the legal relationship of parent
Emphasizing the absence of any "right answer," this comment concludes that
[t]he resolution of these policy conflicts seems preeminently suited for the kind of state
experimentation essential to the functioning of the federal system; the Court would be
misconceiving its role as arbiter of the federal system if it attempted to resolve these
controversies by using the full faith and credit clause to promote those procedures of
which it approves.
Id. at 140-41. The Comment also maintains that the best interests of the child standard is not a
constitutionally compelled standard and thus, that states cannot justify the use of the full faith
and credit clause to approve some state procedures by enforcement and disapprove the procedures
of other states absent a decision that the best interests standard is a matter of federal common law
policy. Id. at 141.
H The trial court not only declared the surrogacy contract valid, but it also endorsed a broad
scope within which surrogacy is permissible. It broadly defined the contract term "infertility" to
cover the case of a fertile woman with a subjective fear of pregnancy, which need not be borne out
by medical fact. Baby M I, 217 N.J. Super. at 379-80, 525 A.2d at 1161. "[I]t is a subjective test
that is being allowed to determine inability to carry without risk of harm." Id. at 380, 525 A.2d at
1161.
"' The sole legal concepts that control are parens patriae and best interests of the child.
To wait for birth, to plan, pray and dream of the joy it will bring and then be told that
the child will not come home, that a new set of rules applies and to ask a court to
approve such a result deeply offends the conscience of this court.
Id. at 375, 525 A.2d at 1159. Although the test the court used is the widely accepted "best
interests of the child" test, the impassioned statement extrapolating the policy focuses solely on
the emotional need of the commissioning party.
"S "Enforcing the contract will leave Mr. and Mrs. Whitehead in the same position that they
were in when the contract was made." Id. at 398, 525 A.2d at 1170. Similar selectivity in judging
what interests are worthy of protection under the rubric of the right to procreate appears in schol-
arship in this area. See, e.g., Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Preg-
nancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405 (1983)[hereinafter Robertson, Procreative Liberty].
Professor Robertson argues that the decision to use available means of reproduction can be limited
only when the government has a compelling state interest, but that a woman's interest in making
decisions related to the process of birth is not entitled to protection. Id. at 433, 451, and passim.
" See Baby M I, 109 N.J. at 411, 462, 537 A.2d at 1234, 1261.
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and child is also subject to public policy limitations.
A. The Surrogacy Controversy
Surrogacy is one of the most hotly contested questions of our time.
The ramifications of the answer our courts and legislatures reach may
affect personal and economic liberty in unforeseen ways.20 The answer
will profoundly affect the way our society views the relationship be-
tween parent and child and, consequently, the reality of the relation-
ship between parents and children of the future and the power of the
state to regulate that relationship.
The primary policy argument favoring commercial surrogacy is
that the practice provides a means of alleviating infertility," thereby
meeting the needs of infertile married couples.2 Surrogacy is analo-
gized to medical technologies that allow infertile couples to bear chil-
20 The issue of surrogacy requires re-evaluation of principles of contract and constitutional
law (including the prohibitions against prebirth adoption contracts and baby selling), the rule
refusing enforcement of contracts for custody of children, and the right of women to decide
whether or not to bear a child.
21 Many who favor surrogacy also assert, however, that infertility in the commissioning
couple or individual should not be required for an enforceable surrogate contract. See, e.g., Rob-
ertson, Procreative Liberty. supra note 18, at 418-20. Indeed, even if courts purported to limit the
use of surrogates to infertile couples, they would have difficulty ascertaining whether infertility
was the true motivation for the surrogacy arrangement.
2' The trial court in Baby M I noted that:
An estimated 10% to 15% of all married couples are involuntarily childless. This cal-
culation represents a three-fold increase of childless married couples over the last 20
years. It is estimated that between five-hundred thousand and one million married
women are unable to have a child related to them genetically or gestationally without
some kind of assisted fertilization or uterine implant.
Baby M 1, 217 N.J. Super. at 331-32, 525 A.2d at 1136 (citing National Center for Health
Statistics, Vital and Health Statistics (December 1982) § 23 no. It at 13-16, 32). The epidemic
of infertility stands in stark contrast to the claim that medical advances have brought us to a new
position of procreative control. "[S]cientific understanding of the reproductive process now allows
greater control over many aspects of reproduction." Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note
18, at 407. Some commentators charge that to a significant extent, infertility is a result of medical
practices. See, e.g., G. COREA, supra note 4, at 146-48, 160-62. Other reasons given for the rise in
infertility include the frequent decision to delay childbearing until after education and initial ca-
reer goals are attained and to the increase in sexually transmitted diseases. See Baby M I, 217
N.J. Super. at 332, 525 A.2d at 1137 (discussing reasons for "dearth of adoptable children").
In Baby M 11 the supreme court noted that if the infertility crisis is as dramatic as repre-
sented, the need to perpetuate may present a compelling state interest sufficient to justify the use
of surrogacy. Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 452-53 n.16, 537 A.2d at 1255-56 n.16. One recent study
indicates that infertility may not be increasing but, in fact, declining slightly. See Costs High,
Births Low for Infertile, Memphis Commercial Appeal, May 18, 1988 at Al 2.
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dren.' s Those who oppose commercial surrogacy, however, argue that it
is a form of baby selling, that it commercializes a fundamentally per-
sonal relationship, and that it exploits the individuals it appears to
serve. 4 Is the surrogate contract a medical triumph2 5 over infertility
and inconvenience, which allows the exercise of the fundamental right
to procreate and raise a family free from demands of childbirth? Or is
it a contract for the sale of a child, albeit one that is produced ex-
pressly for and often genetically related to the purchaser?
If courts and legislatures view surrogacy as a reasonable medical
alternative for those unable or unwilling to bear children, then judicial
enforcement will follow.2 6 But if they conclude that the arrangement is
23 Proponents lump surrogacy with other collaborative reproduction processes such as artifi-
cial insemination by donor (AID), in vitro fertilization (IVF), and embryo transfer (ET). "Surro-
gate motherhood . . . illustrates the legal and ethical issues arising in collaborative reproduction
generally." Robertson, Surrogate Mothers, supra note 5, at 28. Robertson's conclusion is that
surrogacy "is barely distinguishable from the many current practices that separate biologic and
social parentage and that seek parenthood for personal satisfaction." Id. at 34. While these
processes involve controversies, they are not the same controversy presented in surrogacy. See
Annas & Elias, supra note 3, at 208-15. The controversial aspect of IVF and ET is the status of
the embryo. Legal questions surrounding IVF and ET center on the discard of "excess" embryos
and the abortion of unwanted fetuses. By contrast, the issues involved in surrogacy are the sale of
children and the rights of parents to the companionship of their children. Lumping the various
techniques together clouds the issue and aids proponents of surrogacy by associating it with non-
controversial treatments for infertility. Annas and Elias distinguish surrogacy from IVF and ET,
rejecting the practice of surrogacy because of the danger of commercialization. "The experience
of surrogate childbearers in the United States to date (using AID, not IVF) strongly suggests that
this method of procreation should be discouraged by medical and legal practitioners alike." Id. at
217. Unlike the other medical strategies mentioned, surrogacy transfers the burden of gestation
outside the family that intends to raise the child.
"' The supreme court offered one insight on the potential consequences of surrogacy: "It is
expecting something well beyond normal human capabilities to suggest that this mother should
have parted with her newly born infant without a struggle. Other than survival, what stronger
force is there?" Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 459, 537 A.2d at 1259.
25 Surrogate birth is not a new development in medical technology. Since the 1920s artificial
insemination has been used widely in animal husbandry in this country. Increased infertility rates
may be the reason our society now requires a judicial solution to the question of whether surro-
gacy contracts should be enforced. See Baby M I, 217 N.J. Super. at 331, 525 A.2d at 1228,
1136. But see United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Infertility: Medical and
Social Choices, 5 (1988) [hereinafter Infertility). The need for a decision may rest on the new
acceptance by parties involved in such contracts of the analogy of this technique to other medical
techniques such as AID, IVF, and ET.
2' Such enforcement may be either the contract enforcement granted by the trial court in
Baby M I or the more limited right to be compared with the surrogate in a custody dispute. This
interest is stated most convincingly in the case of infertile couples. The constitutional guarantee of
equal protection will make difficult, however, any line between those unable and simply unwilling
to produce children without the aid of a surrogate. See Part II of this Article for a discussion of
problems associated with limitations on the use of surrogacy to the infertile.
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in substance the sale of a child, they will discourage such contracts.
Surrogacy has been the subject of numerous articles in legal and popu-
lar periodicals.2 Many legal commentators have heralded surrogacy
optimistically and uncritically.28 The trial court in Baby M and numer-
ous legal commentators maintain not only that surrogacy agreements
should be recognized as legal, but also that they should be enforceable
by specific performance of the surrogate's promise to relinquish custody
and parental rights in the child. 9 Other commentators have noted
problems inherent in surrogacys° or have expressed reservations about
the use of specific enforcement to compel the surrogate to relinquish
the child."1 To date, no commentator has endorsed specific performance
17 A review of the Index of Legal Periodicals revealed that since the early 1980s the number
of published articles dealing with surrogacy has steadily increased. The number of articles listed
each year is as follows: 1983-three articles, 1984-six articles, 1985-seven articles, 1986--eight
articles, and 1987-fifteen articles.
"8 "Despite the simplicity of the arrangement and its advantages for all concerned surrogate
motherhood is fraught with legal difficulties." Black, supra note 4, at 374 (emphasis added). See
also Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U.L.J. 147, 148; Hollinger,
From Coitus to Commerce: Legal and Social Consequences of Noncoital Reproduction, 18 J.L.
REFORM 865, 869 (Summer 1985)(asserting that "federal and state governments should en-
courage the procreative efforts of childless couples and remain neutral among couples making
different choices. This neutrality implies a presumptive deference to voluntary private agreements
and a reluctance to dictate their terms."). See also Baby M 1, 217 N.J. Super. at 373, 525 A.2d
at 1158:
The fifth argument against surrogacy is that it will undermine traditional notions of
family. How can that be when the childless husband and wife so very much want a
child? They seek to make a family. They intend to have a family. The surrogate mother
could not make a valid contract without her husband's consent to her act. This state-
ment should not be construed as antifeminist. It means that if the surrogate is married,
her husband will, in all probability, have to sign the contract to establish his nonpater-
nity pursuant to the New Jersey Parentage Law. Both sides of the equation must agree.
But see Krause, Artificial Conception. Legislative Approaches, 19 FAM. L.Q. 185, 200 (Fall
1985)("I would prefer to see commercial surrogate motherhood being declared illegal.... If the
practice is illegal, any surrogacy agreement would of course be automatically unenforce-
able.")(emphasis in original).
" Baby M 1, 217 N.J. Super. at 374-75, 525 A.2d at 1158-59; Robertson, Surrogate Con-
tracts Not Against Public Policy, 119 N.J.LJ. 332 (1987) [hereinafter Robertson, Surrogate Con-
tracts]; Note, Developing a Concept of the Modern "'Family'" A Proposed Uniform Surrogate
Parenthood Act, 73 GEO. L.J. 1283 (1985)[hereinafter Note, Modern Family]; KEANE & BREO,
THa SURROGATE MOTHER 236-37 (1981)(stating that legislation is needed that would make
prebirth consent to release of child irrevocable); Note, The Surrogate Mother Contract in Indi-
ana, 15 IND. L. REV. 807, 825 (1982)[hereinafter Note, Surrogate Mother]..
30 In reviewing the book The Baby Makers by Diana Frank and Marta Vogel, Sue M. Hal-
pern noted: "While the prohibitive costs of many of the new reproductive technologies means they
are almost exclusively available to the affluent, the real financial issue is more inclusive. Should
research funds and time be committed to solving a problem that may be more about vanity than
illness?" New York Times Book Review, Mar. 27, 1988, at 35.
" See Coleman, Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis of the Problems and Suggestions for So-
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of the other promises necessary to surrogacy, such as the promise to
submit to insemination, to carry and deliver the child, and to forbear
terminating the pregnancy."
Proponents of surrogacy seek to distinguish surrogacy from baby
selling 8 and adoptions" on the bases that a surrogacy contract is en-
tered before conception and the contract father is often genetically re-
lutions, 50 TENN. L. REV. 71 (1982-83). In her article, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1849 (1987), Professor Margaret Radin accepts the possibility of what she terms "incomplete
commodification" of reproduction through surrogacy, but she concludes that specific enforcement
should not be allowed. "In such an incomplete commodification, performance of surrogacy agree-
ments by willing parties should be permitted, but women who change their minds should not be
forced to perform." Id. at 1934.
82 In dicta, the trial court in Baby M I expressly excluded specific performance of these
preconception promises.
This court holds therefore that in New Jersey, although the surrogacy contract is
signed, the surrogate may nevertheless renounce and terminate the contract until the
time of conception. She may be subject then for such monetary damages as may be
proven. Specific performance to compel the promised conception, gestation, and birth
shall not be available to the male promisor. However, once conception has occurred the
parties rights are fixed, the terms of the contract are firm and performance will be
anticipated with the joy that only a newborn can bring.
Baby M I, 217 N.J. Super. at 375, 525 A.2d at 1159. The court also excluded from the new rule
of specific performance the surrogate's decision of whether to abort the fetus. Id.
Comment, Womb for Rent: A Call for Pennsylvania Legislation Legalizing and Regulat-
ing Surrogate Parenting Agreements, 90 DICK. L. REV. 227, 253 (1985):
The typical surrogate parenting arrangement is not a form of baby-selling. A baby born
as a result of a surrogate gestation transaction is hardly unplanned, nor does it create
an unexpected financial burden for the surrogate mother. On the contrary, the baby is
conceived after careful planning. The surrogate mother has agreed to terminate her
parental interests before the baby is conceived. . . . Unlike the typical baby-selling
transaction, there is no opportunity for the adopting couple to pressure the surrogate
mother because the decision to become pregnant by artificial insemination rests solely
with the surrogate mother.
See also Greenberg & Hirsh, Surrogate Motherhood and Artificial Insemination: Contractual
Implications, 1983 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 149, 155; Katz, supra note 4, at 1. Coleman, supra note
31, at 71. Proponents also argue that the contract father is not purchasing a child but rather is
arranging with the surrogate to carry his child. See Note, The Surrogate Child: Legal Issues and
Implications for the Future, 7 J. Juv. L. 80, 83 (1983)[hereinafter Note, Surrogate Child].
" Note, Modern Family, supra note 29, at 1292:
In the usual voluntary termination of parental rights and responsibilities scenario, a
pregnant woman decides to surrender her child for adoption by unrelated parties. Often
the woman is unmarried or under some other social or economic pressure that makes
her vulnerable to exploitation and impairs her judgment.... In a surrogate parenthood
arrangement, these conditions do not exist.... [Tiraditional legal thinking about termi-
nation of parental rights and responsibilities does not apply to surrogate parenthood
arrangements.
See also Note, Surrogate Child, supra note 33, at 80; Note, Surrogate Mother, supra note 29, at
807; Note, The Rights of the Biological Father. From Adoption and Custody to Surrogate Moth-
erhood, 12 VT. L. REV. 87 (1987)[hereinafter Note, Biological Father].
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lated to the child.8 They maintain that these facts justify a special rule
to accommodate the needs of the contracting father or couple. Current
scholarship on this issue fails to explore adequately the policies that
inform the prohibitions against baby selling and prebirth consent to
adoption. Courts and commentators assume that such laws are moti-
vated by a desire to protect children and society against the commer-
cialization of children and mothers. 6 If indeed this is a valid public
policy objective, the lawfulness or enforceability of surrogacy contracts
can be determined only after examining whether the practice imper-
missibly commercializes the child produced or the surrogate mother.
B. The Future of Surrogacy
Despite the New Jersey Supreme Court's emphatic rejection of
surrogacy, the rights of parties to surrogacy agreements are far from
settled in New Jersey. The New Jersey Supreme Court stated that its
decision in Baby M would deter surrogacy8 7 But the strength of the
deterrence is unclear. In New Jersey a surrogate mother is now unable
to enforce the payment provisions of the contract,38 and the purchas-
ing89 party is unable to obtain specific enforcement of the promise to
" See Note, Surrogate Child, supra note 33, at 83.
" See Katz, Surrogate Motherhood and Baby Selling Laws, 20 COLUM. U. 1, 17
(1986)("The fundamental public policy that human beings are not property and therefore are not
to be bought and sold underlies the baby-broker acts."). See also Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 439-41,
537 A.2d at 1249-50. "Whatever idealism may have motivated any of the participants, the profit
motive predominates, permeates, and ultimately governs the transaction." Id. at 439, 537 A.2d at
1249. See also Landes & Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323,
336 (1978); Coleman, Surrogate Parenting: A Quagmire of Legal Issues, 39 VAND. L. REV. 597,
641-43 (1986)(distinguishing surrogacy from child bartering).
"7 See Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 454, 537 A.2d at 1257 ("Our declaration that this surrogacy
contract is unenforceable and illegal is sufficient to deter similar agreements.").
" Removal of the profit incentive clearly will discourage some women who might otherwise
serve as surrogates. Proponents and critics alike agree that few women will undertake surrogacy
without compensation. See, e.g., Parker, Motivation of Surrogate Mothers: Initial Findings, 140
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 117, 118 (1983)(89% of the women studied said a fee was necessary); KEANE
& BREO, supra note 29 at 268-69, 311; Annas & Elias, supra note 3, at 221; Note, Litigation,
supra note 3, at 433.
"' Both proponents and opponents of surrogacy agree that commercial surrogacy involves a
purchase. The dispute of surrogacy centers on what is purchased, not on whether a purchase
occurs. Proponents maintain that commercial surrogacy involves the sale of gestational services.
See Black, supra note 4, at 384; Robertson, Surrogate Mothers, supra note 5, at 33. Robertson
dismisses the objections to payment as "moral distaste," and concludes such an objection is insuffi-
cient to justify interference with a fundamental right. Id. Robertson rejects the distinction be-
tween purchasing services or a child: "It is quibbling to question whether the couple is 'buying' a
child or the mother's personal services. Quite clearly, the couple is buying the right to rear a child
by paying the mother to beget and bear one for that very purpose." Id. Opponents of surrogacy
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relinquish the child. Additionally, some who might otherwise consider
surrogacy (either as a provider or as a purchaser) will now reject it
because of judicial disapproval."' Others, however, will be desperate
enough--either for a child or for the money-to enter a surrogacy con-
tract despite its illegality.
The holding of the New Jersey Supreme Court produces different
effects on the two parties to the illegal contract. The inability to en-
force the payment provision of the contract is clear. No exception or
qualification exists to allow recovery of the payment promised. 1 How-
ever, the effect of illegality on the commissioning party is less clear.
The commissioning father in both Yates and Baby M secured primary
custody of the child. But a court could grant primary or sole custody to
the surrogate mother, finding her to be the better custodial parent. Or
the court could grant the commissioning father only shared custody
with the surrogate as occurred in these early cases.42 These are risks
the commissioning party may not wish to assume. 3
view the purchase as a purchase of a child. See, e.g., Annas & Elias, supra note 3, at 221
("[E]ven though services are part of what is being purchased, what is really wanted, and for all
practical purposes what is principally being purchased is a child."). The New Jersey Supreme
Court agreed that surrogacy involves an impermissible purchase--either of a child or of the relin-
quishment of parental rights. Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 437-38, 537 A.2d at 1248.
4o One can argue that those who enter a surrogacy contract after its illegality has been estab-
lished have compromised their claim to fitness as parents to a greater extent than did either Wil-
liam Stern or Mary Beth Whitehead who contracted prior to the judicial declaration of its illegal-
ity. On the other hand, the New Jersey Supreme Court committed itself to the goal of furthering
the child's interests over any other goal. Hence, under this rationale if the commissioning party
compares favorably with the surrogate, he or she should prevail in a custody dispute with the
surrogate despite the clear illegality of the transactions.
41 In Baby M II, the supreme court rejected the surrogate's right to payment. Because the
surrogacy contract was held illegal, an action based on other theories such as quantum meruit or
promissory reliance probably would also fail. Both promissory reliance and restitution (quantum
meruit for personal services in this context) are awarded only in circumstances that would create
injustice if no recovery is had. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979). Restitu-
tion is generally unavailable as compensation for services contracts that are unenforceable on
grounds of public policy. See id., ch. 8, Topic 5 introductory note.
4 The court modified the grant of custody to William Stern by an order that, on remand, the
superior court determine visitation rights of Mary Beth Whitehead. Baby M I1, 109 N.J. at 463-
67, 537 A.2d at 1261-63. The superior court granted Mrs. Whitehead a right to weekly visitation
with Melissa of eight hours. The visitation schedule will increase to two days every other week
starting in September 1988 and after one year will include overnight visits. Beginning in the sum-
mer of 1989, Mrs. Whitehead will be allowed two weeks summer visitation with Melissa. Baby M,
14 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1276. See Yates v. Keene, Mich. Cir. Ct. Gratiot City, nos. 9758, 9772
(Jan. 27, 1987)[14 Fain. L. Rep. 1160 (1988)].
41 The New Jersey Supreme Court attempted to control the balance of power between surro-
gate and purchaser by disapproving transfer of any child born to a surrogate pending outcome of a
custody trial:
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C. The Best Interests Test
The courts in Baby M disagreed dramatically about the validity of
surrogacy contracts. Nevertheless, each court found the "best interests
of the child" to be the controlling issue. In the introductory paragraph
of Baby M (quoted at the beginning of this article), the trial court
relegated to dicta its contract and constitutional findings and adopted
the best interests of the child as the "only rule" by which it could be
guided. 4 Although the New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed with the
trial court's determination of the public policy of the state, it agreed
that the best interests of the child controlled.'5
Any application by the natural father in a surrogacy dispute for custody pending the
outcome of the litigation will henceforth require proof of unfitness, of danger to the
child, or the like, of so high a quality and persuasiveness as to make it unlikely that
such application will succeed. Absent the required showing, all that a court should do is
list the matter for argument on notice to the mother. Even her threats to flee should not
suffice to warrant any other relief unless her unfitness is clearly shown. At most, it
should result in an order enjoining such flight.
Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 462-63, 537 A.2d at 1261. Continued custody in the surrogate mother
pending the litigation will affect the determination of best interests of the child. If trial courts
observe this rule, the proven "track record," see id. at 458, 537 A.2d at 1259, of successful cus-
tody in the commissioning party's home will not be available as support for the commissioning
party's claim of best interests. Continuation of custody is not, however, necessarily the crucial
factor in the custody determination. In Baby M II, for example, the supreme court did not suggest
that if Mary Beth Whitehead had been able to retain custody during the litigation, the child's best
interests would have required a grant of custody to Mrs. Whitehead.
In Yates and Baby M, what the commissioning party secured by virtue of the surrogacy
arrangement was the right to be compared by a court with the surrogate mother. (In these cases
this benefit was secured without any payment to the surrogate since the courts invalidated the
payment provisions of the contracts.) Accordingly, anyone who would obtain a child through sur-
rogacy in these states maximizes his chance of success by hiring a surrogate who would likely be
found to be an unfit parent. Such an attribute clearly compromises the best interests of the child
to be born while it enhances the commissioning party's chance of parenthood. Does this mean that
women previously held to be unfit parents will be in demand as surrogates?
"4 This court held that whether there will be specific performance of this surrogacy
contract depends on whether doing so is in the child's best interest .... Any other result
would indeed conflict with the court's role as parens patriae. Thus, in the absence of a
public policy regarding surrogacy in New Jersey, with the rule as aforesaid that the
laws of adoption, custody and parental termination were never intended to apply and do
not apply to surrogacy, the only rule of law by which this court may be guided is the
application of the doctrine of the child's best interests in the exercise of its parens
patriae jurisdiction.
Baby M 1, 217 N.J. Super. at 390, 525 A.2d at 1166-67 (emphasis added).
" "Under the Parentage Act the cla ims of the natural father and the natural mother are
entitled to equal weight, i.e., one is not preferred over the other solely because he or she is the
father or the mother. N.J.S.A. 9:17-40. The applicable rule given these circumstances is clear: the
child's best interests determine custody." Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 453, 537 A.2d at 1256 (citing
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-40 (West 1988)). The supreme court noted that the trial court's approach
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Both courts accepted the parental status of the contract father
without scrutiny of the contractual basis for that status. 6 Accordingly,
both decisions elevate contractual interests above the best interests of
the child in the sense this concept has been traditionally applied to pro-
tect children in various contexts, including adoption and the sale of
children.' Judicial acceptance of the parental status of the commis-
sioning parent achieves in some measure the purpose of this illegal con-
tract. It gives the commissioning party rights with regard to the child
and treats the commissioning party like a parent who has produced a
child through a personal, rather than commercial, relationship. Classi-
fying the commissioning party as a parent when he is the genetic father
may result in the same classification for commissioning parties who are
not related to the child. Because of the contract and the classification
as "natural parent," the father can demand to be compared with the
biological mother in a custody dispute.
D. Parental Status of Commissioning Party
The parental status of the litigants affects profoundly the custody
determination of the best interests of the child. Courts have long held
that primary custody should be granted to the parent who would best
serve the interests of the child,"' and that when the parent's and child's
interests conflict, the child's interests must prevail. Courts and scholars
also agree, however, that these principles should not operate to remove
a child from a fit parent merely to enhance the child's life chances."9
Hence, in the absence of a finding of unfitness of the surrogate, an
award of custody to the commissioning party in a surrogacy arrange-
to the best interests question was "substantially indistinguishable" from its own approach but was
used to determine contractual remedies. Id.
"' This is not to suggest that the supreme court accepted Mr. Stern's parenthood inadver-
tently or without recognition of the influence of the contract on its determination of parental
status. On a related question, the custody determination itself, the court noted the distinction
between giving effect to a contract and considering the existence of the contract as a circum-
stance. "[W]e now must decide the custody question without regard to the provisions of the surro-
gacy contract that would give Mr. Stern sole and permanent custody. (That does not mean that
the existence of the contract and the circumstances under which it was entered may not be consid-
ered to the extent deemed relevant to the child's best interests.)" Id.
'" The supreme court made clear that the contract served the interests of the parties, not
those of the child. Id. at 413-14, 418, 537 A.2d at 1236, 1238. "Worst of all, however, is the
contract's total disregard of the best interests of the child." Id. at 437, 537 A.2d at 1248.
4 See Part III of this Article.
See Baby M I1, 109 N.J. at 445, 537 A.2d at 1252 (expressing rule in context of termina-
tion); Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy,
39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 268-70 (1975).
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ment must be based on acceptance of the parental status of that party.
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected in principle any
contract right to custody of a child, it accepted two concepts necessary
to surrogacy: (1) the parental status of the commissioning party and
(2) the consequent use of the best interests test as a comparison of the
two litigants competing for custody of the child. Because the court ac-
cepted these two concepts, its analysis preserved to a significant extent
the rights and expectations of the commissioning party, which the trial
court protected as a matter of contract law. 50 It is doubtful that the
supreme court would have granted primary custody to William Stern if
it had deemed him a nonparent.5 1 Although both courts stated that the
interests of the child prevail, both rulings respected and effectuated the
contract to a great extent, even to the extent of subjugating the best
interests of children generally to the contractual interests presented.
The New Jersey Supreme Court clarified that contract rights, in-
cluding contractual extinguishment of parental rights, depend on a
public policy judgment. But neither court discussed or acknowledged
that creation of parental status also derives from a public policy deci-
sion. The judgment of what persons are preferred custodians is a public
policy decision traditionally fixed by reference to the status of the liti-
gants as well as the interests of the child involved.
To the extent that the constitution requires the recognition of pa-
rental rights, neither courts nor legislatures may restrict those rights."
" Although the court stated that its holding of illegality is "sufficient to deter" future surro-
gacy, its instructions concerning custody of the child who is the subject of a dispute pending a
custody trial are evidence that the court recognized that surrogacy will continue in New Jersey.
See Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 462-63, 537 A.2d at 1261.
51 One might assume that the contest between Elizabeth Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead,
admittedly a dispute between a parent and a nonparent, would be an indication of what the result
would have been between William Stern and Mrs. Whitehead if Mr. Stern had not been ascribed
parental status. The New Jersey Supreme Court voided the adoption of Baby M by Elizabeth
Stern. Id. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1234.
0' At one time, a father had a legal right to custody of his legitimate children, and the
mother had no rights in competition with his. By means of the Tender Years Doctrine, many
jurisdictions reversed this rule for infants and young children and created a preference for custody
in the mother. With regard to illegitimate children, the mother rather than the father traditionally
had a right to custody. Today, in response to equal protection requirements, most states disavow a
preference for either parent regardless of whether the custody dispute involves a legitimate or
illegitimate child. See, e.g., Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981); Annotation, Modern
Status of Maternal Preference Rule of Presumption in Child Custody Cases, 70 A.L.R.3D 266,
268-69 (1976). In Devine, the court decided that the doctrine constitutes "an unconstitutional
gender-based classification which discriminates between fathers and mothers in child custody pro-
ceedings solely on the basis of sex." Devine, 398 So. 2d at 695. See also Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc.
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Whether constitutional principles of equal protection require identical
treatment of biological parents of children produced by commercial
surrogacy and other biological parents is one of the difficult questions
such contracts generate.
In Baby M, both courts assumed that the genetic link of William
Stern to the child made him a natural parent for purposes of custody
law. New Jersey has adopted the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA),
which requires comparison of "natural parents" disputing custody to
determine which would be the better custodian. The UPA accords pa-
rental status based on biology and does not define the term "natural
parent." ' s It seems reasonable that the UPA intended to give equal
status to genetic parents in ordinary circumstances, but the conclusion
that the UPA mandates an equal comparison of genetic parents in a
commercially created birth may not be justified. In adopting the UPA,
the New Jersey legislature extended to illegitimate fathers rights they
lacked at common law. One should not lightly assume that this statute
in derogation of the common law intended to extend those rights to the
commissioning party in commercial surrogacy-or in arrangements
deemed illegal and perhaps criminal. The parental law was not, of
course, passed with an intent to cover surrogacy specifically. 4 Rather,
the UPA was passed, as was other legislation in this area, on the as-
sumption that genetic parentage springs from personal, rather than
commercial, relationships. Commercial surrogacy runs contrary to this
assumption. One must question whether a genetic parent deserves the
high level of protection ordinarily reserved for the most personal rights.
2d 178, 183, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 291 (1973). In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Court
noted that classifications based on sex are subject to scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment. By
imposing legal burdens on individuals according to the "immutable characteristic of sex," the
tender years presumption forces fathers to affirmatively show mothers unfit. In Devine, the court
concluded that because its effect was to deprive some "loving fathers of the custody of their chil-
dren," the tender years presumption could not be justified as substantially related to a significant
state interest. Devine, 398 So. 2d at 694 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976)). See
UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT §§ 1-2, 9B U.L.A. 296 (1987)[hereinafter UPA]; Devine v. Devine,
398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981); Bah v. Bah, 668 S.W.2d 663 (Tenn. App. 1983). See also infra note
111.
U The New Jersey Supreme Court deemed both Mary Beth Whitehead and William Stern
"natural parents" entitled to equal treatment under New Jersey's Uniform Parentage Act (the
Act). Baby M I, 109 N.J. at 453, 537 A.2d at 1256. The Act mandates equal treatment of
parents regardless of their marital status and states that the natural father's status may be estab-
lished by proof of paternity. UPA § 2, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-40-41 (West 1988).
" See Keane, supra note 28, at 152-54. This point is reminiscent of the argument made by
proponents of surrogacy that because surrogacy was not widely known at the time of passage of
child-selling laws, such laws may not relate to the practice.
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The key to this puzzle may lie in considerations of the best inter-
ests of children" and society's disapproval of commercial transactions
creating rights to children. Principles of personal freedom as well as of
parenthood assume some freedom and consent on behalf of parties who
create a child together. The key to the puzzle certainly is not the exis-
tence or nonexistence of a genetic link between the "natural parent"
and the child. A promise by parents for their daughter to marry a man
and provide him with children is not enforceable, for the bride's con-
sent is essential to the marital relationship. Similarly, rape is not a ba-
sis for parental rights. Moreover, a fraudulent or coercive surrogacy
agreement is not an acceptable basis for parental rights anymore than
fraud or coercion is a basis for rights arising out of any other con-
tract. 6 Yet the cases of the arranged marriage, rape, and fraud could
all create a genetic link between one who might assert parental rights
and a child.57 Once we decide that the genetic link is not the factor
that determines the best interests of the child, the question becomes
whether the status of "natural parent" can exist by contract without
any biological link at all.
If commercial surrogacy is illegal, as the New Jersey Supreme
56 Related to this issue is the validity of the consent of the surrogate to allow either the
termination of her parental rights or the creation of rights in another based on a commercial
contract.
6' Recent Indiana legislation mandates the exclusion of evidence that a child was produced
by surrogacy in determining the best interests of the child unless the agreement was the result of
fraud, duress, or misrepresentation. See 1988 Ind. Acts 175. The effect of this provision is that the
biological parents in surrogacy are compared without a preference just as in Baby M and Yates
absent extraordinary circumstances isolated as depriving the arrangement of valid consent.
17 A court would probably reject a custody claim by a man who fathered the child by rape
even in a jurisdiction that has adopted the UPA's requirement of comparing natural parents. The
court could reject the rapist's claim for custody either by determining that a rapist would not be a
parent in the best interests of the child, or by declaring that forced intercourse is not an accept-
able means of achieving the status of "natural parent." Similarly, most of us would not require
child support payments of a man who consented to neither parenthood nor sexual relations with
the mother of the child. Could a woman secure by deceit or with the help of a doctor the seminal
fluid of a wealthy man, inseminate herself, produce a child and require support payments from the
wealthy man? Our rejection of this scenario reveals a need for minimal consent required to claim
status as "natural parent," perhaps the consent to sexual intercourse rather than consent to have a
child. As the above hypotheticals illustrate, the genetic relationship is not inevitably sufficient in
itself to create parental status. In the first situation, the genetic link of the rapist is not sufficient
to create rights in the rapist for purposes of a custody contest. In the second case, the genetic link
without consent of the wealthy man provides an insufficient basis to tie him to the responsibilities
of parenthood. Should the consent and intent represented by the consensual undertaking of a
commercial contract create parental status even though that consent is deemed insufficient to
create a contract right?
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Court held,5 8 states should seek to impose stronger sanctions to discour-
age the practice than that court employed. Possible sanctions are (1)
refusal to recognize the parental status of either party to the surrogacy
arrangement or (2) termination of parental status of either party.
While these sanctions would discourage surrogacy, the state cannot use
such drastic means of deterring surrogacy if to do so violates the consti-
tutional rights of the parents.59 To determine the legal effect of the
surrogacy agreement on parental rights, one must consider the interests
of society as a whole and the interests of children born from surrogacy,
as well as the interests of contracting parties.
The significant social and legal question of commercial surrogacy
is whether individuals can use contracts to create and extinguish paren-
tal rights to a child yet to be born. In Baby M, the trial court answered
this question in the affirmative, subject to a condition that the interests
of the child be served by enforcement of the contract. At first blush,
the supreme court in Baby M seems to have answered the question in
the negative. The court invalidated the surrogacy contract and voided
the termination of the mother's parental rights. But on the crucial
question of the father's parental status, the court effectuated the con-
tract and recognized William Stern's status as a natural parent of the
child.60 While one could argue that William Stern's parental status is
based on his biological link to the child rather than on the contract, a
birth resulting from surrogacy is contrary to the underlying assumption
that a genetic relationship is founded on a noncommercial relationship
with the child or with the child's mother. Although the genetic rela-
tionship is the trigger for an equal comparison of parties under the
UPA, this trigger usually assumes noncommercial consent.
The void in scholarship that this Article addresses is whether the
58 See Baby M I, 109 N.J. at 421-22, 462, 537 A.2d at 1240, 1261. The supreme court did
not clarify whether the deference to Mr. Stern as a parent is constitutionally required. If this is
the basis for the recognition, the court must have accepted either Mr. Stern's relationship with the
child resulting from an invalid ex parte order of Stern's contractual agreement as sufficient ac-
ceptance of responsibility on his part to create a parental right. See Part V of this Article discuss-
ing Lehr v. Robertson.
" The question of custody rights of a genetic parent has not been sharpened to the point at
issue in surrogacy arrangements. A determination of the rights of the individual parties to a given
agreement necessitates consideration of the constitutional protections afforded parents and of the
showing necessary to be entitled to such protections based on parental status. See Part V of this
Article.
o See Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 452-53, 537 A.2d at 1256. See also Part V dealing with the
basis for parental rights recognized by the Supreme Court in Lehr.
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commissioning party to a surrogacy agreement gains parental status
either because of his genetic link to the child or because he purchased
the right through contract. If surrogacy contracts are contrary to pub-
lic policy, we should consider whose interests are served by recognizing
the parental rights that rely on such contracts.6 In pursuit of this pur-
pose, this Article assesses three possible bases for according the com-
missioning party status as a parent: (1) the contract, (2) the federal
constitution, and (3) legislation.
Part II of this Article explores the elements essential to surrogacy
in an attempt to determine what types of arrangements would be en-
forceable if surrogacy contracts are recognized. The conclusion of Part
II is that the sine qua non of surrogacy is a preconception agreement
for production and surrender of a child.
Part III sets forth the best interests of the child test for determin-
ing custody and compares the application of the test in the two Baby M
opinions. Part III concludes that the grant of primary custody to Wil-
liam Stern rests on implicit recognition of Mr. Stern as a parent and on
a judgment that the surrogacy contract is effective to establish
parentage.
The last three parts of the Article explore three potential bases for
recognizing the commissioning party in a surrogacy contract as a "nat-
ural parent." Part IV considers whether a contract should be regarded
as a sufficient basis for acquiring parental status. It questions whether
acceptance of the contractual declarations of the parties significantly
undermines judicial power to determine the best interests of children. It
also examines whether specific performance of the surrogacy agree-
ment, including the promise to relinquish custody, should be available
to the commissioning party if he is deemed a parent.
Part V considers whether the federal constitution requires recogni-
61 Should legislation on the legality of surrogacy focus on the interests of the individual child
born of surrogacy and involved in a custody dispute or should legislation also consider the interests
of children in the aggregate and the interests of society as a whole? Hegel dealt with the need for
assessing and accommodating the good of the society in general:
In the course of the actual attainment of selfish ends . . . there is formed a system of
complete interdependence, wherein the livelihood, happiness, and legal status of one
man is interwoven with the livelihood, happiness, and rights of all. On this system,
individual happiness, &c., depend and only in this system are they actualized and se-
cured. This system may be prima facie regarded as the external state, the state based
on need, the state as the Understanding envisions it.
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 123 (1967).
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tion of the commissioning party as a parent for purposes of determining
custody of the child born of surrogacy. The right to parent has been
accepted as a fundamental liberty interest. Termination of this right to
serve the public good is possible only if the state's interest is compel-
ling. Part V concludes that the constitutional issue turns on whether
denial of parental status to the commissioning party constitutes a ter-
mination of parental rights or merely a refusal to vest that status.
Part VI explores whether states should endorse surrogacy legisla-
tively. Should parental status be accorded the commissioning party in a
surrogacy arrangement as a matter of public policy even if not consti-
tutionally required? This issue turns on whether surrogacy is indeed a
new and unique arrangement that should be free of the old rules limit-
ing the power of individuals to order privately rights in children. Part
VI examines the policies that inform two established limitations on en-
forcement of contracts for custody of children: (1) the prohibition
against the sale of children and (2) the prohibition against prebirth
consent to adoption. Additionally, this part assesses the arguments that
the dangers these policies protect against are alleviated in surrogacy
because the contract is entered into prior to conception and the con-
tract father is usually the genetic father of the child. This Article con-
cludes that the basic principle against commodification of humans is a
necessary limitation on surrogacy and that reliance on the genetic rela-
tionship or the preconception timing of the contract as safeguards
against commodification is misplaced.
II. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF SURROGACY
Before one can explore the limits or regulations possible in a juris-
diction that enforces surrogacy agreements, one must identify the ele-
ments of a surrogacy contract. The elements deemed essential to the
arrangement influence the assessment of the public policy interests at
stake.62
" Many proponents of surrogacy rely on future legislation to cure surrogacy's problems. See,
e.g., Hollinger, supra note 28, at 869 and passim (suggesting that the government should follow
the principle he calls "supportive neutrality," to "encourage procreative efforts of childless couples
and remain neutral among couples making different choices"). Comment, Contracts to Bear a
Child, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 611, 621-22 (1978). Note, Litigation, supra note 3, at 444.
Those who distinguish surrogacy from baby selling have found safeguards for children in
circumstances that frequently exist in surrogacy. Specifically, they rely on the commissioning fa-
ther's genetic link to the child. See, e.g., Note, Litigation, supra note 3, at 426; Greenberg &
Hirsh, supra note 33, at 155. After setting forth the prohibition of payment for a biological par-
ent's consent to adoption, the Iowa note discusses three cases in which adoption of a child by
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The facts and posture of Baby M present surrogacy in its most
compelling and least controversial form: The genetic father sought cus-
tody of a child born as a result of a surrogacy contract made because
his wife was unable to bear a child.6" It is doubtful, however, that the
law can limit the surrogacy arrangement to the circumstances
presented here without violating equal protection requirements. The
following factors, often present in surrogacy, are explored here to de-
termine whether they are essential for either an enforceable surrogacy
contract or for the recognition of parental status:
(1) The party seeking custody under the agreement is the child's
genetic father.
(2) The genetic father is married.
(3) Infertility of the father's wife is the reason for use of a
surrogate.
(4) The surrogate was artificially inseminated with the semen of
the contract father.
(5) The genetic father and the surrogate entered a contract, free
of fraud, coercion, or mistake, and supported by consideration prior to
conception.
extended family members was allowed despite the exchange of consideration. It argues that surro-
gacy contracts can be justified on the same basis.
[T]he family adoption analysis could be applied when the state recognizes the sponsor-
ing husband as the child's biological father. In this situation fees paid to the surrogate
could be viewed as a private financial arrangement between members of the child's
family, motivated by a concern for the child's best interests, rather than a pecuniary
gain.
Note, Litigation, supra note 3, at 426. But is this the reason for the payment? In a recent study
presented to the American Psychiatrists' Association, 125 women who had applied to act as surro-
gates were questioned concerning their backgrounds, and attitudes. Eighty-nine percent of the
surrogate applicants stated that they would require a fee for their participation as a surrogate. See
Parker, supra note 38, at 117. See also Greenberg & Hirsh, supra note 33, at 156. Reliance on
the genetic relationship of the parent to the child and the preconception timing of the contract
may be misplaced, however, if these safeguards are not essential elements of the surrogacy trans-
action and are not required for an enforceable surrogacy arrangement.
" Although William Stern's claim was based on the contract, the remedy sought was essen-
tially custody of the child. Moreover, the contract action sought specific performance of only the
final promise of relinquishment of parental rights and custody rather than the more controversial
claim for performance of other promises made in surrogacy. See Part IV C of this Article for a
discussion of the other promises inherent in surrogacy contracts.
Mr. Stern's desire to reproduce genetically was linked to the tragic loss of his family in the
Holocaust. See also Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 413, 537 A.2d at 1235. See also Baby M 1, 217 N.J.
Super. at 338, 525 A.2d at 1139.
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In Baby M, the trial court did not expressly find any of the first
four factors necessary to enforce the surrogacy contract. Rather, the
court treated the issue of custody as a contract question and enforced
the agreement because it was a valid contract. The trial court also
noted that the facts present in Baby M may not always appear in sur-
rogacy arrangements and did not expressly limit its holding to the par-
ticular facts of the case." Legal scholars writing in support of surro-
gacy have also rejected the first four factors listed above as limitations
on surrogacy contracts.65
A. Genetic Link of Contract Father
Proponents of surrogacy often rely on the presence of a genetic
link between the commissioning party and the child to distinguish sur-
rogacy from baby selling. 6 Mr. Stern "cannot purchase what is al-
ready his," the trial court stated. 7 But to require a genetic link before
enforcing a surrogacy contract discriminates against the infertile. (The
favored class is the fertile male with an infertile wife.)6 8 If a genetic
link is a prerequisite, many people with the same problem of infertility
that justifies surrogacy in the first place would be denied this option.
Commentators supporting surrogacy have found no valid distinc-
" See Baby M 1, 217 N.J. Super. at 333, 525 A.2d at 1137.
See Robertson, Embryos. Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the.
New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 962-63 (1986)[hereinafter Robertson, Em-
bryos](right of single persons to procreate by coital and noncoital means); Robertson, Procreative
Liberty, supra note 18, at 430 (arguing that "[riestricting the right of noncoital or collaborative
reproduction to one purpose, such as relief of infertility, contradicts the meaning of a right of
autonomy in procreation..."); Greenberg & Hirsh, supra note 33, at 155. See also, Kritchevsky,
The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination: A Call for an Expanded Definition of
Family, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1981)(single persons should enjoy same liberty to procreate as
married persons).
See, e.g., Note, Biological Father, supra note 34, at 87.
8? Baby M 1, 217 N.J. Super. at 372, 525 A.2d at 1157.
Such a requirement would also discriminate against couples of the same sex, especially
male couples. This discrimination may not be deemed to rise to the level of an equal protection
violation, however. The United States Supreme Court's holding in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986), rejected the application of the right of privacy to sexual conduct between members of
the same sex. A violation of the individual's right to equal protection of the laws seems much more
of a danger if surrogacy is allowed for some and denied others. If a surrogacy agreement is valid
for infertile married couples, on what basis can the right be denied homosexual couples or individ-
uals? The only basis for denial is the best interests of the child. This basis loses much of its force,
however, when the right is respected or rejected on the fine points of sexual orientation or marital
status. Certainly homosexual individuals can make good parents. The risk of surrogacy is not that
homosexuals will be empowered to raise children. The risk is the broader danger of general coin-
modification of children and women and, thus, all individuals in the society that allows these sales.
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tion between the purchasing party who uses his own sperm and the
purchaser who uses the sperm of another.69 Insofar as the argument in
favor of surrogacy rests on the constitutional rights of substantive due
process and equal protection, one can justify no distinction between
those able to reproduce genetically and those unable to do S0.70 Relief
from infertility (typically of the wife of a fertile male) is, after all, the
original impetus for surrogacy. If surrogacy is deemed an acceptable
option for couples like the Sterns, it must also be acceptable for a ster-
ile husband, an infertile single female, and an infertile couple (i.e.,
where both the male and female are infertile) 7 1 for these individuals
cannot reproduce genetically.7
e See, e.g., Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 18, at 429-30.
70 One need not believe that the concept of equal protection requires validation of surrogacy
in order to see an equal protection problem in allowing surrogacy in some circumstances and
denying it in others because of the marital status of the commissioning parties or of the other
characteristics dealt with here. If surrogacy becomes available as an option for reproduction, de-
nial of that option based on characteristics must be justified by legitimate distinctions between
those granted and those denied the right to employ a surrogate. Safeguards are not essential ele-
ments of the surrogacy transaction and not required for an enforceable surrogacy arrangement.
71 This is the argument made by Professor John A. Robertson in several articles on surrogacy
and endorsed by the trial court in Baby M. See Baby M I, 217 N.J. Super. at 388, 525 A.2d at
1165. Professor Robertson argues that the inequality of reproductive capability between fertile
and infertile people cannot be a basis for allowing some people to reproduce and not allowing
others to reproduce. "The right of a couple to raise a child should not depend on their luck in the
natural lottery, if they can obtain the missing factor of reproduction from others." Id. (quoting
Robertson, Surrogate Mothers: Not So Novel After All, 13 HASTINGS CENTER RPT. 5, 28, 32
(1983)).
Such an argument ignores reality, however. Even with surrogacy, the government cannot
make people fertile. Fertility is not a benefit bestowed, or a detriment imposed, by the govern-
ment. (The only case in which the Supreme Court addressed directly the right to procreate, Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942), established that the government cannot deprive
individuals of their reproductive powers absent a compelling state interest of the highest order.)
The danger of positing the principle of government control of reproductive powers-when it in
fact does not exist-is that such control must come if the reproductive choices of some result in
burdens to others. Those supporting surrogacy discount troublesome aspects of surrogacy by prom-
ising legislation will properly balance and regulate. If such regulation is effectuated, then the
government dispersal of reproductive powers will be a reality.
Further, although parenting is a fundamental right, nothing in the constitution justifies the
use of another person to exercise that fundamental right, especially if that exercise diminishes the
same fundamental right of the other party. The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the belief
that "the constitutional right of procreation includes within it a constitutionally protected contrac-
tual right to destroy someone else's right of procreation." Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 448, 537 A.2d
at 1254.
71 Surrogacy does not empower an infertile person to procreate. In the most typical setting
(like that in Baby M), it empowers a fertile male to procreate by use of a fertile woman not his
wife. What surrogacy grants to the commissioning party is the ability to enforce the promise to
relinquish a child.
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Factors that limit adoption as a solution have the same impact on
the infertile couple as on couples, such as the Sterns, where only the
wife is infertile. Equal protection considerations preclude limiting the
rights of those who can not or choose not to be linked to the child
genetically, without a legitimate reason for such a distinction." Requir-
ing a genetic relationship as an essential element of surrogacy creates a
classification of individuals based on ability to procreate and allows a
benefit to those able to procreate (surrogacy) while denying the same
benefit (a child by surrogacy) to those unable to procreate. No princi-
pled distinction for the difference in treatment exists. There is no basis
to conclude that one group would make better parents than another.
Moreover, the genetic relationship of the child to the purchasing father
cannot be a necessary condition once surrogate contracts are recog-
nized. Professor John A. Robertson, one of the most prolific scholars
who support surrogacy, maintains that equal protection and due pro-
cess principles require recognition of surrogacy contracts."4 He argues
that because fertile couples are allowed to procreate, denial of the same
right to the infertile violates the equal protection clause. 5
The entire argument against requiring a genetic link between a
commissioning father and a child rests on the assumption that some
fundamental constitutional interest is implicated. But no such interest
exists. Neither procreation nor parentage is a benefit distributed by the
government .7  The equal protection clause prohibits laws that operate
unequally and unfairly on certain classes of people. The decision of a
state to refuse to enforce surrogacy contracts-whether expressed judi-
cially or legislatively-operates equally, allowing no class of people to
procure children by payment.
" See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
" Robertson's theory is that the contracts should be enforceable as opposed to being effective
to confer parental status as was held by the New Jersey Supreme Court. In Robertson's view, the
Baby M court "had to leap over the needs of infertile couples, the autonomous choice of surro-
gates, and the welfare of offspring to focus solely on the importance of the gestational bond and
the symbolic or exploitative taint of money." Robertson, Procreation Rights Ignored by Court,
121 N.J.L.J. 318 (1988).
7" See Robertson, Embryos, supra note 65, at 958-61.
" The government has no obligation to enable individuals to exercise their constitutional
rights. See, e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
It cannot be that because the government may not prohibit the use of contraceptives..
.or prevent parents from sending their child to a private school, . . . government, there-
fore, has an affirmative constitutional obligation to ensure that all persons have the
financial resources to obtain contraceptives or send their children to private schools.
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980)(citations omitted).
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If surrogacy is recognized as a permissible reproductive option for
some individuals, Professor Robertson's argument has considerable
force. Married individuals with an infertile wife and a fertile husband
seem the most likely to receive governmental endorsement for the use
of surrogacy. If the state endorsed surrogacy only where a fertile hus-
band with an infertile wife contracted for a child, the equal protection
clause would require the same endorsement for couples in which both
partners are infertile and for the unmarried. Professor Robertson's ar-
gument that procreation is a state-controlled monopoly" poses a serious
equal protection problem, but only when surrogacy is recognized as an
option for some and denied others.
B. Married Parents
Although being raised in a home with both a mother and father is
usually in the best interests of a child, limiting the use of surrogacy to
this situation also violates equal protection requirements.7 That the
couple wishing to raise the child is not married, or that the commis-
sioning party-male or female-is single cannot constitutionally deter-
mine the validity of the agreement. 9 Once recognized as a reproductive
option for some, the surrogate method may not be denied others unless
there is a legitimate distinction between the class of individuals receiv-
ing the benefit and those denied the benefit.8 0 The point raised above
applies here. The absence of a constitutional basis to distinguish be-
tween married and unmarried parents does not mean that the constitu-
tion requires recognition of commercial surrogacy.
C. Infertility
The interests of the infertile in surrogacy and the desire for geneti-
cally related children provided the impetus for surrogacy and remain
the strongest arguments in its favor."1 Articles on surrogacy typically
" See Robertson, Surrogate Mothers, supra note 5, at 33.
" This means that the commissioning party may have no mate or a mate to whom he is not
married.
" See Robertson, Embryos, supra note 65, at 962.
"0 See Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 18, at 430.
"1 See, e.g., Note, Litigation, supra note 3, at 415-17; Robertson, Embryos, supra note 65, at
939-47. See also KEANE, THE SURROGATE MOTHER 11-17 (1981); Coleman, supra note 31, at 71-
72; Robertson, Surrogate Mothers, supra note 5, at 28. Robertson maintains that the right to
procreate is a fundamental right that cannot be curtailed by governmental action because "the
state's monopoly of those functions [of reproduction] and the impact its denial will have on the
ability of infertile couples to find reproductive collaborators" makes it reasonable to "view the
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mingle discussion of the interests of infertile couples and the father's
relationship to the child born of surrogacy; they suggest that infertility
is the primary reason for surrogacy. Whether principled and constitu-
tionally sound distinctions can be based on these grounds is doubtful,
however.82 To date infertile couples have formed the majority of parties
who have contracted for surrogate births. Yet no basis exists for deny-
ing surrogacy to a commissioning party who seeks the surrogate be-
cause of convenience rather than the infertility of the female partner.83
The government probably has a legitimate interest in this area be-
cause the use of a surrogate to avoid the inconvenience of the birth
process may be relevant to the ability or willingness of the commission-
ing party to fulfill the challenging role of parenting.84 As a practical
matter, however, restricting surrogacy to the infertile would be impossi-
ble for at least two reasons. First, proving infertility (by a doctor's cer-
tificate,85 for example) would necessitate an unprecedented intrusion
into the privacy of the commissioning party's wife (to say nothing of
the pain and expense of the medical services). Second, such a regula-
refusal to certify and effectuate surrogate contracts as an infringement of the right to procreate."
Id. at 33.
"' Attempts to limit the use of a surrogate to the infertile faces the same equal protection
problems noted above.
S See Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 18, at 430 ("Restricting the right of
noncoital or collaborative reproduction to one purpose, such as relief of infertility, contradicts the
meaning of a right of autonomy in procreation and also raises insuperable problems of definition
and monitoring.").
" Professor Robertson asserts that the individual's reason for employing surrogacy may not
be used to deny the arrangement. "The right of married persons to use noncoital and collaborative
means of conception to overcome infertility must extend to any purpose, including selecting the
gender or genetic characteristics of the child or transferring the burden of gestation to another."
Id. (emphasis added). The person who hires another to bear a child merely to avoid the inconve-
nience of childbirth may be misinformed about the burdens of childrearing, however. That person
may need to hire someone to sit up nights with a sick child, to change diapers, or to volunteer for
the PTA.
85 To enforce an infertility limitation, a mechanism similar to that proposed in Michigan
House Bill No. 5184 would be necessary. The 1981 legislature considered and defeated the bill
that required couples seeking to obtain a child by use of a surrogate to obtain approval from
probate court prior to insemination of a surrogate. The Michigan bill did not expressly require a
showing of infertility. If infertility were a requirement, the certificate of infertility would probably
be filed at this time. Such a certificate and the petition itself would create additional cost for the
commissioning couple and enhance the likelihood that surrogacy would be an option for the
wealthy only. The court would then investigate the couple's fitness or unfitness as parents. If the
couple were determined to be fit, court approval would be registered and a surrogacy permit is-
sued. Upon verification of pregnancy, the commissioning male could file an affidavit acknowledg-
ing paternity. Fourteen days after the birth of the child, the court could issue a final decree
granting custody in the commissioning parents and terminating parental rights of the surrogate.
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tion would probably be fruitless. Infertility is not susceptible to medical
certainty. It springs from a variety of causes, both physical and psycho-
logical, both known and unknown. For this reason infertility is gener-
ally defined vaguely, as "the inability of a couple to achieve pregnancy
after a year of trying to do so.'"' This definition is both medically de-
fensible and completely subject to control by the couple (or individual)
involved. Among those seeking surrogacy for convenience, falsification
and subjective diagnosis are likely.
In Baby M, the trial court examined the term "infertility" as used
in the surrogacy agreement between Mary Beth Whitehead and Wil-
liam Stern to assess Mrs. Whitehead's claim that the contract should
be rescinded on the ground of fraud.8" In giving the term "a broad
meaning," it defined infertility as "the inability to conceive and carry
to term without serious threat of harm to one's physical well-being." 88
The trial court also left the determination of infertility to the individual
judgment of Elizabeth Stern:
This court is satisfied that Mrs. Stern had a sound sense of threat to her well-
being if she were to become pregnant. .. . A risk, though minimal, remains a
risk to one who is faced with it and so it was a genuine risk to Mrs. Stern.
Certainly, it is a subjective test that is being allowed to determine inability to
carry without risk of harm.s'
The facts of Baby M illustrate the classification of infertility is
largely within the power of the couple or individual seeking a child
through surrogacy. Elizabeth Stern diagnosed herself as suffering from
multiple sclerosis." The supreme court noted that Mrs. Stern's fears of
endangering her health by pregnancy "exceeded the actual risk." 91
"The inability of a couple to conceive after 12 months of intercourse without contracep-
tion." See Infertility, supra note 25, at 35.
"' Baby M 1, 217 N.J. Super. at 379-80, 525 A.2d at 1161. The court made no suggestion
that infertility was a prerequisite to surrogacy.
Id. at 380, 525 A.2d at 1161.
8 Id.
'. Liebmann-Smith, "I Had to Protect Baby M," Redbook, 130, 188 (Oct. 1987).
Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 413, 537 A.2d at 1235. Additionally, the guardian ad litem for
Baby M noted that "one could question the fact that Betsy Stern didn't get the diagnosis of
multiple sclerosis confirmed by another doctor until they were preparing for trial." See Liebmann-
Smith, supra note 90, at 188. Mrs. Stern was not infertile but rather was concerned about the
health consequences to her of pregnancy. This raises the issue of whether her medical condition
was the central motivation for the couple's decision to seek a child through surrogacy rather than
through natural reproduction.
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D. Artificial Insemination
As with most legal issues, the questions surrogacy poses turn on
the relationships and rights of individuals, not on the technology in-
volved in a transaction. Although no one has raised the point, surely
the absence of artificial insemination, a nonessential medical technique,
could not destroy an otherwise enforceable contract. That insemination
is achieved coitally rather than artificially probably would not change
the legal force of the contract. In one sense the struggle in surrogacy
law is the struggle of old law applied to new problems. The advent of
the medical technique of artificial insemination has been credited with
forming the basis for a new relationship and requiring a new contract
right. But the only difference between the medical technique of artifi-
cial insemination by donor (AID) and impregnation by natural means
is the slender syringe used for insemination. It cures no infertility; it
provides no new ability for those unable to conceive. In fact, the legal
struggle is the same; only the nonessentials have changed.
In Baby M, the trial court held that if a right to procreate exists,
then the means of reproducing, coitally or noncoitally, cannot affect the
interest protected from governmental intrusion.92 Indeed, the significant
issue in surrogate agreements is not the means of insemination, artifi-
cial or natural; rather, it is whether a purchasing party can acquire
parental rights by contract.93
92 [I]t must be reasoned that if one has a right to procreate coitally, then one has the
right to reproduce noncoitally. If it is the reproduction that is protected, then the means
of reproduction are also to be protected. The value and interests underlying the creation
of family are the same by whatever means obtained. This court holds that the protected
means extends to the use of surrogates.
Baby M 1, 217 N.J. Super. at 386, 525 A.2d at 1164. Viewing people as a means to an end rather
than as individuals may create problems even when the person used consents to his or her own
commodification.
93 Natural insemination was, of course, the method of procreation used by the first recorded
surrogate birth: that of Ishmael. See Genesis 16:20. Justice O'Connor has made the point that
focusing on medical technology as a reason for justifying or refusing to justify an abortion is
misguided. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 455-58
(I 983)(O'Connor, J., dissenting). In the surrogacy context reliance on medical techniques as justi-
fication of legal rights seems misplaced for two reasons. First, medical procedures are subject to
rapid change. Recognition of a medical procedure as the touchstone for a legal determination will
almost certainly result in frequent and perhaps dramatic change in legal relationships so classified.
As a consequence, certainty in legal relations will diminish. This is substantially Justice
O'Connor's point about the use of abortion techniques as a basis for legal standards. Second, use
of a medical technique as a legal test may be particularly inappropriate in the surrogacy context
since the technique is totally unnecessary to the relationship. Any pregnancy achieved artificially
can also be achieved coitally.
SURROGACY CONTRACTS
E. Preconception Contract
The one clear requirement of surrogacy is that the contract be en-
tered into prior to conception. Otherwise, the transaction is the sale of
a child. The central issue of surrogacy is the contract question of
whether a woman can bind herself to relinquish a child by entering a
contract before conception. In other words, is a baby something that
cannot be sold once it exists but can be ordered on a preproduction
(customized) basis? Does a preconception sale neutralize the dangers
that exist in the traditional baby-selling contract? In Baby M, the New
Jersey Supreme Court changed this inquiry only slightly by dealing
with surrogacy as a custody dispute. The unavoidable issue is whether
parental status can be created by a commercial contract.
Surrogacy is not a reproductive option that cures infertility in any
medical sense. No infertile person is rendered fertile by surrogacy. Pur-
suant to the contract, a fertile male impregnates a fertile female.94 Sur-
rogacy is a social mechanism to empower the commissioning party, typ-
ically a male, to obtain parental rights to a child.95
An analogous manner of the private ordering of rights in children
is the antenuptial agreement. A man who wishes to obtain a child with-
out interference in rearing the child might require his bride to promise
to grant a divorce and to relinquish all parental rights upon the birth of
their child. But such an agreement would not be enforced. Antenuptial
agreements, like other contracts, are subject to requirements of
fairness.9
Whether a surrogacy agreement should be recognized as creating
'4 The fertile male may or may not be the commissioning parent. By means of embryo trans-
fer, the impregnation may occur outside the body of the surrogate. The egg fertilized may be from
the surrogate, from the woman who plans to raise the child, or from a donor.
• In New Jersey, the commissioning party to a commercial surrogacy agreement does not
gain a contract right to the child born as a result of the arrangement. The commissioning party
appears to obtain parental status by the contract, however-at least when he is the genetic parent
of the child produced.
" Courts will not enforce an antenuptial agreement unless convinced that it is fair. See, e.g.,
Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1987); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970);
Gross v. Gross, II Ohio St. 3d 99, 464 N.E.2d 500 (Ohio 1984). Some courts reject categorically
any premarital agreement that waives or modifies rights to support after divorce. See, e.g., New-
man v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982); In re Winegard, 278 N.W.2d 505 (Iowa 1979);
Connolly v. Connolly, 270 N.W.2d 44 (S.D. 1978); Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1983). The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act provides that a premarital agreement is
not enforceable if the court finds the agreement unconscionable. See UNIFORM PREMARITAL
AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 369, 378 (1987).
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either a contract right to parent (as the trial court held in Baby M) or
parental status (as the supreme court assumed in Baby M) depends on
whether such recognition is consistent with our country's law of custody
of children. The paramount concern in this area is protecting and serv-
ing the best interests of the child involved. Although by its name, the
"best interests test" seems to provide a basis for assessing the claims of
any litigant (even a nonparent) in a custody dispute, the standard has
never been applied to defeat the rights of a parent except in extraordi-
nary circumstances. From this perspective the issue of surrogacy is
whether the contractual commitment presents such a circumstance.
III. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
In the usual custody scenario, parental status of the litigants is
clear. In surrogacy, however, the question is far from clear. Is the com-
missioning party a "parent" for purposes of a custody dispute? Is the
commissioning party a parent only when he or she is genetically related
to the child? Should the commissioning party be regarded as a parent
only if the jurisdiction hearing the dispute accepts surrogacy as a valid,
legal transaction? This section will examine the relationship of the best
interests test and its preference for custody with a parent.97 Both courts
in Baby M identified the best interests of the child as the controlling
issue of the case.98 Neither court acknowledged, however, the signifi-
cance of the classification of parental status in application of the best
interests test 9 or scrutinized the basis for William Stern's classification
The meaning of custody is generally based on the typical life together of parents and child
in a family setting, including a day to day control and supervision of the child. "In its broadest
sense custody refers to the relationship which exists between parents and child in a normal, going
family." H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 573 (1968).
g See Baby M i, 217 N.J. Super. at 388-90, 525 A.2d at 1166; Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 453,
537 A.2d at 1256. Application of the best interests test requires that the two disputants seeking
custody be parents of the child. In Baby M II, the holding that custody depends on the best
interests of the child may implicitly require a valid agreement between these parents. It is doubt-
ful that the court would have recognized Stern as a parent if the birth had resulted from a non-
consensual act such as a rape, or if the contract with Mary Beth Whitehead was the result of
fraud or coercion. In effect, the supreme court inverted the two factors considered by the trial
court as controlling: (I) the contract; and (2) the best interests of the child. While the trial court
found the contract enforceable subject to the implicit condition of the child's best interests, the
supreme court held the best interests test determines custody, subject in all probability to an
implicit condition that the contract meet some standard of fairness.
99 Both courts articulated the best interests test as though it operates without regard to the
parental status of the litigants. The trial court stated: "Where courts are forced to choose between
a parent's rights and a child's welfare, the choice is and must be the child's welfare and best
interest by virtue of the court's responsibility as parens patriae. " Baby M , 217 N.J. Super. at
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as a parent."' The trial court found the surrogacy contract specifically
enforceable, subject to an implied-in-law condition that the enforce-
ment serve the best interests of the child.' 01 After rejecting the contrac-
tual basis of William Stern's claim, the supreme court treated the case
as a custody dispute between parents and compared the two genetic
parents without a preference for either. 02
323, 525 A.2d at 1132 (citing In re J.R. Guardianship, 174 N.J. Super. 211, 224, 416 A.2d 62,
68 (App. Div. 1980)). Such a conflict between the rights of the parent and the welfare of the child
typically occurs only when the parent is unfit, however; such a finding will remove parental status
for application of the best interests test. While some states have allowed a nonparent to retain
custody despite a cause of action filed by a fit parent to regain custody, this limited exception to
the preference for a fit parent applies only in cases where parents voluntarily and for a long time
surrender custody to the other party. In such cases, courts have compared the natural parent with
the party who has had extended custody without a preference for the parent. See, e.g., In re J.R.
Guardianship, 174 N.J. Super. at 223, 416 A.2d at 67. Such cases recognize parental status by
virtue of a relationship of responsibility and care for a child rather than by a genetic link with the
child. Courts deem these parents to be "psychological parents." See Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 n.52 (1977); Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi,
586 F.2d 625, 634 (6th Cir. 1978)(stressing that the important element the state court should
consider in determining custody is whether the children's American foster parents had become the
boys' psychological parents); M.H.B. v. H.T.B., 100 N.J. 567, 571-74, 498 A.2d 775, 777-78
(1985). See also, Johns v. Department of Justice, 653 F.2d 884, 886 (5th Cir. 1981); Drummond
v. Fulton City Dep't of Family, 563 F.2d 1200, 1206-07 (5th Cir. 1977). The psychological parent
is afforded parental status and compared with the genetic parent without a preference for either.
But no basis for such elevation of the commissioning party in surrogacy exists by the surrogacy
agreement alone. If the surrogate mother surrendered the child to the father and then after an
extended period sought to reclaim the child, the father who had achieved status of psychological
parent should be compared with the mother whether or not he or she is genetically related to the
child.
100 The trial court recognized William Stern as a parent based on the contract. See Baby M
1, 217 N.J. Super. at 390, 525 A.2d at 1166. The trial court relied on the genetic relationship of
William Stern to Melissa yet also noted that such a relationship is not necessary for surrogacy. Id.
at 333, 525 A.2d at 1137.
The supreme court accepted William Stern as a parent based on the Parentage Act of New
Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-39 (West 1988). See Baby M 1I, 109 N.J. at 453, 537 A.2d at
1256. The court did not determine whether the statute's term "natural parent" was intended to
include the genetic father who begets a child by means of a surrogacy agreement. The Parentage
Act displaces the common law which gave an illegitimate father no rights in his genetic children.
A statute in derogation of the common law should be narrowly construed to prevent unintended
changes in the common law. See Isbrandtsen Co. Inc. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952);
United States v. Tilleras, 709 F.2d 1088, 1092 (6th Cir. 1983); Devers v. City of Scranton, 308
Pa. 13, 17, 161 A. 540, 542 (1932). Principles of statutory construction suggest that the court
should not lightly assume that by adopting the Uniform Parentage Act, the legislature intended to
include in the undefined term "natural parent" the genetic father who acquired his genetic rela-
tionship with a child by a means the court found to be "illegal" and "perhaps criminal." The
determination of parental status based purely on a genetic relation will be explored further in Part
VI of this Article.
See Baby M 1, 217 N.J. Super. at 390, 525 A.2d at 1166.
101 See Baby M H, 109 N.J. at 453, 537 A.2d at 1256.
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The best interests of the child are the primary concern in custody
cases,L0 3 as well as in a variety of other cases where the interests of a
child are at stake.10 4 In custody disputes, courts do not determine the
child's best interests simply by comparing the litigants."0 5 Rather, a
1O Courts strive to protect and further the interests of the child who is the subject of a
custody dispute, relying on the parens patriae powers. See, e.g., Baby M 1, 217 N.J. Super. at
323, 525 A.2d at 1132-33; In re J.R. Guardianship, 174 N.J. Super. at 224, 416 A.2d at 68. See
also Wilson v. Mitchell, 48 Colo. 454, 465, 111 P. 21, 25 (1910); Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury,
2 P. Wins. 103, 118, 24 Eng. Rep. 659, 664 (Ch. 1722); Note, Alternatives to "Parental Right"
in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151 n.3 (1963) [hereinafter
Note, Alternatives]; Note, Parent and Child-Parent's Right to Custody as Against Third Par-
ties, 4 U. PITT. L. REV. 302 (1938); Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 UNIV. CHI. L. REV.
672, 686 (1942). Some jurisdictions approach the custody issue from the perspective of parental
rights. The ultimate aim of a custody determination is the same in all jurisdictions, however:
protection and enhancement of the interests of the child. Classification of the issue as one of
parental rights reflects a presumption that custody with a parent is in the child's best interests.
See H. CLARK, supra note 97, at 591 (footnotes omitted).
In adoption cases, the best interests test is applied only after parental rights have been
severed.
Where there is an objection by a natural parent to an adoption, and a finding that the
statutory prerequisite of forsaking of parental obligations has not been met, the rights
of the natural parent cannot be cut off, and the adoption must be denied. On such a
record, the court does not even reach the element of the best interests of the child, since
the termination of parental rights is a condition precedent which must be met before
final adoption.
In re Adoption of a Child, 164 N.J. Super. 476, 487, 397 A.2d 341, 346 (1978).
', Consideration of the best interests of children permeates all areas of the law affecting
children, their custody, adoption, and guardianship. See, e.g., UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURIS-
DICTION ACT § 1, 9 U.L.A. 123 (1987); UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT
9B U.L.A. 381 (1968); Government of Virgin Islands v. Lorillard, 242 F. Supp. 1021 (V.I.
1965)(purpose of act is to assist wives and children in gaining support from husbands who de-
serted family and were beyond reach of process); REVISED UNIFORM GIFTS TO MINORS ACT
U.L.A. 4 (b), (c)(1966); Indian Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 95-608, § 102(f), 92 Stat. 3072
(1983)(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f)(1982)). For discussions of the rights of chil-
dren generally, see Worsforld, A Philosophical Justification for Children's Rights, 44 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 142, 146-47 (1974).
'01 Without regard to the parental status of the litigants before the court, application of the
best interests test in custody disputes would create unprecedented power in courts to remove chil-
dren from their homes-whether or not they were born as a result of surrogacy-and to place
them in homes offering what a particular judge regards as beneficial. United States courts have
consistently refused to disregard the natural affection between parent and child in this way.
The starting point for this discussion is the obvious but often overlooked principle that
in the going family the parents are entitled to the custody of their children. Even if they
are not very skillful parents, the state does not interfere with their efforts unless the
child is so seriously in trouble as to be within the statutes defining neglected or delin-
quent children, and even then the parents may retain custody under some state supervi-
sion. One reason for this is the firmly held belief that with all their faults and mistakes
parents will generally be more successful in caring for their children than strangers or
agencies of the state. There is also the traditional conviction that the profound and
elemental emotional ties between parent and child should be respected by the state
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universal preference for custody in the parent of the child tempers the
best interests analysis. The parental preference has been described al-
ternatively as a doctrine protecting parental rights or as a doctrine fur-
thering the best interests of the child based on a generalized judgment
that custody with the parent is in the child's best interests."0 6
Of the three possible configurations of litigants in custody dis-
putes-(1) parent vs. parent, (2) nonparent vs. nonparent, and (3) par-
ent vs. nonparent, 10 7 the parental preference affects only the last config-
uration, when a parent and a nonparent compete for custody." 8 In
Baby M, both courts treated the dispute as falling within the first cate-
gory and raising the same issue as the traditional custody dispute be-
tween parents. This approach advances dramatically the case of the
commissioning party in a surrogacy agreement. The trial court in Baby
M held that Mary Beth Whitehead was a fit parent but that she would
not be the best parent for the child.""9
Because the New Jersey Supreme Court treated the case as a dis-
pute between parents, it did not address the issue of the strength of the
parental preference in the context of custody as opposed to a context
where parental rights are terminated. 1" 0 The effect of the holding is to
although the child might have greater material advantages and perhaps might receive
better care in the custody of someone else.
H. CLARK, supra note 97, at 591 (footnotes omitted).
Noting that courts rarely "appoint a nonparent guardian for a child over the objection of a
parent who then has custody," Robert H. Mnookin observes that in a custody dispute between a
parent and a nonparent who has custody and has assumed the role of parent, courts have relied on
the best interests test to effectuate the desire of the child to remain with the nonparent. Mnookin,
supra note 49, at 239-40.
' See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760-61 (1982). See also GOLDSTEIN. FREUD &
SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, (1979) ("So long as the child is part of a
viable family, his own interests are merged with those of the other members. Only after the family
fails in its function should the child's interests become a matter for state intrusion.").
107 The third category includes an action by the state to sever custody of a parent.
108 In the first instance both parties are of equal status and thus the preference applies to
each but works a preference for neither. See H. CLARK, supra note 97, at 581-90. In the second
category no parental preference operates because neither party to the dispute is a parent. Id. at
596-97. The third category is the sphere for application of the parental preference.
10 Baby M 1, 217 N.J. Super. at 397, 525 A.2d at 1170. Because the trial court in Baby M
based its decision on the contract, it apparently endorsed the recognition of parental status for
unrelated parties so long as the contract is not coercive or fraudulent. The trial court had no need
to address this question since William Stern is the genetic father of Melissa. The court imposed no
limit of genetic relationship on its contract holding, however. Id. at 333, 525 A.2d at 1137.
1' The New Jersey Supreme Court noted:
Although the best interests of the child is dispositive of the custody issue in a dispute
between natural parents, it does not govern the question of termination. It has long
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recognize parental status in the commissioning party-at least when
that party is genetically related to the child. No termination of the
parental rights of Mrs. Whitehead was necessary because William
Stern was deemed to be a parent of the child and, thus, a litigant who
could be compared with the child's mother without a preference for the
mother.'
A. Parental Preference
Because both New Jersey courts assumed that William Stern was
a parent for purposes of the custody dispute, neither court confronted
what is required to achieve parental status. Nevertheless, to enforce a
surrogacy contract or to decide a custody dispute arising from it, the
threshold question is whether the commissioning party (genetically re-
lated to the child or not) has parental status. If so, in a custody dispute,
the court can compare him and the natural mother without a prefer-
ence for either party." 2 If not, the court must place him in the position
been decided that the mere fact that a child would be better off with one set of parents
than with another is an insufficient basis for terminating the natural parent's rights.
Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 445, 537 A.2d at 1252. See, e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-302 8
U.L.A. 90 (1983)(pretermitted children); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § §§ 5-201 to 5-212, 8 U.L.A.
441 (1983)(guardians of minors).
Surely if William Stern were deemed to be a nonparent, the same policy against stripping a
parent of all rights would require a preference for Mrs. Whitehead (in the less than total destruc-
tion of parental rights effected by a grant of primary custody to the nonparent). The policy impli-
cations in the two situations are the same although the need for protection is more pronounced
when rights are terminated.
.. In the surrogacy context, the same burden of proving the surrogate mother unfit inheres if
the mother is recognized as a parent while the commissioning father (or party) is not accorded
parental status. If gender alone confers this beneficial status, the burden of showing her an unfit
parent would resurrect the tender years doctrine. See supra note 52. But if the burden is imposed
because the surrogate has a relationship with the child, no violation of the equal protection clause
is apparent.
In Baby M I, the supreme court noted that the equality required to protect mothers and
fathers disputing custody of a child does not require "that all of the considerations underlying the
'tender years doctrine' have been abolished." 109 N.J. at 453 n.17, 537 A.2d at 1256 n.17. Other
jurisdictions have continued to emphasize the factors given weight under the tender years doc-
trine. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101(d)(1987); Bah v. Bah, 668 S.W.2d 663 (Tenn. App.
1983)(holding that a child of 21h years would be placed in the custody of his father even though
the mother was not held unfit). "To the extent the 'tender years' doctrine has continued efficacy it
is simply one factor to be considered in determining custody, not an unyielding rule of law. The
only rigid principle is that the best interests of the child are paramount in any custody determina-
tion." Id. at 666. See also Note, Biological Father, supra note 34, at 92.
"' Some states also recognize a presumption for the parent in custody at the time the dispute
arises. See, e.g., Henrikson v. Gable, 162 Mich. App. 248, 412 N.W.2d 702 (1987). It could be
argued that the trial court applied a preference favoring the commissioning father. The court
emphasized Mrs. Whitehead's contract to relinquish the child, suggesting-although not expressly
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of a nonparent, sometimes termed a "stranger""' to the child, who
must show that the mother's parental rights should be terminated be-
cause she is unfit as a parent,"1 4 or otherwise overcome the preference
for custody in the parent.11 "
To resolve a custody dispute where only one of the litigants is a
legal parent, all jurisdictions give great weight to the parent's status.11
Two approaches effectuate the preference for the parent over the
nonparent: (1) "the best interests of the child" approach and (2) "the
parental rights" approach. In theory, the "parental rights" approach
inquires whether the parent has forfeited rights to the child either by
abandonment or failing to be a fit parent. The "best interests" ap-
proach, on the other hand, appears to consider only the child's interests
in placement that would provide the most benefit or least detriment to
the child.' Yet no jurisdiction appears to adopt either extreme. None
holding-that the fact of contracting was a strike against her under the best interests comparison.
See Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 452-53, 537 A.2d at 1256. Moreover, the trial court attached no
special significance to (or at any rate did not discuss) William Stern's participation in an illegal
contract in order to gain parental rights.
11 In this context "stranger" includes anyone other than a party classified as a legal parent.
See H. CLARK, supra note 97, at 591 n.l.
", See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Baby M I, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227.
This role is not typically undertaken by an unrelated party. Most determinations of unfitness are
made by the State Department of Human Services. After termination, adoption of the child could
be secured through administrative channels of the same agency. See H. CLARK, supra note 97, at
593 (suggesting that less weight be given a public or private agency than one who has cared for
the child).
"I The quantum of evidence necessary to overcome the parental preference varies among
jurisdictions. In New Jersey, the supreme court has required the "clear and convincing evidence"
standard mandated by Santosky for terminating parental rights. See E.E.B. v. D.A., 89 N.J. 595,
601, 446 A.2d 871, 874 (1982). But in Baby M II, the Supreme Court of New Jersey did not
address what standard must be met to overcome the parental preference when determining cus-
tody because it deemed both Mr. Stern and Mrs. Whitehead parents of the child.
l' See Note, Alternatives, supra note 103, at 153-55. The author of this Note argues that
the child's interests should be the test applied in third party disputes. Id. at 156. The Note focuses
on an action initiated by a biological parent to regain custody from a third party who has kept the
child for a significant period and has formed a parent-child relationship. Id., passim. The author
emphasizes the child's need for stability in early relationships and the danger to the future mental
health of the child if the affection relationship is terminated. Id. at 157-62. In this situation, the
psychological or emotional parent may be judged to have acquired a kind of equitable parent
status such that a direct comparison of the disputants is justified. The author maintains that the
"contending party with the highest emotional attachment to the child will also be protected in the
usual case." Id. at 156-57 n.28. See also H. CLARK, supra note 97, at 593.
117 Judicial application of the best interests test may be seen as a continuum from considera-
tion of the child's interests alone at one pole to consideration of the rights of the parent alone at
the other extreme. See Note, Alternatives, supra note 103, at 151, 154 (stating that courts have
"created a continuum from a neutral determination of the best interest of the child to a disguised
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applies a pure best interests test or a pure parental rights test. All con-
sider the interests of both the child and the natural parent. Invariably,
courts that apply the best interests test to compare a parent and a
nonparent do so in the context of a noncustodial parent seeking to
regain custody of a child.11 Moreover, all jurisdictions apply a pre-
sumption that the child's best interests lie in the custody of a natural
parent rather than a nonparent. 11"9 The strength of this preference var-
ies within and among jurisdictions.12 0 In The Law of Domestic Rela-
tions, Professor Clark describes the two approaches to custody as "a
difference in emphasis and in standards for tolerable parental perform-
ance rather than a clash of opposing rules of law.' 2' Clark suggests
application of the parental right doctrine").
The distinction between the versions of the test applied appears in resolution of the custody
dispute between Mary Beth Whitehead and Elizabeth Stern. The trial court did not find Mary
Beth Whitehead to be unfit. See Baby M I, 217 N.J. Super. at 397, 525 A.2d at 1170. Rather, it
found by clear and convincing evidence that Elizabeth Stern would be the better parent. Such a
rebuttal preference for the natural parent was described in 1963 as the majority approach to
custody disputes between a parent and a nonparent. See Note, Alternatives, supra note 103, at
152. By contrast, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that parental rights of Mary Beth White-
head could not be terminated absent a finding of unfitness. Baby M I, 109 N.J. at 426, 537 A.2d
at 1242. This test is mandated when the litigation would terminate parental rights. See Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 715, 768-69 (1982). To determine which parent should serve as primary
custodian, courts consider a wide variety of factors.
I" The Kansas Supreme Court laid the foundation for the view that the best interests of the
child should control a custody termination. In Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881), the Kansas
Supreme Court found that custody of a child is not a property right and, thus, cannot be decided
without regard to the holder's conduct or moral qualities. Chapsky involved a father's attempt to
regain custody of his daughter after she had been raised by a Mrs. Wood for 5 / years. The court
weighed wealth, social position, health, and education prospects, and resolved to leave the child
with Mrs. Wood. While the court recognized that a natural father had a primafacie entitlement
to custody corresponding to the common law duty of support, it noted that this "right" is not
absolute. When a nonparent fulfills the parental role "the ties of blood weaken and ties of com-
panionship strengthen." Id. at 653. The court focused on three factors: the right of the father
(natural parent), the right of the one who has filled the parental role, and, paramountly, the
welfare of the child. Id.
In Halstead v. Halstead, 259 Iowa 526, 144 N.W.2d 861 (1966), a teenage mother who had
been married and divorced several times, left her 12 year old son with paternal grandparents. The
court recognized the mother's right, but invoked the best interests analysis. Particularly persuasive
was the 12 year old's preference to remain with the grandparents. See also Grover v. Grover, 143
Me. 34, 54 A.2d 637 (1947); Wilkins v. Wilkins, 324 Mass. 261, 85 N.E.2d 768 (1949).
"' See Mnookin, supra note 49, at 239-40; H. CLARK, supra note 97, at 591-92.
a2o See Note, Alternatives, supra note 103, at 152-56; Mnookin, supra note 49, at 240 n.65.
Compare Wilson v. Mitchell, 48 Colo. 454, 111 P. 21 (1910)(fit, noncustodial natural parent
allowed to regain custody from third party psychological parents as Supreme Court of Colorado
stressed the parental rights of the natural parent) with Root v. Allen, 151 Colo. 311, 377 P.2d 117
(1962)(claim of fit noncustodial natural parent to regain custody from third party psychological
parent denied under application of best interest test).
' H. CLARK, supra note 97, at 592.
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that in applying the best interests test the court should "place the ad-
vantages of a parent's care high in the scale of factors conducive to the
child's welfare." '22 A nonparent may be awarded custody of a child
despite the parent's request for custody only if the evidence overcomes
the presumption that the child's best interests are served by giving cus-
tody to the natural parent.12-
Review of cases and scholarship on the application of the best in-
terests test in custody disputes reveals that the test has operated as a
straightforward comparison of two litigants only when they have equal
status, i.e., when: (1) both litigants are parents of the child con-
cerned,124 (2) one parent seeks to regain custody from a "psychological
122 Id.
In any controversy between a parent and a stranger the parent as such should have a
strong initial advantage, to be lost only where it is shown that the child's welfare plainly
requires custody to be placed in the stranger. The cases sometimes state this principle
in terms of a presumption that the child will fare best in the parent's custody. This is a
broader test than whether the parent is "fit" or "unfit" since it requires looking at the
whole situation rather than just at the parent's qualifications.
Id. See also Sayre, supra note 103, at 681-83.
2 The quantum of evidence necessary to overcome the parental presumption varies greatly
among jurisdictions. Some courts have described the burden of evidence as "clear and convinc-
ing," "clear," "plain and certain," "strong and satisfactory," "cogent and convincing," and "sub-
stantial," or merely a "preponderance of the evidence." See In re Perales, 52 Ohio St. 2d 89, 369
N.E.2d 1047 (1977). If the parental right to custody can be defeated by a showing of a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the parent is not fit, the distinction between termination of parental
rights and determination of custody is vastly different as a constitutional matter. Parental rights
can be terminated only if unfitness is shown by clear and convincing evidence. See Santosky, 455
U.S. 745, 768-69. Even in cases in which the lower standard of proof of a mere preponderance of
parental unfitness is sufficient, the result is not the equivalent of comparing the two parties seeking
custody to determine which is the better custodian. See Perales, 52 Ohio St. 2d at 98, 369 N.E.2d
at 1052.
124 The sole question in a custody dispute between parents is the best interests of the child
(see, e.g., Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 453, 537 A.2d at 1256) because the presumption favoring a
parent operates equally for each disputant, causing a preference for neither. The court applying
the test decides which of the parents will be the better custodial parent based on any of a wide
variety of factors and awards primary custody to that parent.
For a criticism of the best interests standard, see Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the
Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1987). Many commentators have noted problems
with the current mechanism for providing for the welfare of children of divorced couples, the
principal group of children for whom the best interest test is applied. See, e.g., Kubie, Provisions
for the Care of Children of Divorced Parents: A New Legal Instrument, 73 YALE L.J. 1197
(1964). In this article, Dr. Kubie suggests that upon divorce parents agree to joint custody and to
the formation of a committee to resolve any disputes that arise between the divorced parents
regarding the child's welfare. It is unlikely, however, that joint custody alone or with an arbitra-
tion committee would be a feasible solution to the custody dispute in surrogacy cases. The parties
to the surrogacy agreement typically do not know each other well, and, by the time of the custody
dispute, are antagonistic toward one another. See Baby M 1, 217 N.J. Super. at 357-59, 525 A.2d
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parent" who has raised the child for some time, 125 or (3) both litigants
are nonparents. The last two situations are unlikely to influence the
surrogacy context. The custody dispute is likely to arise before enough
time has elapsed to develop a relationship with a "psychological par-
ent,"12'  and the biological mother becomes a nonparent.
Without some deference to the parent, every family is at risk from
competition from a stranger who wants custody of a child and who can
give the child more benefits than the family can. 27 Courts check the
power of the state by putting a gloss on the best interests test: They
note that a child's being "better off" in a home other than that of the
natural parents is not a ground for adoption over the objections of a
parent.1 28 The New Jersey Supreme Court adverted to this point when
it reversed the trial court's termination of Mary Beth Whitehead's pa-
at 1149-50; Note, Alternatives. supra note 103, 151-52.
Some of the factors courts use to decide a child's best interests include the financial resources
of the parent, the temperament of the parent, the morals of the parties, religious and social views
of the parties, and the relative benefits or disadvantages to the child with each parent. See H.
CLARK, supra note 97, at 584-90. In Baby M, the trial court recited at length the opinions of the
experts in psychology who testified at the trial. Baby M 1, 217 N.J. Super at 355-69, 525 A.2d at
1148-56. While the supreme court affirmed the trial court's award of custody to Mr. Stern, it
simplified the approach to determining the child's best interests and expressly disapproved the
emphasis of the trial court's treatment of some factors. The supreme court noted that the stability
of the Whitehead home was doubtful at the time of trial. It also considered factors in the pre-
sent-including the "track record of sorts-during the one and a half years of custody" with the
Sterns. Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 452-63, 537 A.2d at 1255-61. In its response to the trial court's
reliance on the benefits of the educational opportunities available in the Stern household, the
supreme court summarized the factors it found significant in the best interest test:
[Ilt should not be overlooked that a best-interest test is designed to create not a new
member of the intelligentsia but rather a well-integrated person who might reasonably
be expected to be happy with life. "Best interests" does not contain within it any ideal-
ized lifestyle; the question boils down to a judgment, consisting of many factors, about
the likely future happiness of a human being. Stability, love, family happiness, toler-
ance, and, ultimately, support of independence-all rank much higher in predicting fu-
ture happiness than the likelihood of a college education.
Baby M I, 109 N.J. at 460, 537 A.2d at 1260 (citations omitted).
Mrs. Whitehead appeared to have proper respect for educational goals. The trial court noted
that the surrogate's fee was intended by Mrs. Whitehead to "assist her in providing for her chil-
dren's long range educational goals." Baby M 1, 217 N.J. Super. at 342-43, 525 A.2d at 1142.
'"' See Mnookin, supra note 49, at 282-83.
:Z6 See supra note 99.
17 See Mnookin, supra note 49, at 268.
"' See, e.g., Exparte Wolfenden, 48 Tenn. App. 433, 446, 348 S.W.2d 751, 757 (1961). See
also Mnookin, supra note 49, at 269-70 (suggesting that courts sometimes improperly remove
children from natural parents when the lifestyle of a parent conflicts with a judge's personal
values).
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rental rights.129 The New Jersey court compared Mrs. Whitehead and
Mr. Stern without any assessment of parental interest because it ac-
corded both disputants the status of parent.
In custody disputes between nonparents and parents, the best in-
terests test considers parental status. The commentators who contend
that the best interests test should replace the parental rights doctrine
make their case in the context of the child who has developed a rela-
tionship with the nonparent under acceptable circumstances.130 Profes-
sor Mnookin highlights the shared assumption that the function of the
best interests test is "to enforce minimum social standards" rather than
to "intervene coercively in an attempt to do what is best or least detri-
mental" 1831 for the child.
Suppose there are two couples, the Smiths and the Joneses. The Smiths
wish to adopt a child. The Joneses have a four-day-old baby daughter whom
they wish to keep....
Suppose both Smith parents were well educated, wealthy, and healthy;
loved children; and appeared to be highly successful parents with two older
129 Although the question of best interests of the child is dispositive of the custody issue
in a dispute between natural parents, it does not govern the question of termination. It
has long been decided that the mere fact that a child would be better off with one set of
parents than with another is an insufficient basis for terminating the natural parent's
rights.
Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 445, 537 A.2d at 1252.
1SO For example, McGough and Shindell, in Coming of Age: The Best Interests of the Child
Standard in Parent-Third Party Custody Disputes, 27 EMORY L.J. 209, 215-16 (1978), present
the case of Susan (an actual case studied by the Family Law Section of the American Bar Associ-
ation) in which a father sought to regain custody from maternal grandparents who had reared the
child for II years. The authors point out that under the parental rights doctrine, the father would
probably prevail, as long as he was not unfit and had not forfeited his right to custody. Under the
best interests of the child standard, the court could make a full inquiry into Susan's welfare and
consider the strong psychological parent relationship with the nonparents. Use of this standard
makes it much more likely that the nonparents would prevail and retain custody of Susan.
"' Mnookin, supra note 49, at 268. In this article, Professor Mnookin explored the current
law of child custody in the areas of divorce, guardianship, juvenile court, and child neglect law
and termination of parental rights. He criticizes the best interests standard as "indeterminate,"
that is the standard is not capable of effective implementation:
The indeterminacy flows from our inability to predict accurately human behavior and
from a lack of social consensus about the values that should inform the decision. ...
Our inadequate knowledge about human behavior and our inability to generalize confi-
dently about the relationship between past events or conduct and future behavior make
the formulation of rules especially problematic. Moreover, the very lack of consensus
about values that makes the best interests standard indeterminate may also make the
formulation of rules inappropriate: a legal rule must, after all, reflect some social value
or values.
Id. at 264.
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children. Suppose the Joneses were older; had no experience at child rearing;
had severe financial problems; and Mr. Jones was in bad health. There are
certainly plausible and perhaps even persuasive reasons to believe the child's
"life chances" would be greater if placed with the Smiths. And yet, a decision
to remove the daughter from the Joneses for placement with the Smiths
would be considered by most in our society to be monstrously unjust. On the
facts of the hypothetical, most judges and other state officials would no doubt
refuse to remove. But the legal standards themselves, by asking an indetermi-
nate and inappropriate question, invite an overly ambitious and inappropriate
response."' 2
Although the view that the interests of the natural parent and the
child coincide has been criticized, 3 ' it finds support in decisions of the
United States Supreme Court in the related area of termination of pa-
rental rights. For example, in Santosky v. Kramer,"" the Court over-
turned the termination of the natural parents' custody because the state
procedure bifurcated the interests of the parent and child without a
finding of parental unfitness.1 5
At the fact finding, the State cannot presume that a child and his parents are
adversaries. After the State has established parental unfitness at the initial
proceeding, the court may assume at the dispositional stage that the interests
of the child and the natural parents do diverge .... But, until the State proves
parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in prevent-
ing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.'
Additionally, in Santosky, the Supreme Court noted that protection of
the parent-child relationship is particularly desirable in proceedings
that "employ imprecise substantive standards that leave determinations
unusually open to the subjective values of the judge.' 37 Custody pro-
ceedings, like termination proceedings, are marked by the subjective
nature of the inquiry. 36 Although in Santosky the issue was the per-
"' Id. at 268-69.
"I See, e.g., Note, Alternatives, supra note 103, at 154.
84 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982)(quoting N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act 631).
"' The applicable state statute required that the judge make his order of parental unfitness
"solely on the basis of the best interests of the child," and without reference to the natural par-
ent's rights. Id.
136 Id. at 762.
137 Id.
'" Concerning the judge's discretion, Mnookin stated: "What is best for children is often
indeterminate; broad and discretionary standards for child-protection invite decisions based on the
values of the particular judges and state officials responsible for a particular case." Mnookin,
supra note 49, at 267. See also Note, Alternatives, supra note 103, at 153 ("courts which use the
more prevalent best interest test operate in a comparatively free-wheeling manner"). Indeed be-
cause of the unavoidably subjective nature of the best interests test, Mnookin urged rejection of
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manent termination of parental rights rather than custodial place-
ment,1 39 the concept of shared interest within the parent and child rela-
tionship applies to the custody proceeding as well.""0 Indeed, to the
extent that the custody decision limits visitation and rights to influence
decisions about the child's welfare, it may operate as a de facto termi-
nation of parental rights. The New Jersey Supreme Court noted this
fact: "It seems obvious to us that since custody and visitation encom-
pass practically all of what we call 'parental rights,' a total denial of
both would be the equivalent of termination of parental rights ...
That, however, as will be seen below has not occurred here."'' The
heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence may not apply to
a mere custody determination involving a parent and a nonparent. Rec-
ognition of the connected interests of parent and child argues for some
presumption-whether it is called "parental rights" or the "child's best
interests."
B. Parental Status in Surrogacy
The significance of the parental relationship to a disputed child
highlights the need to decide the question of parental status in the sur-
rogacy context. In its essential form, the question is simply whether a
contract can serve as a basis for parental rights. When a claim of pa-
the test because it is unworkable. He observed that a judge usually will not have enough informa-
tion to make the proper decision:
But even where a judge has substantial information about the child's past home life and
the present alternatives, present-day knowledge about human behavior provides no basis
for the kind of individualized predictions required by the best-interests standards. There
are numerous competing theories of human behavior, based on radically different con-
ceptions of the nature of man, and no consensus exists that any one is correct.
Mnookin, supra note 49, at 258.
189 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. In Baby M 1, the trial court based its termination of
Mary Beth Whitehead's parental rights on the contract rather than on a finding that she was an
unfit parent. Baby M 1, 217 N.J. Super. at 399, 525 A.2d at 1171. This holding apparently vio-
lated Santosky v. Kramer. But the New Jersey Supreme Court overruled the termination of pa-
rental rights on public policy grounds rather than on the constitutional violation. See Baby M 11,
109 N.J. at 450-51, 537 A.2d at 1255.
140 The relational aspect of determinations that involve the rights of both the parent and the
child has been noted in other areas as well. In Child, Parent, State, and the Due Process Clause:
An Essay on the Supreme Court's Recent Work, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 769 (1978), Professor John
Garvey suggests that the focus of questions of state control over juvenile behavior and custody
should be the protection of the family's autonomy. "[Tihe interest in familial privacy protected by
the due process clause is not strictly parental, but relational-a right held by parent and child
alike." Id. at 770.
141 Baby M 1I, 109 N.J. at 451, 537 A.2d at 1255 (citing Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d
582, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW
rental right is based on a surrogacy contract, no separation of the ques-
tion of contractual rights from the custody issue is possible. The paren-
tal rights of the contract parent are established by contract. Parental
status is not merely a matter of genetics.1"' For a father to establish
parental status such that a state must take cognizance of the father's
rights, some relationship--either between the father and the child's
mother 4 3 or between the father and child-is necessary. "4 A state
may recognize an individual as a father based on some indicia other
than his relationship with the child, but such indicia may not infringe
on the surrogate's constitutional right to parent. 45  For married per-
sons, the marriage establishes the father's parental status toward the
children of the marriage. Presumptions of legitimacy further the public
interest of promoting parental rights and responsibilities within mar-
riage. When parents are not married, the father's parental status exists
as a constitutional matter only when he has established a relationship
of responsibility for the child. 146
Recognition of the contract between William Stern and Mary
Beth Whitehead was essential to the award of custody to William
Stern because William Stern's claim to a parental right of custody
could not be based solely on his genetic link to the child. His agreement
with Mrs. Whitehead is the putative link of a relationship of responsi-
bility for the child. When the New Jersey courts gave William Stern
' See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983). See infra note 57 and accompanying
text.
143 Traditionally, parental rights are established by marriage. "[Tihe relation between a fa-
ther and his natural child may acquire constitutional protection if the father enters into a tradi-
tional marriage with the mother." Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260 n.16. Apparently, the marital relationship
is the only relationship between the parents that establishes the relationship with the child. In
Lehr, for example, the father had lived with the child's mother before the child (Jessica) was
born. They were not married, however. After Jessica was born, her mother prevented Lehr from
seeing his child. The relationship with Jessica's mother prior to her birth provided no basis for a
claim of parental rights or custody of Jessica. Id. at 251, 261.
... In establishing a link between father and child, absent marriage, both Lehr and Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), follow the principle that a mere biological connection with a
child is insufficient to create parental rights. "In those cases where the father never has come
forward to participate in the rearing of his child, nothing in the equal protection clause precludes
the State from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child." Caban,
441 U.S. at 392. In surrogacy, the commissioning father has "come forward" to participate in
rearing the child (to the exclusion of the surrogate in all probability). Whether this attempt is
sufficient to create rights in the commissioning party is unclear. In Lehr, the father made sincere
efforts to "come forward to participate in rearing his child." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
found that his attempts failed to establish parental rights.
145 See Santosky, 455 U.S. 745, 754.
""' See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261.
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parental status, they implicitly recognized the contractual creation of
parental rights.14
C. Focus: The Individual Child or Children in the Aggregate
In Baby M, both courts focused on the particular child before
them in the contract action by William Stern. The supreme court ex-
pressly rejected Mrs. Whitehead's contention that the need to deter
surrogacy should influence its decision.1"8 In a custody dispute, how-
ever, the child's interests are determined by applying a generalization
that a child's best interests lie in the custody of a parent. Thus, if Wil-
liam Stern had been deemed a nonparent, the court would have found
the child's interests better served by custody with the mother-absent
evidence overcoming the presumption. To find otherwise would increase
the power of government in an area of life traditionally left free from
government interference. 14 9
To support its point that the child's interests rather than deter-
rence must govern the inquiry, the New Jersey Supreme Court relied
on two cases involving payment in connection with adoption: "Use of
unapproved intermediaries and the payment of money in connection
with adoption is insufficient to establish that the would-be adoptive par-
ents are unfit or that the adoption would not be in the child's best inter-
est." 150 But these cases did not involve a contest between the adoptive
parents and the natural mother. Unless the mother is unfit or has relin-
17 Surely the court would have held differently if rape or fraud had been involved. See infra
note 57 and accompanying text. However, acceptance of a contract right to parenthood affects
application of the best interests test. If the right to parent is created by contract, should it not be
extinguished by contract? If a father's right to status as a parent (and thus application of the best
interests comparative test) can spring from contract, should not the contractual extinguishment of
Mary Beth Whitehead's rights also be given effect? By the same contractual vehicle, one party
has risen to the status of parent and another has relinquished that status, and thus, application of
the best interests test is inappropriate.
"' The Whiteheads claim that even if the child's best interests would be served by our
awarding custody to the Sterns, we should not do so, since that will encourage surro-
gacy contracts--contracts claimed by the Whiteheads, and we agree, to be violative of
important legislatively-stated public policies. Their position is that in order that surro-
gacy contracts be deterred, custody should remain in the surrogate mother unless she is
unfit, regardless of the best interest of the child. We disagree. Our declaration that this
surrogacy contract is unenforceable and illegal is sufficient to deter similar agreements.
We need not sacrifice the child's interests in order to make that point sharper.
Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 454-55, 537 A.2d at 1257.
149 See H. CLARK, supra note 97, at 592.
110 Baby M H, 109 N.J. at 455, 537 A.2d at 1257 (citing In re Adoption of a Child, 165 N.J.
Super. 591, 398 A.2d 937 (1979)).
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quished her child to another, the test in adoption disputes turns on the
fitness of the mother, not on the fitness of the parties seeking to adopt.
Despite the desire of both courts in Baby M to effectuate the best inter-
ests of the child, the established preference for a natural parent con-
trols the test.
When applying the best interests standard, courts universally pre-
fer custody with a parent--either the legal parent or the psychological
parent. In surrogacy, the concept of a psychological parent will not
come into play since the custody dispute-if one is to occur--comes
before the child has developed a relationship with the commissioning
party. Thus, to win a custody case, the commissioning party must gain
recognition as a legal parent entitled to parental status and direct com-
parison with the surrogate.
The concept of equal treatment of individuals similarly situated
argues against creation of a special rule that would single out children
of surrogacy. To apply a best interests standard in surrogacy without
the necessary presumption favoring parental custody puts these chil-
dren in a class different from others. The use of a special rule that
directly compares the commissioning party and the surrogate accepts
commodification of these children. The rule applied to the children of
surrogacy should be the same applied to all other children. A
nonparent should secure primary custody of a child born of surrogacy
only when such a nonparent would prevail in a contest for a child not
resulting from surrogacy, that is, when he is a psychological or equita-
ble parent. The best interests test should not be used to impose a differ-
ent standard that gives the nonparent an advantage in the surrogacy
context greater than a nonparent would have in other contexts.'51
The parental status of litigants in a custody dispute has a profound
influence on the application of the best interests test in custody deter-
minations. Concern for the best interests of the child does not justify
removal of a child from a fit parent absent unusual circumstances. All
jurisdictions consider the parental status of the disputants in deciding
which party will best serve the interests of the child. Three potential
bases for the commissioning parties' parental status are (1) the creation
of parental rights in the surrogacy contract, (2) the constitutional right
to procreate and parent, and (3) legislation recognizing such status in
the surrogate father. The following parts of this Article examine these
'"" See Mnookin, supra note 49, at 282.
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bases as well as the individual's and society's interest in parental status
in the surrogate father.
IV. THE CONTRACT
A. As Basis for Parental Status
A surrogacy contract serves the interests of two adults. The com-
missioning party seeks a child to fill a need. The surrogate wishes to
provide the child either as an act of altruism, or as a means of making
money (or perhaps both). Neither interest focuses on the needs of the
child, however.152 Resolution of contract issues necessarily focuses on
the interests of the parties to the contract: the fairness of their bargain
(is each protected from overreaching or fraud?), the presence or ab-
sence of misrepresentations, or other irregularities that might invalidate
the contract. These considerations are unrelated to the child's best in-
terests and should not be allowed to affect the custody determination.
In surrogacy the parties seek to accomplish by contract three
things crucial to custody and parental rights: (1) termination of the
surrogate's parental relationship to the child, 15 1 (2) the voluntary relin-
quishment of the surrogate's parental rights," 4 and (3) the commis-
sioning party's parental relationship to the child. The question is
whether parties can effectively establish these things by agreement. In
Baby M, the trial court accepted all three of the contract declarations
and enforced the contract. The court did, however, condition the rem-
edy of specific performance on its serving the best interests of the
child."' The New Jersey Supreme Court avowedly rejected all three
declarations and invalidated the surrogate parenting agreement in toto.
Nevertheless, it accepted William Stern as a natural parent based on
both genetics and the contract.156 Long-established public policy rejects
the right of a parent to sell his or her child.15 7 In commercial surro-
... See Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 413, 438, 537 A.2d at 1236, 1248.
1" This termination is assertedly accomplished at the time of the child's birth, but the surro-
gate mother commits irrevocably to the termination prior to conception.
1" The New Jersey Supreme Court held that since the decision to surrender the child is
made before the surrogate knows the strength of her bond with the child, her decision cannot be
totally voluntary. See Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 437, 537 A.2d at 1248. And, at any rate consent is
irrelevant since commercial surrogacy is either a sale of a child or a promise to relinquish parental
rights, and, thus, violates public policy. See id. at 437, 537 A.2d at 1249.
'5' See Baby M 1, 217 N.J. Super. at 390, 525 A.2d at 1166.
'" As to the supreme court's interpretation of the Uniform Parentage Act, see supra notes
53, 57, 100 and accompanying text.
... See Baby M 1I, 109 N.J. at 422, 437-38, 537 A.2d at 1240, 1248; Berg v. Catholic
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gacy, it is clear that something is sold. Consideration is exchanged for
something-either the child, the services of gestation, or relinquish-
ment of parental rights. The New Jersey Supreme Court deemed the
contract a sale either of the child or of parental rights.158 From the
perspective of public policy, the question is whether what is sold is
something that our society will recognize as marketable-either as a
commodity or a service.' 59 Although in Baby M, the supreme court re-
jected the sale of the child or of the parental rights, it implicitly ac-
cepted the creation of parental rights by contract.
B. Limitations on Power of Contract
Contract law is primarily an instrument of commercial transfer. It
is "concerned with the securing and protection of those economic inter-
ests that result from assurances."' 60 Contract law arises from promises.
By contract, parties transfer property rights and create obligations to
act or refrain from acting in prescribed ways.' Although the power to
contract in our society is far-reaching, it is not unfettered. Some con-
tracts have no effect because they are contrary to law or public
policy.' 2
Bureau, 167 Pa. Super. 514, 76 A.2d 427 (1950); Annotation, Validity of Agreement by Parent to
Surrender Custody of Child in Consideration of Promise to Leave Property to Child, 15 A.L.R.
223 (1921); Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. 122, 229 S.W. 1114 (1921).
18 Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 437-38, 537 A.2d at 1248. The closely related question whether
such a transaction violates child-selling laws is considered in Part VI of this Article in the context
of legislation to exempt surrogacy from this prohibition and declare surrogacy valid.
159 Radin, supra note 31, at 1850-51, 1926-31. Even assuming the contract to be for personal
services, the court could also have found the contract void as contrary to public policy.
160 MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 1 at 2 (2d rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter MURRAY]. See also P.S.
ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT (3d ed. 1981). Professor Karl Llewellyn
describes contract law as "the branch of law which plays primarily into what economists know as
the market, the balance wheel of a money economy, the social machine which makes possible our
regime of specialization." THE BRAMBLE BUSH ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 10 (1969).
:$I MURRAY, supra note 160, § 2 at 4.
162 The New Jersey Supreme Court found the surrogacy parenting agreement invalid on both
these bases. See Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 421-22, 537 A.2d at 1240. Section 178 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts (1981) provides in part: "A promise or other term of an agreement is
unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the
interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against
the enforcement of such terms." By this literal language, the illegality of a contract for the sale of
a baby (or a surrogacy contract held to be illegal) would not be the direct basis for refusing
enforcement of the contract unless the legislation expressly stated that such contracts are unen-
forceable, i.e., "legislation provides that it is unenforceable." Rather, a contract to commit an
illegal act would be unenforceable on the ground that public policy against enforcement outweighs
the interest in enforcement. Enactment of the prohibiting law is a legislative declaration that
public policy outweighs the contract interest. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
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With respect to the custody of children, for example, contracts are
unenforceable if not in the best interests of the child."' A contract that
constitutes the sale of a child is void as an illegal contract"'6 and as
contrary to public policy. 16 5 Parties cannot control facts or legal rela-
tionships by agreement. This is not an encroachment by the state on
the parties' freedom to contract.' 6 A court may always look behind the
contract to determine whether an agreement was induced by fraud6 7
or whether a party is exempt from the legal effect of fraud. 68 Simi-
larly, a state may limit the power of individuals to create legal relation-
ships by contract. Even though marriage is often spoken of as a con-
tractual relationship, " individuals can marry only by fulfilling
369 (1981); CALAMARI & PERILLO. THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 22-3 to 22-14 (2d ed. 1977);
MURRAY, supra note 160, § 344, at 729.
163 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 191 (1981); In re Custody of Neal, 260
Pa. Super. 151, 393 A.2d 1057 (1978).
'e' See, e.g., Enders v. Enders, 164 Pa. 266, 30 A. 129 (1894).
See Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 422, 434-38, 537 A.2d at 1240, 1246-48.
166 The Restatement of Contracts notes that "[tihe principle of freedom of contract is itself
rooted in the notion that it is in the public interest to recognize that individuals have broad powers
to order their own affairs by making legally enforceable promises." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS ch. 8 Introductory Note (1981). This conception of the power to contract as an indi-
vidual right secured for the protection of all individuals in the aggregate is consistent with the
traditional view of law as a social compact. See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN OR THE MATTER, FORM
AND POWER OF A COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL, ch. 15 (1651).
167 Section 214 of the Restatement of Contracts provides that the parol evidence rule is not a
bar to evidence of fraud. Thus, a declaration in the contract that the contract was not influenced
by fraud will not prevent a court from accepting evidence of fraudulent statements that induced a
party to enter the contract. The section states in pertinent part: "Agreements and negotiations
prior to or contemporaneous with the adoption of a writing are admissible in evidence to establish
... illegality, fraud, duress, mistake, lack of consideration, or other invalidating cause." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214 (1981). See also id. §§ 208 (unconscionable contract or
term), 218 (untrue recitals).
166 See id. § 196.
169 Various rights and responsibilities follow from the fact that a couple is married. Rights of
inheritance, communal ownership, status for tax purposes, eligibility for insurance benefits, and a
myriad of other legal determinations are dependent on a legally-recognized marriage.
Some commentators treat marriage essentially as a business relationship. See, e.g., R. POS-
NER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 130-37 (3d ed. 1986). Hegel rejected the concept of marriage
as a contract because of the overtones of property in such a concept.
The object about which a contract is made is a single external thing, since it is only
things of that kind which the parties' purely arbitrary will has it in its power to alien-
ate. To subsume marriage under the concept of contract is thus quite impossible; this
subsumption-though shameful is the only word for it-is propounded in Kant's Philoso-
phy of Law.
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 58 (1945). See also Bold v. Bold, 374 Pa. Super. 317, -, 542
A.2d 1374, 1379 (1988). ("Marriage is not a business enterprise [that] requires a strict economic
accounting for all financial aid rendered during its course.")
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requirements of society and the state.17 0 A declaration by the parties
that they are married is not sufficient.'17
The limited power of individuals to establish facts or legal rela-
tionships by agreement underlies judicial inquiry in virtually every
sphere of law. Even if parties can establish a relationship by their con-
duct, they are not necessarily able to establish the same relationship by
the force of words alone. For example, parties are free to declare that
they either are or are not principal and agent in business contracts,
such as dealership agreements or contracts of escrow, trust, bailment,
and the like. Such a declaration cannot effectively bind a court to ac-
cept the declared relationship as established, however. 171 "Mere words
will not blind us to realities.' 7  The question of agency is a factual
one, which the trier of fact must determine when necessary. 4
A striking example of a statement of facts contrary to a literal
declaration occurs in the area of surrogacy in the affidavit of noncon-
sent. In this affidavit, the surrogate's husband declares that he does not
consent to the artificial insemination of his wife. The purpose of the
affidavit is to preclude application of the statutory presumption of
1I For individuals to marry in Tennessee, for example, they must comply with incest restric-
tions, meet minimum age requirements, have dissolved all prior marriage contracts, and obtain a
valid marriage license. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-3-101 to 103 (1984 & Supp. 1988).
" Although common law marriage is recognized in several states, no state will recognize a
marriage if it falls within the jurisdiction's definition of incest. See, e.g., In re Estate of Stiles, 59
Ohio St. 2d 73, 391 N.E.2d 1026 (1979)(holding common law marriage of uncle and niece is
incestuous and void ab initio). See generally, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 207, 9A
U.L.A. 157 (1987).
"I In distinguishing between the agency-principal relationship and the sale relationship,
Mechem stated that "doubtful cases are to be determined, not by the name which the parties have
seen fit to apply to their contract but by its true nature and effect. The essence of sale is the
transfer of the title to the goods for a price paid or to be paid." I MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF AGENCY § 48 (2d ed. 1914). See also United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476
(1926); Stansifer v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 487 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1973). Similarly, the Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency states:
When it is doubtful whether a representative is the agent of one or the other of two
contracting parties, the function of the court is to ascertain the factual relation of the
parties to each other and in so doing can properly disregard a statement in the agree-
ment that the agent is to be the agent of one rather than of the other, or a statement by
the parties as to the legal relations which are thereby created.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § I comment b (1958).
'"" Martin v. Peyton, 246 N.Y. 213, 218, 158 N.E. 77, 78 (1927).
... Similarly, in contract formation the parties' terminology does not control the decision of
the court or jury concerning a fact. That parties refer to a communication as an offer will not
prevent a court from finding that it was in fact an invitation for offers or an acceptance. See, e.g.,
Moulton v. Kershaw, 59 Wis. 316, 18 N.W. 172 (1884).
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many states that a child conceived by a married woman through artifi-
cial insemination consented to by her husband is the issue of the mar-
riage.'75 The only purpose of the affidavit of nonconsent is to remove
the problem that the statute could pose for the commissioning party.
The court should regard the cooperation of the surrogate's husband as
clear evidence of his consent to the insemination. 176
Limitations on the contractual power of individuals may be viewed
either as the definite expression of a specific public policy of the rela-
tive value of the personal interests at stake or as the consequence of
public norms and values. 177 Such limits are vulnerable to the charge of
tyranny of the majority no more than other prohibitory or prescriptive
law. The requirement of factfinding outside of the powers of the parties
is essential to the existence of public norms whether they are expressed
as criminal prohibitions, legal relationships, or minimum fairness re-
quirements.'78 If parties could define their legal relationships or their
own inclusion or exclusion from particular categories, prohibitions re-
lating to the status of parties would be meaningless.
C. The Judicial Role
However a custody dispute arises (from surrogacy or from more
typical circumstances), the court is ultimately responsible for determin-
375 See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.111 (West 1980). See also Wadlington, supra
note 3, at 496 & n.115.
170 The affidavit of nonconsent is given to facilitate the surrogacy contract. The commission-
ing party requires the affidavit before entering the surrogacy arrangement. If the husband truly
refused to consent to the insemination, he would give his formal consent. Such a consent would
render any child presumably his offspring and would thus discourage any surrogacy contract. En-
tering an affidavit of nonconsent is clear evidence of the husband's consent to the procedure.
7 A long standing conceptual dichotomy of views exists in this regard. One view appears to
consider the law primarily as a medium of balancing private interests. Another model regards the
law as a means of protecting society as a whole or even of serving values of society as distinct
from strictly utilitarian interests. See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 537, 540-43 (1972).
'78 If parties were free to declare in a final and binding sense their legal relationships without
complying with exterior requirements, public norms would be without force. A manufacturer
could prevent a dealer who sells its products from binding it by any representations by including
in all purchase contracts a statement that the dealer is not an agent of the manufacturer. By
contract, parties could circumvent the requirement that performance is subject to the obligation of
good faith and fair dealing; they could either declare the norm inapplicable to their contract or
define their subsequent performance as satisfying the standard. By the same reasoning, parties
could avoid incest with adult children by a contractual declaration that the parent and child rela-
tionship had been terminated. The absurdity of these examples highlights the ultimate impossibil-
ity of dictating facts by contract.
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ing the appropriate custody of the child. In exercising its parens pa-
triae jurisdiction, the court's duty is to put the child's interests before
the competing interests of the contracting parents.17 9 Although courts
typically implement custody agreements between parents, 180 they are
not bound by them, regardless of the parental or marital status of par-
ties to an agreement.1 81 "Whatever the agreement of the parents, the
ultimate determination of custody lies with the court in the exercise of
its supervisory jurisdiction as parens patriae."'18 Neither the trial court
nor the New Jersey Supreme Court would have given effect to a con-
tractual declaration that the best interests of the baby would be served
by custody with the father. A court would insist on exercising its judg-
ment rather than merely enforcing the declaration of the parties. 8 For
the court to enforce the parties' contractual declaration of the child's
best interests without an independent inquiry and judgment would be
to abdicate judicial responsibility. 84
Recognition of parental status based on a contract is also an abdi-
cation of the court's responsibility. Judicial acceptance of the contrac-
tual declaration of parental status of parties to a custody dispute usurps
the court's role as surely as judicial acceptance of a contractual decla-
ration of the best interests of the child does. If courts were bound by
the contractual declarations regarding parental status, the power of the
court to determine the child's best interests would be significantly cur-
tailed. In a custody dispute, precedent constrains the court to prefer a
parent over a nonparent and, if two parents dispute custody, to prefer
neither but to compare them in order to determine the best interests of
the child.'85
' See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962). A fortiori, courts are not bound by
commercial agreements regarding the custody of children. "The custody and welfare of children
are not the subject of barter." Id. (quoting Buchanan v. Buchanan, 170 Va. 458, 477, 197 S.E.
426, 434 (1938)). See also Knight v. Deavers, 259 Ark. 45, 52, 531 S.W.2d 252, 256 (1976).
180 Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 434, 537 A.2d at 1243, 1246.
181 The rule that the court rather than the parties determines custody appears to cut against
the finding of the trial court in Baby M I that parties may terminate parental rights. The trial
court held that enforcement of the contract required termination of Mrs. Whitehead's parental
rights.
:82 See Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. at 399, 525 A.2d at 1171.
'83 That the court might reach the same conclusion as that stated by the parties would not
mean it had abdicated its role so long as the court exercised its own judgment of the child's best
interests.
I" The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that the fact that the trial court enforced the
contract subject to the best interests of the child could not save the contract from invalidity. Baby
M II, 109 N.J. at 435, 537 A.2d at 1246.
18' See Part III of this Article.
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If a court adopts the contractual declarations of parental sta-
tus-accepting the creation and extinguishment of parental status-the
parent created by the contract, the commissioning father, would be in
competition with a nonparent, the mother whose parental status was
extinguished by the same contract. Once these status changes are ac-
cepted, an award of custody to the commissioning party is almost cer-
tain unless the parental preference for him is overcome.1 86
The best interests of the child are hardly served by such analysis.
Closer scrutiny of the points that contracting parties attempt to estab-
lish in a surrogacy contract is important. 187
1. Termination of Parental Rights
The relationship of parent and child is a legal relationship. 188 In
Baby M, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that the legislature re-
tains the power to determine what constitutes a parent-child relation-
ship. 89 Hence, it is not necessarily subject to terms agreed upon by
parties to a contract. It also ruled that prebirth consent to adoption is
as ineffective for a child born of surrogacy as it is in other adoptions.19
2. Voluntariness of Termination
The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the power of contracting
parties to establish the voluntariness of parental termination.9 A dec-
laration of voluntariness would have essentially the same effect as a
declaration that no fraud occurred in inducing the contract. Unless the
court looks behind the declaration to make a factual determination, the
power of the court to enforce public norms is thwarted. Moreover, as
the supreme court noted, the consent of the mother, voluntary or not, is
irrelevant:
" The commissioning party could be female and genetically related to the child in the case
of in vitro fertilization and implantation in the surrogate. See supra notes 3 & 5.
187 Professor Wadlington suggests expansion of the role of contract law to allow private or-
dering of parent-child relationships. See Wadlington, supra note 3, at 507-11.
'" See J. CHERFAS & J. GRIBBIN, THE REDUNDANT MALE: IS SEX RELEVANT IN THE MOD-
ERN WORLD? 121-22 (1984). Cherfas and Gribbin rely on studies linking tribal inheritance pat-
terns with the level of promiscuity in a culture for support of their thesis that probable paternity
influences inheritance rules in a culture.
98 But the New Jersey Supreme Court did not decide this point. Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at
441-42 n.10, 537 A.2d at 1250 n.10.
'" Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 422, 537 A.2d at 1240.
Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 440-41, 537 A.2d at 1248-49.
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There are, in a civilized society, some things that money cannot buy. In
America, we decided long ago that merely because conduct purchased by
money was "voluntary" did not mean that it was good or beyond regulation
and prohibition .... There are, in short, values that society deems more im-
portant than granting to wealth whatever it can buy, be it labor, love, or
life. 92
3. Creation of Parental Status by Contract
Whether the parent-child relationship can be either created or ter-
minated by declaration depends on the rules of the society. It is clear,
for example, that parents cannot avoid parental responsibilities (e.g.,
for support) simply by declaring the relationship terminated.193 In some
circumstances state statutes create the legal relationship of parent and
child despite the absence of a genetic link. Statutes presume the pater-
nity of the husband of a child's mother. Such statutes apparently are
motivated by a desire to provide a father-and traditionally the pri-
mary support-for the child and to preserve the family. 94 Sometimes
courts separate parental rights and responsibilities to protect chil-
dren.195 When jurisdictions deem a custodian an "equitable parent"
192 Id. at 440, 537 A.2d at 1249.
19" Courts have ordered retroactive child support payments where parents have intentionally
attempted to avoid their support obligations. See, e.g., Gremillion v. Erenberg, 402 N.W.2d 410
(Iowa 1987); Nettles v. Beckley, 32 Wash. App. 606, 648 P.2d 508 (1982); Hobbs v. Christenson,
Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist., No. B021510, February 4, 1988, 14 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1196 (child
support payments awarded retroactively despite fact that child had reached majority by the time
of trial and no judicial determination of paternity had been made at the time the defendant se-
creted himself to avoid payment).
'" Some statutes conclusively presume the paternity of a husband in the children born to his
wife. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West 1966 & Supp. 1988)(issue of wife cohabiting with
husband who is not impotent is conclusively presumed). The United States Supreme Court has
noted probable jurisdiction of Michael H. v. Gerald D. a case arising under Cal. Evid. Code § 621
to decide whether the state's conclusive presumption of paternity based on the mother's marital
status at the time the child is born violates the equal protection clause. Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1987), prob. juris. noted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988).
Although the California code includes a provision for rebuttal of the presumption of paternity, the
provision cannot be invoked by the putative father alone. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West 1966 &
Supp. 1988). Such statutes apparently are motivated by a desire to provide a father-and tradi-
tionally the primary support-for the child and to preserve the integrity of the family. Such stat-
utes also provide children for husbands. In some jurisdictions, the statutory presumption of legiti-
macy can be disputed only by the parties to the marriage, and not by a male claiming to be the
father of the child. See Annotation, Who May Dispute Presumption of Legitimacy of Child Con-
ceived or Born During Wedlock, 90 A.L.R.3D 1032, 1039 n.43 (1979).
"I Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 427-28, 433-34, 537 A.2d at 1243, 1246. See also Barrett v.
Barrett, 44 Ariz. 509, 39 P.2d 621 (1934); Brown v. Brown, 132 Ga. 712, 64 S.E. 1092 (1909).
"[lit is the duty of the father to provide reasonably for the maintenance of his minor children, and
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and "psychological parent" (despite the lack of genetic relationship),
they accord the same status to both the biological and nonbiological
parents. The above examples suggest that the determination of parental
rights and status depends on a sometimes complex legal judgment of
the interests at stake rather than on the simple genetic or contractual
relationship.
D. Comparison of Parties
In a jurisdiction where surrogacy contracts are illegal, both par-
ties-the genetic mother and the genetic father-are arguably in pari
delicto, and the contract should not affect the outcome of a custody
dispute. This suggests the two should be compared without preference.
Although it has appeal, the argument fails to account for the different
treatment often accorded the mother and father of illegitimate
children.
In the case of a legitimate child, the status of both parents is es-
tablished at birth. In the case of illegitimate children, however, the law
differentiates between the unwed father1 9 and the unwed mother. The
unwed mother's status is established at birth if she does not abandon
the child, but the unwed father's status must be established by his as-
sumption of parental responsibility toward the child.
In at least three cases 197 the United States Supreme Court has
scrutinized this distinction and found that disparate treatment of bio-
logic fathers and mothers'" does not constitute invidious gender dis-
crimination when it is based on the parent's relationship with the child.
"[T]he existence or nonexistence of a substantial relationship between
that this liability is in no wise affected by the fact that the custody of said children may have been
taken away from him by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." Boggs v. Boggs, 138
Md. 422, ., 114 A. 474, 477 (1921)(quoting Alvey v. Hartwig, 106 Md. 254, -. , 67 A. 132,
135 (1907)).
' See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266-67 (1983); H. CLARK, supra note 97, at 595.
,t' See Lehr, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
198 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266-67. The Lehr court also stated:
If one parent has an established custodial relationship with the child and the other
parent has either abandoned or never established a relationship, the Equal Protection
Clause does not prevent a State from according the two parents different legal rights.
Id. at 267-68.
Recently the Arkansas Supreme Court held that even if the illegitimate father has never
received notice that he is the father of a child, an adoption could proceed without his consent. See
Adoption of S.J.B., 294 Ark. 598, 745 S.W.2d 606 (1988).
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parent and child is a relevant criterion in evaluating both the rights of
the parent and the best interests of the child." '99 In Quilloin v.
Walcott, the Supreme Court invalidated a Georgia statute that allowed
adoption of an illegitimate child only if the child's mother consented to
the adoption. The state required consent by the father only if he had
legitimated the child.2 00 In invalidating the statute as violative of the
equal protection clause, the Supreme Court noted that a statute that
dispensed with paternal consent when the father had formed no rela-
tionship with the child does not violate the fathers' constitutional
rights. In Lehr v. Robertson, the Court refused to accord parental
rights to the father of an illegitimate child despite his attempts to con-
tact the child, holding that in addition to a biological link, acceptance
of parental responsibility is required to establish parental rights.2 0' In
both Lehr and Quilloin, the Supreme Court held that a father who
lacks a relationship with his child is not deprived of due process by
denial of parental rights. 202
In a surrogacy dispute the father probably will not have had an
opportunity to form a relationship with the child. Typically, the dispute
will originate when the surrogate refuses to relinquish custody. The po-
sition of the commissioning party would thus have to be that the neces-
sary acknowledgement of responsibility is achieved by the surrogacy
agreement. Whether a contract that is "illegal, perhaps criminal, and
potentially degrading to women"2 0' 3 should be recognized as an assump-
tion of parental responsibility and therefore the crucial link to
parenthood depends on the rights of the individual as well as the laws
of society. If the constitutional right to beget arises without regard to
the legality of the means employed, then the father has a right to due
process before his right to parent a child born of surrogacy is termi-
nated. The illegality of the contract can be a factor only insofar as it
indicates the unfitness of a parent and thus the right of the state to
terminate parental rights. If the constitution does not protect the right
to beget through a surrogate, then a state need not recognize a parental
right in the genetic father of a child born of surrogacy. The commis-
sioning party who seeks custody would stand as a stranger to the child
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266-67.
Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256.
101 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266-68.
202 Id. at 267-68. See Part V of this Article for a discussion of the relevance of the Lehr case
to a claim of parental rights in the surrogacy context.
203 Baby M I, 109 N.J. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1234.
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unless he has been able to establish a parental relationship with the
child.
Traditionally, the law has accorded parental status to the mother
of an illegitimate at the child's birth.""4 If a state considers the mater-
nal relationship as developing during the period of gestation in which
the mother nurtured the developing child and refrained from terminat-
ing the pregnancy, it may determine that a parent-child relationship is
established at birth. In such a case, the illegal conduct appears relevant
only to the question of whether to terminate the parental rights of the
mother 0" or whether the evidence overcomes the presumption that cus-
tody with the mother protects the child's best interests. 06
Surrogacy may also require that courts determine the reasons for
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266.
205 To terminate parental rights, unfitness must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982). It is conceivable that the illegal contract to
relinquish the child could be convincing evidence of unfitness---especially if the woman has en-
tered into more than one such contract.
In the related area of black market sales and adoptions, New Jersey has held that unfitness is
not necessarily established by the purchase of a child, or by the fact that prohibited payments are
made in connection with the adoption of a child. See In re Adoption of a Child by I.T. and K.T.,
164 N.J. Super. 476, 397 A.2d 341 (1978); In re Adoption of a Child by N.P. and F.P., 165 N.J.
Super. 591, 398 A.2d 937 (1979). Such cases have not presented the issue whether the sale as
opposed to purchase of a child establishes unfitness. Nor have the cases involved a custody dispute
between the parent of the child and the adopting parent.
'2" When the presumption in favor of a parent is overcome, custody may be awarded to a
nonparent without termination of parental status. See Mnookin, supra note 49, at 239-40. The
constitutional safeguards that attach when a nonparent seeks custody despite a parent's desire for
custody are unclear. The United States Supreme Court has not explored what showing, if any,
could justify an award of custody to someone other than a parent when the decision does not
terminate the parent's rights. See Santosky, 455 U.S. 745. The New Jersey Supreme Court de-
clined to address two issues relevant here: (i) whether a decision giving custody to the Sterns and
no visitation rights to Mrs. Whitehead would amount to a termination of Mrs. Whitehead's paren-
tal rights (see Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 451, 537 A.2d at 1255); and (2) whether termination of
parental rights would be justified in the surrogacy setting (see id. at 452-53 n.16, 537 A.2d at
1255-56 n.16 ("We do not believe it would be wise for this Court to attempt to identify various
combinations of circumstances and interests, and attempt to indicate which combinations might
and which might not constitutionally permit termination of parental rights.")).
Although the quantum of evidence necessary to overcome the parental presumption varies
among jurisdictions, some jurisdictions require clear evidence. See, e.g., Newman v. Sample, 205
So. 2d 650 (Miss. 1968); In re Guardianship of Hight, 194 Okla. 214, 148 P.2d 475 (1944). Other
courts describe the standard of proof as clear and conclusive, see In re Sweet, 317 P.2d 231 (Okla.
1957), or plain and certain, see, e.g., Pierce v. Jeffries, 103 W. Va. 410, 137 S.E. 651 (1927);
Annotation, Right of Mother to Custody of Illegitimate Child, 51 A.L.R. 1507 (1907). Finally,
some courts have held that a preponderance of the evidence overcomes the presumption that
child's best interest mandate parental custody of a parent. See In re Perales, 52 Ohio St. 2d 89,
369 N.E.2d 1047 (1977). Even in such a case, the presumption is something more than a compari-
son of the parent and the nonparent.
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the difference in treatment of parental rights in illegitimate children. If
the mother's genetic link to the child is the basis for according her
parental status, there appears to be no basis for preferring her over the
genetic father. If, on the other hand, the special status of the mother is
granted in recognition of her biological relationship-of nurturing the
child during gestation and laboring for its birth, then a basis for prefer-
ring the mother exists. The reason for such recognition is even more
important in cases where the surrogate is not the genetic mother of the
child.
The New Jersey Supreme Court assumed that William Stern was
entitled to parental status for the determination of custody of his ge-
netic child. This status, however, need not be recognized any more than
contractual relinquishment of parental rights. A state may refuse to
recognize parental status despite the genetic link. The traditional
means of achieving parental status are marriage, adoption, or paternity
action. The dangers of contractual creation of parental rights are not as
obvious as those attending the relinquishment of rights prior to birth.
Effectuating such a contract may commodify human relations signifi-
cantly. It allows a prebirth compromise of the mother's rights in her
child for pay. Although the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to ac-
cept a prebirth relinquishment--especially one for payment-it as-
sumed that creation of a parental right in this manner is unavoidable.
The court should have addressed directly whether creation of parental
rights by contract poses the same dangers of commodification as does
the contractual extinguishment of rights.
E. The Contract as a Basis for Specific Performance
Even if a jurisdiction deems the surrogacy contract to establish the
parental status of the commissioning party, the court must decide
whether specific performance should be available to enforce the surro-
gate's promise to relinquish the child207 or other promises. 20 1 In the
"07 See Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 450, 537 A.2d at 1254-55. In Baby M I, the trial court
followed this analysis, holding that the contract was valid and then considering whether the rem-
edy of specific performance was appropriate. Then in this context the trial court conditioned the
enforcement of the contract on serving the best interest of the child. See Baby M 1, 217 N.J.
Super. at 390, 525 A.2d at 1166.
20 The surrogate contract typically includes at least four promises by the surrogate: (1) to
consent to be artificially inseminated with the semen of the contracting father; (2) to carry any
resulting fetus until delivery; (3) to refrain from aborting the fetus; and (4) to relinquish custody
and all parental rights to the child. Additionally, the surrogate often promises to submit to an
abortion when so required by the contracting father (generally as a result of a medical determina-
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ordinary noncommercial setting, such as a custody dispute, courts do
not enforce contracts that do not serve the child's interests.2 9 To grant
specific performance of a commercial surrogacy contract is to grant a
commercial remedy in a noncommercial setting-at best an inconsis-
tent position. Thus, courts should not enforce by specific performance
promises made in the surrogacy agreement. 10
V. THE CONSTITUTION
In Baby M, the trial court based its decision terminating all paren-
tal rights of Mrs. Whitehead on the contract itself, on a finding that
termination was in the best interests of the child,21 and on a conclusion
that the constitution protects the right to procreate through a surro-
gate. 12 Although the New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged the
existence of a fundamental right to the companionship of one's child, 213
it did not rely on state or federal constitutional standards to invalidate
the termination of Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights. Rather, it used
statutory law and public policy to reverse the termination and thus held
her constitutional claim moot. " '
A thorough assessment of the constitutional implications of surro-
gacy is not possible here, but a brief discussion of the various constitu-
tional arguments is necessary to determine whether parental status is
properly viewed as an issue of public policy. If surrogacy is a constitu-
tional right public policy and contract law arguments become mere ac-
ademic inquiries.21 ' Surrogacy presents two separate constitutional is-
tion that the child will be born with a defect) and to refrain from forming any emotional bond
with the child. The Stern-Whitehead contract contained both of these additional promises by Mrs.
Whitehead. See Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 470-73, 537 A.2d at 1265-68.
100 See H. CLARK supra note 97, at 590.
110 For examples of these promises, see Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 470-73, 537 A.2d at 1265-68
(Appendix A, Surrogate Parenting Agreement); Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a
Child, 20 J. FAM. L. 263, 271-72 (1981-82); N. KEENE & D. BREO, supra note 29, 275-306.
.. Baby M I, 217 N.J. Super. at 389-90, 525 A.2d at 1166.
211 The trial court held that invalidation of surrogacy arguably was justifiable only when the
state interest in invalidation was compelling. See Baby M 1, 217 N.J. Super. at 386, 525 A.2d at
1161.
213 109 N.J. at 451, 537 A.2d at 1255 n.14 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982)).
214 Baby M I1, 109 N.J. at 450, 537 A.2d at 1255.
11' The constitution protects the right to contract from state action that would deny this right
without due process. See generally Flagg Bros., Inc., v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 22 (1948). See also
Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 451 n.15, 537 A.2d at 1255 n.15. Whether refusal to enforce a contract
constitutes state action is questionable. In Flagg Bros., the Supreme Court rejected the argument
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sues: (1) whether the constitutional right to procreate extends to the
use of the body of another (the surrogate) and (2) whether the genetic
parent of a child has a constitutional right to be treated as a parent for
purposes of a custody dispute. The first issue is complicated by the
question whether these rights, if cognizable, inhere regardless of or only
because of a genetic relationship with the child.
An affirmative decision on the first question seems to require an
affirmative answer on the second. If a person has the right to use a
surrogate, a court in a custody dispute between the surrogate and the
commissioning party would have to compare the surrogate and the
commissioning party both as parents. A negative decision on the first
question does not require a negative on the second, however. Even if no
constitutional right to use a surrogate exists, the constitutional right to
parent one's existing offspring is an entirely separate question. A court
could reject a constitutional right to use a surrogate and yet recognize
a constitutional interest in being treated as a parent for custody pur-
poses. Indeed, in Baby M, the New Jersey Supreme Court made this
distinction in rights, although not on a constitutional basis.2 16
Both proponents and opponents of surrogacy rely on the federal
constitution for their argument.117 Opponents argue that the surrogate
has a constitutional right to the companionship of the child she has
borne. Proponents argue that the constitution requires courts to enforce
surrogacy contracts as an incident of the commissioning party's right to
procreate or to justify a refusal to enforce such right by a compelling
state interest.218 The constitution does not support, however, the eleva-
that a warehouse's sale of bailed goods to satisfy a lien authorized by the Uniform Commercial
Code constituted state action: this "Court has never held ... that a State's mere acquiescence in a
private action converts that action into that of the State." 436 U.S. at 164. The Court noted that
the interpretation of state action required to find such action in a legislation would also require a
finding of state action in "the mere denial of judicial relief." Id. at 165. Even if state action were
found in the refusal to enforce, the surrogate's liberty interest must be weighed against the com-
missioning party's property interest. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 22 (1948).
218 The state supreme court denied any right to enforce a commercial contract to obtain
children. Baby M IH, 109 N.J. at 448-49, 537 A.2d at 1254-55. Yet it held that the statutory
custody provision required comparison of Mr. Stern and Mrs. Whitehead as natural parents. Id. at
452-54, 537 A.2d at 1254-56.
217 Id. at 447, 537 A.2d at 1253.
218 "While a state could regulate ... it could not ban or refuse to enforce such transactions
altogether without compelling reasons." Baby M 1, 217 N.J. Super. at 386, 525 A.2d at 1164
(citing Robertson, Embryos, supra note 65, at 961). See also Stumpf, Redefining Mother: A
Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies. 96 YALE L.J. 187, 198-201 (1986)(arguing
that greater protection is due the commissioning party). "Conscious and intentional exertion of the
right to procreate should be accorded more protection than an accidental and unintended action of
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tion of one individual's rights over those of another.
A. Basis for Contract Enforcement
If the right to procreate includes a right to use the body of another
who consents to that use, then the constitution would require enforce-
ment of the agreement through which this constitutional right is exer-
cised, absent a compelling state interest against enforcement. 21 '9 This
was one basis for the trial court decision in Baby M.2 0
For several decades, United States Supreme Court decisions have
extended special protection to rights involving procreation and the fam-
ily unit. In Santosky v. Kramer,2 1 the Supreme Court noted its "his-
torical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family
life is a fundamental liberty interest. ' 22 The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized fundamental privacy rights in family and sexual matters in
several contexts: the right to marry;223 the right to bear and beget chil-
dren;224 the right to decide whether to bear a child;225 and the right to
procreate.226 But for several reasons, such protection does not properly
extend to the use of governmental power to enforce surrogacy
contracts.
Fundamental rights are not absolute, nor do they exist in a vac-
uum.227 They are limited by considerations of the constitutional rights
of others.2 In the context of surrogacy, the conflicting rights of both
procreation." Id. at 201.
See Robertson, Embryos, supra note 65, at 961-62.
22 See Baby M , 217 N.J. Super. at 386, 525 A.2d at 1153.
... 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
222 Id. at 753.
223 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
224. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965).
"l Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
220 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
227 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1305 (2d ed. 1988). Traditionally the
United States Supreme Court has endorsed fundamental values of our society and refused to find
fundamental rights in conduct that offends the Court's view of basic liberties, see Meachum v.
Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976)(Stevens, J., dissenting), and in some cases, the Court's view of
conventional morality, see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983)("State laws almost uni-
versally express an appropriate preference for the formal family."). See also Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)(federal Constitution does not confer upon homosexuals a fundamental
right to engage in sodomy); Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, sub nom.,
Lovisi v. Zahradnick, 429 U.S. 977 (1976)(Federal protection of privacy dissolves when a married
couple admits a third person into the marital bedroom as an onlooker.).
22' See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944)(Jackson, J., concurring)(limits on
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the surrogate and the commissioning party are implicated. These in-
clude the surrogate's right to procreate and parent,12 9 the right to
choose to terminate a pregnancy, 30 and the right to be free from intru-
sions on other liberty interests such as freedom from forced insemina-
tion.231 Surrogacy proponents maintain that by agreeing to relinquish
these rights the surrogate has waived or sold her constitutional right to
parent the child. 2  But the universal refusal to enforce prebirth con-
sent to adoptions as a matter of public policy is recognition of a surro-
gate's inability to waive parental rights prior to the birth of a child. 33
constitutional freedom operate when actions collide with liberties of others).
As a general rule, a person should be accorded the right to make decisions affecting his
or her own body, health, and life, unless that choice adversely affects others. In the
present case, the parties' right to procreate by methods of their own choosing cannot be
enforced without consideration of the state's interest in protecting the resulting child,
just as the right to the companionship of one's child cannot be enforced without consid-
eration of that crucial state interest.
Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 449 n.13, 537 A.2d at 1254 n.13. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 227, at
1329-37.
12' See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. The trial court tried to meet the Santosky standard by
finding that the various factors relating to the best interests of the child were established by clear
and convincing evidence. See Baby M 1, 217 N.J. Super. at 396, 525 A.2d at 1169-70. The court
found "by clear and convincing proofs that Mrs. Whitehead is unreliable insofar as her promise is
concerned," id. at 396, 525 A.2d at 1169, and was "satisfied by clear and convincing proof that
Mr. and Mrs. Stern wanted and planned for this child," id. at 397, 525 A.2d at 1170. The court
concluded: "we find by clear and convincing evidence, indeed by a measure of evidence reaching
beyond reasonable doubt, that Melissa's best interests will be served by being placed in her fa-
ther's sole custody." Id. at 398, 525 A.2d at 1170 (emphasis added).
None of these findings, however, meet the constitutional requirement that parental rights be
terminated only on a finding of unfitness based on clear and convincing evidence. See Baby M II,
109 N.J. at 451 n.14, 537 A.2d at 1255 n.14 (citing Santosky, 455 U.S. 745). The supreme court
found no evidence to justify termination under the statutory standard because "obviously there
was no 'intentional abandonment or... neglect of parental duties.'" Id. at 445, 537 A.2d at 1252
(citations omitted). It noted that "the trial court never found Mrs. Whitehead an unfit mother and
indeed affirmatively stated that Mary Beth Whitehead had been a good mother to her other chil-
dren." Id.
:30 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"8' See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
'2 Neither court addressed the question whether retention of minimal rights in a parent
allows a court to grant custody to a nonparent without affording any sort of preference to the
parent in a dispute. The implication of Santosky, 455 U.S. 745, is that a parent is entitled to
protection against any arbitrary termination of the right to parent, rather than only against com-
plete termination of all parental rights.
233 See Stark, Constitutional Analysis of Baby M Decision, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 38
(1988)(surrogate cannot irrevocably waive decisional rights). In Law and Morals, Lee Simon sug-
gests that government may properly restrict an individual's choice when the restriction will en-
hance his or her autonomy in the long run.
If we regard freedom or liberty or autonomy as something existing over time, and if
Mill's aim is to increase our autonomy overall, it might well be the case that a short-
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Further, the constitutional protections that comprise the right of pri-
vacy are rooted in personal rather than economic freedom. The funda-
mentally personal nature of the right to privacy and the rejection of
any economic facets to the right was present in the genesis of this right.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court pro-
tected the right to privacy in marital decisions to use contraceptives,
stating that marriage "promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; and a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects."'' The Court has recognized a corresponding right to
privacy for unmarried individuals engaged in interpersonal as opposed
to economic relationships.23 5 Nothing supports the exercise of procrea-
tive rights in a commercial enterprise as a protected activity, however.
Roe v. Wade established the right of a woman to secure an abortion
during the first trimester of pregnancy, but in Roe the Supreme Court
expressly refused to endorse the concept that "one has an unlimited
right to do with one's body as one pleases." 36 Nothing in the expres-
sion of one's right of privacy suggests that the right extends to abortion
as part of a commercial enterprise. Fetal tissue is now used for treat-
ment of Parkinson's and other diseases, 37 but this does not mean that a
woman exercises her right of privacy when she becomes pregnant in
order to harvest and sell her aborted fetus for medical research or
treatment. The right of privacy does not protect the use of personal
rights for commercial purposes.
The dichotomy of economic and personal rights governs the most
basic classifications of rights. Commercial surrogacy falls in the eco-
term restriction of liberty enlarges or preserves our long-term freedom. If we stop even
the adult from taking heroin once, we have infringed his autonomy. Nevertheless, we
have stopped him from taking the first step to drug addiction which would end up with
his inability to make any autonomous decision. In that context the law's paternalism in
prohibiting the sale or use of heroin can be seen as liberty-enhancing in the long run at
the same time as being liberty-restricting in the short term.
L. SIMON, LAW AND MORALS 24-25 (1986). See also Note, Rumpelstiltskin Revisited: The Ina-
lienable Rights of Surrogate Mothers, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1936, 1946-49 (1986)(suggesting that
the judgment of whether to allow alienation of the right to abort a fetus or to rear a child be made
based on the centrality of the decision to a woman's personhood). See also Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948)(stepping aside to allow police officers to enter defendant's apartment
held not a knowing and intelligent waiver of fourth amendment right of freedom from unreasona-
ble searches).
'" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)(emphasis added).
... See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
's Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
a See Lewin, Use of Fetal Tissue Deepens Abortion Controversy, Memphis Commercial
Appeal, Aug. 16, 1987, at B7.
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nomic rights category" 8 rather than the personal rights category. The
right of privacy includes consensual sexual relations between marriage
partners. One can not make a serious argument that the right to pri-
vacy protecting sexual relations from government interference extends
to intercourse with a prostitute. Even if the act is the same as that
between married persons, the commercial nature of the intercourse
brings it within the state power to regulate or prohibit without objec-
tion that the constitutional rights of either the prostitute or the client
are violated. " ' This analysis suggests that a state may constitutionally
prohibit surrogacy. It also suggests that a state could choose to deter
surrogacy by refusing to grant "natural parent" standing to the com-
missioning party despite a biological link.
Some scholars maintain that because the constitution protects re-
productive choices such as contraception, abortion, and childbearing, it
also secures the ability to exercise a protected option. 40 Thus, they ar-
gue that infertile couples have the right "to avail themselves of a will-
ing surrogate to provide the missing uterine function." 24 But the con-
cept of equal protection does not extend so far. Although government
may not interfere with the exercise of constitutional rights, government
refusal to enable an individual to exercise those rights does not violate
the Constitution. 2
B. Basis for Parental Status
Even if no constitutional right to use a surrogate exists, a commis-
sioning party who is genetically related to the child might have a con-
stitutional right to parental status in a custody dispute.24 In Lehr v.
Robertson," the United States Supreme Court explored the question
3a See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
's' Some recognition of right of privacy has been accorded sexual and family interests in
relationships outside marriage. Extension of such rights to the commercial sphere would involve a
dramatic change in the analysis of rights since it would merge the area of personal rights tradi-
tionally afforded special protection with commercial rights, an area historically regarded as within
the state's police power.
340 Robertson, Surrogate Contracts, supra note 29, at 332.
241 Id.
,4, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980).
141 This was the situation in Baby M. It is the strongest case for recognition of a parental
right in surrogacy: a parent who is genetically related to the child. But a limitation on surrogacy
that would allow a parental right only for the genetic parent may violate the equal protection
clause. See supra note 68 and accompanying text; see generally Part II A of this Article.
463 U.S. 248 (1983).
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of what recognition the state is required to afford a genetic parent. The
issue in Lehr was whether New York sufficiently protected an unmar-
ried father's right to a parental relationship with his offspring. 4 '
Jonathan Lehr challenged the constitutionality of a New York statute
under which a New York court entered an adoption order for Lehr's
illegitimate daughter, Jessica, without affording him notice or an op-
portunity to be heard. Before Jessica was born, appellant Lehr and the
child's mother both acknowledged that Lehr was her father. 46 Lehr
visited the mother and daughter in the hospital after the child's
birth.24 According to Lehr, the child's mother frustrated his attempts
to form a relationship with the child. 4" Lehr filed a petition in family
court seeking a declaration that he was the child's father.2 49 Despite his
paternity petition, the New York Court gave Lehr no notice of an
adoption proceeding filed by the man Jessica's mother had married.
The statute controlling adoption required notification of a putative fa-
ther only when he fell into one of seven classifications of putative fa-
thers who had somehow declared or assumed responsibility for the
child.2 0 The Supreme Court held that the Constitution did not require
the state to give Lehr notice or an opportunity to be heard in the adop-
tion proceeding. It reasoned that a genetic link with a child is not in
itself sufficient to establish parental status. "Parental rights do not
spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and
245 Id. at 249-50.
246 Id. at 269 (White, J., dissenting).
247 Id. at 252.
246 According to Lehr, from the time Lorraine was discharged from the hospital until August
1978, she concealed her whereabouts from him. During this time Lehr never ceased his efforts to
locate Lorraine and Jessica and achieved sporadic success until August 1977, after which time he
was unable to locate them at all. On those occasions that he did find Lorraine, he visited with her
and her children to the extent she would permit it. When Lehr, with the aid of a detective agency
located Lorraine and Jessica in August 1978, Lorraine was already married to Mr. Robertson.
Lehr asserts that at this time he offered to provide financial assistance and to set up a trust fund
for Jessica, but that Lorraine refused. Lorraine threatened Lehr with arrest unless he stayed
away, and she refused to let him see Jessica. Id. at 269 (White, J., dissenting).
249 Id. at 252.
120 Id. at 263. At the time of Jessica's adoption, the classifications provided for by New York
law included any person who has been: (1) adjudicated to be the child's father by a New York
court; (2) has been declared the father by a court of another state when a certified copy of the
order is filed with the putative father registry; (3) has filed a notice of intent to claim paternity of
the child; (4) is recorded on the child's birth certificate; (5) is openly living with the child's
mother and holding himself out as father at the time of the proceedings;(6) has been identified by
the child's mother as the father in a written, sworn statement; or (7) has married the child's
mother within six months after the child's birth. Id. at 251-52 n.5 (quoting N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW
§§ 1ll-a (2) & lll-a (3)(McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1982-83).
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child. They require relationships more enduring,"2 51 namely that the
father shouldered some of the burdens of parenthood. "When an unwed
father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood by com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his
child, .... his interest in personal contact with his child acquires sub-
stantial protection under the Due Process Clause. 252 The Court made
a relational or familial link rather than a genetic link the significant
factor deserving protection. The "mere existence of a biological link
does not merit equivalent constitutional protection."2 53
Traditionally, the primary way of demonstrating parental commit-
ment has been to show a familial relationship created by marriage.
Like the issue of parental rights in illegitimate children, the question of
parental rights in surrogacy arises by definition only when the parents
are not married to each other. The Court stated that in illegitimacy,
the "absence of a legal tie with the mother may appropriately place a
limit on whatever substantive constitutional claims might otherwise ex-
ist by virtue of the father's actual relationship with the children. 254 In
a surrogacy arrangement the commissioning party has attempted to es-
tablish a relationship of responsibility toward the child by entering a
contract. 55 Thus, whether parental rights are created in the commis-
sioning party depends on whether such rights can arise from a commer-
cial agreement.2 56 This question necessarily includes consideration of
the contract through which parental status is sought.
Not every act undertaken as an attempt to accept and demonstrate
a commitment of responsibility is sufficient to meet the Lehr standard.
251 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397. (1979)).
Id. at 261 (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 392).
153 Id.
" Caban, 441 U.S. at 392.
255 The contract establishes the responsibility of support for the child in Mr. Stern. In some
cases, the additional factor of a genetic link is present. But it is doubtful that this relationship can
be required consistent with equal protection requirements. See Part II of this Article.
"" If they (Mr. Stern and Mrs. Whitehead) had had a conventional relationship before
the child's birth, then Mr. Stern would have had some claim to custody of the child
without relying on any formal contractual document that they had signed. Even if Mr.
Stern and Mrs. Whitehead had never been married, Mr. Stern could seek custody of
the child, or at least visitation rights, by demonstrating in court that the child's "best
interests" would thereby be served.... [H]owever, the court must take account of the
highly unusual character of the relationship that Mr. Stern and Mrs. Whitehead en-
tered that produced this child.




If, for example, the contract entered into by the genetic parents grew
out of rape, fraud, or coercion, the constitution would not require that
protected parental status be accorded the father even if he sought to
establish a parental relationship with the child. Additionally, apart
from such unconscionable acts, the commercial nature of the contract
raises the question of whether the commitment merits constitutional
protection. Lehr does not stand for the proposition that a man's genetic
parentage plus sincere attempts to establish a parental relationship
with one's offspring creates constitutionally protected parental status.
Indeed, as the dissent in Lehr pointed out, Lehr had done everything he
thought he could to locate the child and establish a relationship. 5 ,
In surrogacy, the commissioning party has "sought to establish a
relationship with the child" by means of an agreement with the mother,
even though he may have had no contact with the child. 58 The
purchasing father may argue that constitutional protection of his right
to parent requires that he be given the opportunity to form such a rela-
tionship. But the majority opinion in Lehr required, in addition to the
biological link, some conduct indicating parental responsibility. The
dissent faulted the Lehr majority for requiring more than a biological
connection to attach the panoply of due process protections to parents'
rights:
The "biological connection" is itself a relationship that creates a protected
interest. Thus the "nature" of the interest is the parent-child relationship;
how well developed that relationship has become goes to its "weight," not its
"nature." Whether Lehr's interest is entitled to constitutional protection does
not entail a searching inquiry into the quality of the relationship but a simple
determination of the fact that the relationship exists-a fact that even the
majority agrees must be assumed to be established. Even accepting the view
of the dissent, the sale of a claim in a child does not have to be constitution-
ally protected. Despite the absolute nature of the biological test stated by the
dissent, that test need not protect a purchasing party in a commercial surro-
gacy agreement. Irrespective of the soundness of the dissent's arguments,
Lehr arose in the context of a sexual relationship between the child's mother
and putative father . .. .25
"' Lehr, 463 U.S. at 271 (White, J., dissenting). Similarly, in Baby M the commissioning
party, William Stern, had done all he could to establish a relationship with his offspring.
", Some surrogacy contracts include a provision to allow the purchasing father to abrogate
responsibility in the event the child is not defect free or to require an abortion if a defect is
discovered during pregnancy. See generally, Burt, supra note 256, at 328. Such provision raises
the question whether a qualified promise is a sufficient expression of intent by the father to estab-
lish an unequivocal relationship of responsibility for his offspring.
" Lehr, 436 U.S. at 272. It is doubtful, however, that the dissent would apply its rule of
biology to all facts. Though the parents in Lehr were not married, they did enter a consensual
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This was an interpersonal rather than a commercial relationship. Al-
though Lehr does not clarify just how a biological father achieves the
requisite parental relationship, commercial surrogacy is antithetical to
the family model that is the focus of the constitutional right of privacy.
The dissent in Lehr stressed that the mother's actions prevented
the father from forming a relationship with the child, and thus, the
absence of a relationship did not justify the denial of the father's pa-
rental rights. "This case requires us to assume that Lehr's allegations
are true-that but for the actions of the child's mother there would
have been the kind of significant relationship that the majority con-
cedes is entitled to the full panoply of procedural due process protec-
tions.126 0 The majority opinion did not respond directly to this argu-
ment. It distinguished between "a mere biological relationship and an
actual relationship of parental responsibility. '6 1 Implicit in the major-
ity's approach is a judgment that the protection of the due process
clause against government intrusion does not require that the state af-
ford opportunities for the father to form a relationship with his illegiti-
mate child. The filing of the filiation proceeding was deemed insuffi-
cient either to establish the relationship or to require delay of the
adoption proceedings to give the father time to establish a legal rela-
tionship with the child."'
The basis of the Supreme Court's analysis of the right to parent is
personal, not economic, freedom.2 "6  No constitutional right secures
family relationships by purchase. Hence, the constitution does not re-
quire the commissioning party to be treated as a natural parent entitled
to the status of the surrogate in a custody dispute. As Lehr established,
a genetic relationship alone does not confer this status. In surrogacy the
commitment of responsibility to the child results from a commercial
transaction that secures the birth of a child for the benefit of the com-
missioning party. To recognize parental status through a commercial
contract would ignore the line between personal and economic freedom
that the Court has drawn in order to define regulatory powers of
government.
personal relationship that included sexual intercourse. See supra note 57.
260 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 271 (White, J., dissenting).
I d. at 259-60.
262 If Lehr had succeeded in his filiation action before adoption had begun, or if he had filed
in the putative father registry, he would have established a relationship of responsibility recog-
nized by the state.
263 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
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VI. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
If freedom of contract and constitutional principles neither compel
nor prohibit recognition of surrogacy, the states may decide whether
and to what extent to allow surrogacy'" according to policies made for
the general welfare.'" Thus, state legislatures and courts will be called
on to determine whether such recognition preserves or violates the
state's public policy." ' This part of this Article will present public pol-
icy considerations that states will address in deciding whether to en-
force a surrogacy contract or to recognize the parental status of the
commissioning party when a surrogacy agreement results in a custody
dispute.
In Baby M, the New Jersey Supreme Court assumed that the state
parentage law required comparison of William Stern and Mary Beth
Whitehead as "natural parents" in a custody dispute. Despite its clear
rejection of surrogacy as illegal and perhaps criminal," the supreme
court's holding conferred parental status based on a commercial trans-
action. As an expression of public policy, the supreme court decision in
Baby M encourages some to use surrogacy to obtain children. While
denying a right to purchase a child, the supreme court allowed the ac-
quisition of parental status by a contract that violates public policy.2"
I" Although Lehr held that the constitution does not require that states recognize parental
rights in illegitimate fathers, the Court also acknowledged that the state may choose to protect the
rights of illegitimate fathers.
The legislation at issue in this case ... is intended to establish procedures for adoptions
... to promote the best interests of the child, to protect the rights of interested parties,
and to ensure promptness and finality. To serve those ends, the legislation guarantees to
certain people the right to veto an adoption and the right to prior notice of any adoption
proceeding. . . . [O]nly certain putative fathers are included.
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266.
I" Surrogacy contracts could be accorded weight either as creating a contract right in the
commissioning party or only indirectly affording the commissioning party parental status in a
custody dispute.
'" Comment, supra note 15, at 142-43. In Lehr, the Supreme Court noted that state law
controls in the "vast majority" of cases involving family matters. 463 U.S. at 256.
", In Baby M H1, the court observed that its decision did not "preclude the Legislature from
altering the current statutory scheme, within constitutional limits, so as to permit surrogacy con-
tracts." 109 N.J. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1235.
'" Baby M H, 109 N.J. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1235.
2 The acquisition of parental rights in Baby M was not, strictly speaking, a purchase since
the court invalidated the contract payment. It was, however, the result of an intended purchase.
Moreover, it is clearly foreseeable that when future custody disputes arise from surrogacy, they
will result from commercial transactions that have gone awry. Both proponents and opponents of
surrogacy agree that the availability of a surrogate generally depends on the offer of payment.
See. e.g., Katz, supra note 4, at 13; Keane, supra note 28, at 156; Note, Litigation, supra note 3;
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A commissioning party in New Jersey now purchases a chance. If the
surrogate performs the contract, the commissioning party may pay the
contract price and receive a child. 7 If the surrogate balks, the pur-
chaser has a chance to secure the child through a custody action.2 71
And if the commissioning party is deemed a parent, he has at least as
good a chance of winning primary custody as if he had married the
mother of the child. Indeed, his chances may be better. The trial judge
may well identify and sypathize more with the father than with the
surrogate. The judge will likely be from the same social and economic
background as the father and will likely empathize with the father's
need and ultimate decision to employ a surrogate-rather than with
the surrogate's decision to fill that role. 272 Applying the flexible and
subjective test of the best interests of the child, a judge is more likely
to deem the father the better parent compared to a surrogate than
compared to his wife.273
But whether parental status should be accorded a commissioning
party cannot be answered without considering the strength of the pub-
lic policy concerning surrogacy. Legislatures and courts must weigh
surrogacy in light of important prohibitions against (1) child selling
and (2) prebirth consent to adoption. 74 One could argue that these
prohibitions are aspects of a single policy that seeks to prevent creation
of a commercial market in children. The first prohibition makes the
sale of a child a crime. The second invalidates all prebirth transfers,
regardless of whether consideration was paid. Since recognizing pa-
Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 438, 537 A.2d at 1248.
270 Even if the surrogate delivers the child, in New Jersey based on the Baby M decision the
commissioning party may well refuse to make the promised payment. See Baby M II, 109 N.J. at
421-22, 537 A.2d at 1240. It is unlikely that the surrogate could prevail in an action for price.
Whether this conduct by the commissioning party might affect the court's determination of the
best custodial parent is unclear.
171 In this situation the commissioning party probably can save the amount promised as pay-
ment since the court will invalidate the contract. See Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 422, 537 A.2d at
1241 ("entire contract is unenforceable").
272 In a similar situation, the "gray market" for purchase of babies, some courts have held
that payment for a child does not render a parent unfit even though such payment is a violation of
the laws of the state. See In re Adoption of a Child, 164 N.J. Super. 476, 397 A.2d 341 (1978); In
re Adoption of a Child, 165 N.J. Super. 591, 398 A.2d 937 (1979).
273 See Mnookin, supra note 49, at 238-40.
... The New Jersey Supreme Court relied on both prohibitions as separate and independent
grounds for its invalidation of the agreement. See Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 423, 537 A.2d at 1240.
275 For this discussion, we need not explore whether a prohibition makes an act-such as
transfer of a child for consideration-a crime or simply renders a promise to perform the act
unenforceable. In either case, a finding that surrogacy contracts fall within such prohibitions will
[Vol. 27
SURROGACY CONTRACTS
rental status in the commissioning party encourages surrogacy, legisla-
tures and courts should deny parental status in custody disputes if they
view surrogacy as a form of child selling or as a circumvention of the
laws against prebirth consent to adoption.
A. Comparison with Child Selling
Every state in the United States prohibits baby selling.2" In fact,
our society prohibits selling humans of any age. 8 Of course, in some
circumstances, courts have enforced contractual custody agreements
between parents or between a parent and a relative when the court
determined that the agreement was motivated by concern for the child,
was intended to benefit the child, and was in the best interests of the
child .' 9 But any transaction that in substance amounts to the sale of a
child is prohibited. 80
If surrogacy so commercializes a child as to constitute the sale of a
child, the long-established policy against child selling should prohibit
render the contracts unenforceable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).
The New Jersey Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide whether surrogacy constituted the
crime of child selling. It noted that the conduct was "perhaps criminal" and held the contract
unenforceable and illegal. Baby M I1, 109 N.J. at 422, 537 A.2d at 1240.
'" These laws protect the right of the mother to meet her child before she gives that child up
for adoption.
271 Many states invalidate baby selling by statute. See Note, Litigation, supra note 3, at 422.
Other jurisdictions invalidate it as a matter of public policy. See, e.g., Kelsey v. Green, 69 Conn.
291, 37 A. 679 (1897); Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881); Osburn v. Roberts, 197 Okla. 206,
169 P.2d 293 (1946); Enders v. Enders, 164 Pa. 266 (1884); Commonwealth ex rel. Berg v.
Catholic Bureau, 167 Pa. Super. 514, 76 A.2d 427 (1950); Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. 122,
229 S.W. 1114 (1921). Similarly, relinquishing parental rights for consideration is prohibited.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Shirk, 186 Kan. 311, 350 P.2d 1 (1960); Hanley v. Savannah Bank &
Trust, 208 Ga. 585, 68 S.E.2d 581 (1952). Some states criminalize such sales. See, e.g., TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-1-135 (1984); Annotation, Criminal Liability of One Arranging for Adoption of
Child Through Other Than Licensed Child Placement Agency, "Baby Broker Acts" 3 A.L.R.4TH
468 (1981).
"I' See U.S. CONST., amend. XIII. See also Means, Surrogacy v. the Thirteenth Amendment.
4 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTs. ANN. 445 (1987). Because children are not property, courts also hold
that a child cannot be subject to irrevocable gift any more than he or she can be sold. See, e.g.,
Osburn v. Roberts, 169 P.2d 293 (Okla. 1946). In her article, Market Inalienability, Professor
Radin considered reasons for deeming some things inalienable in the market. Radin, supra note
31, at 1909-14.
S' See, e.g., Brown v. DeWitt, 320 Mich. 156, 30 N.W.2d 818 (1948); In re Swall, 36 Nev.
171, 134 P. 96 (1913); State ex rel. Harmon v. Utterback, 144 W. Va. 419, 108 S.E.2d 521
(1959). Custody agreements are sometimes said to bind the parties but not the courts. See, e.g.,
Crocker v. Crocker, 195 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1952).
'" See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 787 (1962); Enders v. Enders, 164 Pa. 266, 30 A. 129 (1894).
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commercial surrogacy. 81 To distinguish surrogacy from child selling,
surrogacy proponents argue (1) that the contract is essentially one for
the personal service of gestation of a child-typically the genetic off-
spring of the commissioning party,282 and (2) that legislation against
baby selling predated the practice of surrogacy and could not be in-
tended to prohibit surrogacy.283
1. Personal Services Contract
The contract between Mary Beth Whitehead and William Stern
expressly stated that Stern's payment of $10,000 was "compensation
for services" and not "a fee for the termination of parental rights" or
for "consent to surrender the child for adoption." '2 " The trial court ac-
cepted this designation, but the supreme court found that the contract
was in substance either a sale of a child or a sale of parental rights and
held it illegal in either case."8 5
While gestation and childbirth are undeniably work, the purpose
of the contract is not to secure a service but to obtain the end prod-
uct-a child. The services provided in the surrogate contract include
allowing insemination, carrying the child during gestation, and deliver-
ing the child. These are production services; their sole purpose is to
produce the desired product. In fact, most surrogacy contracts provide
281 Legal and social commentators have eloquently stated the dangers of commercialization
of both the birth process and of children. See. e.g., Radin, supra note 31, at 1925; Annas & Elias,
supra note 3, at 218-22; Kass, "Making Babies" Revisted, 54 PuB. INTEREST 32, 47-48. Rosen-
blatt, The Baby in the Factory, Time, Feb. 14, 1983, at 90.
s The trial court in Baby M construed the surrogate parenting agreement as a contract for
personal services:
The law of adoption in New Jersey does prohibit the exchange of any consideration for
obtaining a child. The fact is, however, that the money to be paid to the surrogate is not
being paid for the surrender of the child to the father. And that is just the point-at
birth, mother and father have egual rights to the child absent any other agreement. The
biological father pays the surrogate for her willingness to be impregnated and carry his
child to term. At birth, the father does not purchase the child. It is his own biological
genetically related child. He cannot purchase what is already his.
Baby M 1, 217 N.J. Super. at 372, 525 A.2d at 1157. Professor Means provides the historical
answer to this question; he explains that before the prohibition against involuntary servitude a
father could and did purchase his own genetic offspring. See Means, supra note 278, at 447-48.
*s) "It is submitted that at the time that even the most current adoption laws were adopted,
no thought or consideration was given to the law's effect or relevance to surrogacy. Surrogacy was
not a viable procreation alternative and was unknown when the laws of adoption were passed."
Baby M I, 217 N.J. Super. at 372, 525 A.2d at 1157.
184 See Baby M I1, 109 N.J. at 423-24, 537 A.2d at 1241. See Part I of this Article, which
discusses the ineffectiveness of the parties' designation of or labels to a contract.
18s Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 422, 537 A.2d at 1240.
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only a small payment if the child is lost by miscarriage or still birth.286
The surrogate performs the same service whether the child lives or dies.
Yet the surrogate who bears a stillborn child ordinarily gets less than
half the amount promised for delivery of a living child. This is evidence
of the "goods" nature of the transaction. 87 The final promise to be
performed (delivery and relinquishment of custody) is not a personal
service unless every delivery of goods also constitutes, in addition to
sale of goods, a personal service contract of delivery.28 8 To order spe-
cific performance of the surrogacy contract is to apply the rule that
specific performance may be had when the seller refuses to deliver
unique goods in conformity with his contractual obligation. 289
2. Legislative Intent of Child Selling Laws
Although laws against selling children were enacted before the
technology of surrogacy developed,290 they do not exclude surrogacy
from their scope. Statutes do not exempt conduct from their operation
simply because the legislature could not foresee the specific manner in
which the violation could occur.291 That legislators did not consciously
28" The Stern-Whitehead agreement specified that in the event of miscarriage prior to the
fifth month of pregnancy, no compensation would be paid. The agreement provides for payment of
$1,000 in the event the child "is miscarried, dies or is stillborn" subsequent to the fourth month of
pregnancy. Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 472 app. A, 537 A.2d at 1267 app. A.
The surrogacy agreement described by Ms. Ince provided no compensation in the event of
miscarriage but required full payment to the surrogate in the event of stillbirth. See INCE, TEST-
TUBE WOMEN: WHAT FUTURE FOR MOTHERHOOD 101 (1984). "Possible fine-line distinctions be-
tween a late miscarriage (no fee to surrogate) and a stillborn premature baby (full fee paid) are
made by the primary physician provided by and paid for by the company." Id.
.87 The Baby M contract provided for payment of $1,000 in the event of loss of the baby at
birth. See Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 472 app. A, 537 A.2d at 1267 app. A. Noel Keane, the attorney
who arranged the surrogacy contract between Mary Beth Whitehead and William Stern and per-
haps the country's largest dealer in surrogacy, stated that under the typical surrogate contract
drafted at his office, the surrogate will receive only $3,000 if a child is delivered dead and $10,000
if a living child is delivered. 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 31, 1988).
288 On the 60 Minutes interview, supra note 287, Mr. Keane acknowledged that the surro-
gate contract can properly be regarded as a sale of a child, but maintained that the father's right
to the child is superior.
289 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-716 (1987)("Specific performance may be decreed where the goods
are unique or in other proper circumstances."). Comment 2 to § 2-716 states that "inability to
cover is strong evidence" of a proper circumstance for specific performance. See Part IV B of this
Article, infra for a discussion of the balance to be struck in a decision whether to grant specific
performance. See Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 18, at 461.
280 See Baby MI, 217 N.J. Super. at 372, 525 A.2d at 1157; Keane, supra note 28, at 152-
54.
291 Where conduct apparently violates a statute, courts should place the burden of proving
the need for an exception on the party arguing for an exclusion. An assertion that the legislators
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address surrogacy when passing baby selling laws does not mean such
laws do not apply to surrogacy. Courts must determine whether a new
situation falls within the letter and intent of existing law.
Thus, a significant question in assessing surrogacy is whether the
agreement to conceive, bear, and relinquish custody of a child for pay-
ment is a sale of a child. The essential elements of surrogacy appear to
be (1) a preconception contract to the birth and (2) relinquishment of
custody and parental rights in a child . 92 Many commentators acknowl-
edge that a surrogacy arrangement presents a legal rather than medical
question. 98 Because statutes prohibiting child selling create an irrebut-
table presumption that being sold is contrary to any child's best inter-
ests, prosecutions for child selling do not address the best interests of
the individual child. Thus, in such prosecutions, courts do not compare
the two individuals involved in the commercial transfer of the child. A
finding that the purchasing party would provide a better home for the
child cannot overcome the prohibition. The conclusive presumption op-
erates for the protection of children in the aggregate even if it is con-
trary to the best interests of an individual child. 94
Failure to apply traditional prohibitions against baby selling to
surrogacy defeats the purposes of those traditional prohibitions. By
preventing commercial transactions in humans, state statutes regulat-
ing custody and adoption promote the interests of children in the aggre-
gate. Such statutes protect children from the perceived danger of place-
ment in the homes of purchasers.295 The purpose of these statutes is
were not thinking of the challenged conduct when they passed the statute does not meet this
burden.
292 See Part II of this Article.
992 In their book, The Surrogate Mother, Keane and Breo state "the medical aspects [of
surrogacy] are peripheral and routine." KEANE & BREO, supra note 29, at 234. As Robertson has
observed, surrogacy involves no genetic manipulation or other sophisticated medical techniques:
"The only technological aid is a syringe to inseminate and a thermometer to determine when
ovulation occurs." Robertson, Surrogate Mothers, supra note 5, at 32.
29, See supra note 272. In many states, however, the prohibition operates primarily against
the intermediary or broker rather than against the individual purchaser and seller. See In re
Adoption of a Child, 165 N.J. Super. 591, 398 A.2d 937 (1979).
129 Regarding the sale of children in general (not surrogacy in particluar), Posner argues that
if the price of the child is high enough, selling children would be a good thing because people
generally take care of that for which they pay dearly. PosNER. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 114
(2d ed. 1977). The social and legislative repugnance toward child selling may evidence a judgment
that the only cost sufficiently high to insure a presumption of fitness is the cost-what would be
termed an "opportunity cost" by Posner-of natural conception and child birth. But accepting
Posner's assertion does not advance the inquiry. Arriving at a dollar figure high enough to insure
that the purchaser has invested enough to make the child product secure is impossi-
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broader than the interests of any individual child who might be sold
absent the prohibition. Accordingly, child selling is not merely regu-
lated; it is flatly prohibited. Legislation against child selling not only
protects living children; it also prevents creation of a class of children
that would be born, or "produced" for the market.
Enforcement of a preconception contract would create the power
to market children by increasing contractual security for the purchaser
and depriving women of their ability to renounce contracts to relinquish
children not yet born. If the sale of existing children is prohibited in
part because of a fear that such sales would encourage future inten-
tional commercial breeding, then surrogacy a fortiori violates the pol-
icy against child selling.2 96 Rather than distinguishing surrogacy from
baby selling, the intentional nature of surrogacy enhances the need for
the prohibition. Parties could hardly defend against a prosecution for
baby selling that they intentionally entered into for pregnancy and sale
for profit. This is precisely the danger the legislature sought to prevent
when passing baby selling laws. Thus, surrogacy falls more squarely
within these statutory prohibitions than does the sale of a child result-
ing from an unintentional pregnancy.
Surrogacy proponents maintain that statutes prohibiting child sell-
ing are intended to forbid bartering in children and to promote the
concept of family. They present a narrow view of the concept of bar-
ter297 and a broad view of the concept of family.29 8 In addition to these
policies, three other specific purposes of statutory prohibitions against
child selling should be and are frequently noted: (1) protection of bio-
logical parents; (2) protection of the welfare of the child; and (3) pre-
ble-particularly in a society where Neiman-Marcus can sell swimming pools filled with Perrier.
For the protection of children, the market place is unsafe at any price. Here market forces must
not be allowed to operate without regulation. Proponents of surrogacy note a lack of empirical
evidence that the risk of abuse is greater for children born of surrogacy and placed in the home of
the commissioning party than for other children. See, e.g., Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra
note 18, at 434-35. But this argument places the burden of proof on public policy and ties the
hands of courts until sociologists' data are graphed. Since many public policies lack empirical
data, the same argument would sanction many departures absent proof of harm.
'" See Annas & Elias, supra note 3, at 221.
Many proponents of surrogacy distinguish surrogacy from "back-alley" sales. Yet how to
distinguish between the unsavory and undesirable sale and the allowable sale is left unclear. If the
buyer wears a nice suit and has clean fingernails is the sale in the best interests of the child?
"' See, e.g., Note, Litigation, supra note 3, at 415. One commentator argues that surrogacy
contracts promote family bonding since the child acquired may save a marriage that would other-
wise fail. Traditional child selling, however, promotes the same end. And though surrogacy may
strenghen the commissioning family, it is probably detrimental to the surrogate's family.
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vention of exploitation of women.2 "'
(a) Protection of Biological Parents
This purpose seems designed to increase the deference accorded
the biological father who enters a surrogacy agreement to obtain a
child. There is no suggestion that protection is necessary for egg or
sperm donors who have no expectation of parental rights. While propo-
nents of surrogacy maintain that the genetic relationship of the father
to the child distinguishes surrogacy from the dangers of child selling,
this factor cannot be required as an essential element of surrogacy.300
(b) Prevention of Exploitation of the Birth Mother
Much analysis of the right to procreate focuses on the interests of
infertile couples. Concern for the emotions of the infertile couple is the
primary basis for protecting the procreative liberty of these individuals.
Some commentators recognize yet dismiss the problems facing the sur-
rogate mother who does not wish to relinquish the child at birth; they
find protection of this interest paternalistic.
Harm to the surrogate is a real possibility, but it may not be sufficient ground
for overriding contractual commitments. Although a surrogate may be able to
think of the gestating fetus as the couple's, as pregnancy continues and birth
approaches, she is likely to begin regarding it as "hers." Relinquishing the
child at birth may be extremely difficult, and could lead to grief, depression
and the need for counseling. Yet preventing informed women playing such
partial procreative roles denies them the freedom to decide how best to fulfill
their own procreative needs. If they are willing to undergo those risks, it may
be unfairly paternalistic to prevent them from doing so.801
200 See Note, Litigation, supra note 3, at 426; Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 18,
at 424-27.
:00 No commentator supporting surrogacy has suggested that the practice can be limited to
those who are biologically related to the child produced. Several commentators specifically argue
that a genetic relation cannot be required to enforce a surrogate contract, and the reasons for
seeking surrogacy can hardly be the basis for limiting the practice.
View of the rightness or wrongness of particular means of conception might properly
animate individual choices to avoid, seek or provide such services. They also permit the
state to refrain from funding or subsidizing this activity. But they generally do not
justify public action that interferes with the exercise of the right.
Robertson, Embryos, supra note 65, at 966. See also Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note
18, at 430. For a discussion of the essential elements of a surrogacy contract, see Part 1I of this
Article.
"0' Robertson, Embryos, supra note 65, at 1014. The hard question is not whether society
should prevent a woman from being a surrogate, but, rather, who bears the risk of breaching the
surrogacy contract by refusing to relinquish the child. For thorough personal accounts of the expe-
SURROGACY CONTRACTS
Whether harm to one of the parties to a contract is sufficient to over-
ride an express contractual obligation and prevent enforcement of the
obligation depends on the benefits and risks of the contract. To the
contracting parent or parents, the primary benefit of surrogacy is the
emotional and psychological fulfillment of having a child to love and
raise. Fairness demands, however, that society give like consideration to
the emotional effects on the other party-the surrogate.
The typical setting for baby selling involves an unintentional preg-
nancy of an unwed mother, who is contacted by a couple or individual
wanting to adopt the child and willing to pay for the child. By contrast,
the surrogate contract involves an intentional pregnancy. Thus, propo-
nents maintain, the surrogate needs no protection since she was not at
the mercy of the other party at the time of the pregnancy. She made a
free choice to become pregnant. While the unwed, unintentionally preg-
nant mother is one victim of the traditional black market for children,
the better bargaining position of the surrogate-assuming it is a real-
ity---does not neutralize the dangers addressed by legislation.302 Little
evidence suggests that surrogacy alleviates the danger of coercion; po-
tential for coercion of women into surrogacy is real. Financial need has
pushed many women into sexual prostitution. More women may con-
sider surrogacy because both the media and surrogacy brokers empha-
size the altruistic motivation of surrogates."' 3 Proponents depict
mothers consenting to adoption differently from surrogate mothers to
justify applying different rules to each. They portray the mother con-
senting to adoption as unique in acting under stress of both financial
and social pressures.304 But the situations of these mothers are more
alike than different. While the surrogate mother does not become preg-
nant accidentally, her decision to bear a child for others often results
from financial pressures. To conclude that because the surrogate
mother is not pregnant at the time she enters the contract, she is free of
stress or emotional pressures makes no sense and fosters distorted stere-
otypes. For the nonsurrogate mother considering adoption, financial
rience of relinquishing or losing a child to surrogacy, see E. KANE, THE STORY OF AMERICA'S
FIRST LEGAL SURROGATE MOTHER (1988); P. CHESLER, THE LEGACY OF BABY M (1988). See
also Coles, So You Fell in Love with Your Baby, N.Y. Times Book Review, June 26, 1988.
"01 To find credence in this argument, one must believe that the legislature's primary concern
in baby selling statutes was that the selling mother would be taken advantage of in the bargain.
303 See A Special Lady (video produced by N. Keane). See also INCE, supra note 286, at
102, 112.
'" See Note, Developing a Concept of the Modern "Family". A Proposed Uniform Surro-
gate Parenthood Act, 73 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1292 (1985).
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stress exists both before and after delivery. But nothing in the policy
requiring an existing child for an adoption contract alleviates these fi-
nancial pressures. The only factor that cannot be assessed before birth
is the emotional relationship with her child-her living child.30 5 Simi-
larly, the surrogate can weigh economic stresses before birth, but she
cannot assess her relationship to the child until after the child is born.
According to many commentators, to date the typical surrogate
has been married and is the mother of one or more children prior to the
surrogacy contract."' A woman who has had the experience of child-
birth and who has children and a husband in her home may be deemed
marginally more capable of judging her own ability to surrender a child
willingly. But these characteristics may not describe future surrogates,
especially if surrogacy becomes an enforceable reproductive option.
307
Because of the current uncertainty in surrogacy arrangements, surro-
gacy brokers have probably chosen surrogates with care in order to
maximize both the probability of winning a judicial enforcement and
also the odds of the surrogate's performing without judicial interven-
tion. If courts enforce surrogate contracts, however, the need for cau-
tion in choosing a surrogate will diminish. Like the black market pur-
veyor of infants, the surrogate broker, who is motivated by profit, 08
can be expected to procure mothers where he or she finds them at the
lowest rate of pay. If they are young and unmarried, yet available, the
profile of the typical surrogate mother will change. 0 9 Some commenta-
tors have suggested that legislation can set the perimeters of the surro-
gate relationship on the basis that factors such as marital status and
808 Every state protects this decision, which the mother alone can make, by prohibiting
prebirth contracts for adoption.
804 At this point, the category of surrogates constitutes too small a sample of potential surro-
gates to provide a reliable generalization. Whether these women represent the women who will be
drawn to surrogacy if it is declared legal is doubtful.
80" See Elster, supra note 124, at 1. A woman's capacity for willing surrender of her child
pursuant to a surrogacy agreement depends on many psychological factors. A few might include
the ability to control emotions, the ability to act contrary to feelings, and the ability to make
significant life choices without sentiment or emotion. One might speculate that the women who
could best serve as surrogates with the least emotional trauma may have harnessed a psychologi-
cal mindset that would reduce the probability that they would be in a financial predicament that
would make them consider surrogacy.
3" See Baby M 11, 109 N.J. at 438-40, 537 A.2d at 1248-49.
"9 If market forces make other women more available or available at a lower rate of pay, the
surrogate broker will give less consideration to the surrogate's characteristics that predict her
ability to keep her promise. Of course, if courts refuse to enforce contracts with surrogates who




children in the home protect women. But, the proper role of legislation
is problematic. Any regulation would involve government intrusion in
an arena recognized as private and would involve serious equal protec-
tion problems.3 10 Accordingly, one should view with skepticism the re-
sponse to objections to surrogacy that legislation will take care of the
details.
In this transaction the potential that the seller will regret the
promise to sell is far greater than in other sales. The emotional well
being of the surrogate is at risk in any surrogacy contract. This risk
should not be dismissed as unrealistic or unworthy of protection.
(c) Protection of the Child
Because children cannot protect their own interests, this category
should be given special weight. Whether the children are extant or yet
to be born, conceived by accident or by design, their interest as a group
is central to any sound policy regarding their sale. Current statutes in
most states prohibit payment for a child.31' Previously, this prohibition
has not encompassed children born as a result of surrogacy contracts,
such contracts being unknown.
Viewed from the narrow perspective of the individual child already
born as a result of a surrogacy agreement, the interests of the child
might seem to be served best by placement with the commissioning
party. Of course, the same is true of an outright sale. Typically, the
commissioning or purchasing parents can provide a financially secure
home."' By contrast, the surrogate's family is likely to be financially
disadvantaged. (Financial problems may have spurred the woman's de-
cision to become a surrogate.) Additionally, the surrogate's decision to
bear a child for another will often cause emotional turmoil for her fam-
ily. Some writers argue that surrogacy is in the best interests of the
child because the life of this particular child would not exist but for the
surrogacy arrangement.1 3
3'0 If the state sanctions surrogacy, equal protection considerations will significantly circum-
scribe the state's power to dictate the particulars of the arrangement.
31l See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-135 (1984); FLA. STAT. § 63.212(I)(d)(1985).
... See, e.g., Baby M I, 217 N.J. Super. at 354-55, 525 A.2d at 1148. The New Jersey
Supreme Court also noted that a lower income woman would hardly hire an upper income woman
to be her surrogate. Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 440, 537 A.2d at 1249.
... See Robertson, Surrogate Mothers, supra note 5, at 29; Eaton, Contract Consistent with
Public Policy, 119 N.J.L.J. 328, 399 (1987). This argument also applies when a pregnancy was
entered for the purpose of an outright sale.
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The broader and more appropriate inquiry, however, is whether
the policy against child selling is intended to protect existing children
only or all children including those yet to be born. Four possible cate-
gories of transfers of children merit consideration: (1) the child born as
a result of an accidental pregnancy and sold to a stranger; (2) the child
born as a result of an intentional pregnancy and sold to a stranger; (3)
the child born as a result of an intentional pregnancy pursuant to a
preconception contract and genetically related to the contracting party;
and (4) a child born as a result of a preconception contract but not
related to the contracting party.
The first category is the typical case clearly prohibited by the law
against baby selling. The second category is not typical, but would
clearly be prohibited. It is a sale. The result of this conduct would be
the same as allowing sales in the first category. One of the dangers
prohibition of sale of babies prevents is the sanction and creation of the
business of making babies. Proponents of surrogacy propose the final
two categories for exclusion from laws against baby selling. The third
category is the typical surrogate contract. The fourth category is not
currently typical but is probably not distinguishable on any principled
basis. The only difference between the first two categories and the final
two is the preconception agreement to bear the child.31' Some states
may find that as a matter of public policy, this distinction is sufficient
to protect children because persons posing a risk to children would not
be willing to wait the necessary nine months for a child. Such states
may also find that public policy is not offended by recognition of paren-
tal status in the commissioning party.
Categories two and four are substantially the same: each creates
commerce in children. The production of children for money appears to
be precisely the harm that legislation against baby selling is meant to
prevent. If the dangers to individual children-as opposed to children
in the aggregate-were the only concern, then the regulation suggested
in the surrogacy context should serve for all four categories. The logic
of proponents of surrogacy supports a policy that allows but regulates
child selling so that individuals deemed likely to be desirable parents
can obtain children by purchase. But legislatures have categorically re-
jected regulated child selling as a way of meeting the needs of the in-
fertile. Obviously, the needs of existing individual children to be sold is
:14 Because the agreement is before conception, the proponents can assert that the contract is
for a personal service rather than for sale of goods.
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not the sole concern of such legislation. Rather, child selling legislation
is based on the broader principle that the production of children for
money is an activity that harms all involved, including society. The
greatest long run effect of legalization of surrogate contracts is the
same effect of the legalization of the sale of children: the production of
children for money.315
B. Comparison to Prebirth Consent to Adoption
The prohibition against recognition of prebirth consent to adoption
of a child also serves the public policy against creating a market in
children. In Baby M, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the
irrevocable nature of the promise to relinquish a child violated public
policy and constituted an independent reason for invalidating the con-
tract, even if the contract made no promise to pay for the child.3 16
The policy behind the caution that all states require for termina-
tion of parental authority is longstanding. The underlying societal judg-
ment includes recognition of the different regard our society holds for
unborn children versus living children. 1 7 Indeed, the conceptional dif-
ference between a living child and an unconceived child may be the
reason our society has afforded any credence to commercial surrogacy
as a reproductive option. Before children are conceived, they are often
treated like fungible goods. Couples opt for more vacations, a larger
house, or buying additional things in preference to having another
child. It is common to hear people speak of their decision not to have
more children in order to finance better educational opportunities and
other benefits to the children already within the family. It would be
unusual, however, for a couple to state that they decided to have more
children in order to sell them to provide these same benefits for their
elder children. Both courts and legislatures have struck down prebirth
agreements in order to protect the family as an institution, as well as
the individual parent and child from the inability to appreciate fully
3" This judgment contradicts the assertion by Landes and Posner that the greatest long run
effect of baby selling would be the reduced number of abortions used to terminate unintentional
pregnancies. See Landes & Posner, supra note 36, at 342-46.
3,6 See Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 435-36, 537 A.2d at 1247.
"" The decision in Roe v. Wade relied on this difference in perception of the living and the
unborn. 410 U.S. 113 (1978). The important considerations sufficient to allow a woman to decide
to abort a fetus are clearly insufficient to justify killing the child once it is born. Prior to viability,
the interests of the fetus are minimal in comparison with those of the mother. Further evidence of
our disregard for the interests of the fetus is the rejection of a claim for wrongful death of a viable
fetus. See, e.g., Milton v. Cary Medical Center, 538 A.2d 252 (Me. 1988).
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the important place a child holds once it is born.318
The decision to recognize the commissioning father's right to a
commercial contract for a child is a judgment that the benefits of over-
coming infertility or avoiding the inconvenience of childbirth outweigh
the costs of the arrangement. Such costs include the financial costs at-
tending dispute resolution in courts or through arbitration, the emo-
tional costs to the mother who is unable to surrender her child will-
ingly, and the risk of loss to the commissioning party.
Analyses of the benefits and detriments of surrogacy have yet to
explore the difference in the quality of the compared needs. The situa-
tion of the infertile couple is heartrending. If the emptiness of infertil-
ity is termed a "loss," it is the loss of a child "in general." But the loss
risked by all parties to surrogacy is the loss of a particular, unique, and
identifiable child. Such a loss is different in quality from the loss cre-
ated by childlessness.
The Sterns no longer want a child; they want this particular child,
Melissa. In Baby M the trial court justified enforcement of the contract
on this basis despite the equally heavy burden such enforcement placed
on the mother. Viewed from a perspective of public policy, however,
this fact argues for rejection of the surrogacy arrangement as too
costly. The loss of the particular child is a cost present in every surro-
gacy contract. This loss will fall either to the commissioning party or to
the mother who loses the custody dispute. Even when the mother deliv-
ers her child and relinquishes parental rights as promised, she will ex-
perience psychological pain.3 19
818 Professor Russell Coombs criticized portions of the New Jersey Supreme Court opinion in
Baby M 11 as sexist.
[T]he Court states that, since a woman agrees to become a surrogate 'before she knows
the strength of her bond with her child' she never makes a totally voluntary, informed
decision, for quite clearly any decision prior to the baby's birth is, in the most impor-
tant sense, uninformed. Even a woman who, like Mrs. Whitehead, has borne and raised
other children is deemed so lacking in information and will that 'no amount of advice
would satisfy the potential mother's need.' This view of women's incapacities is reflected
also in other language in the opinion.
Coombs, Sexual Stereotypes Clutter Ruling, 121 N.J.L.J. 320 (1988). Rather than expressing
sexism, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court may be recognizing all parents' inability to expe-
rience natural attachment to their children until they are born. The limits on consent to adoption
prior to birth and the court's rejection of surrogacy because of the irrevocability of the promise to
relinquish are consistent with the long held presumption of the common law: No parent-male or
female-is able to fully appreciate and knowingly renounce parenthood of this particular child
prior to that child's birth.
.. Even Noel Keene's video, A Special Lady, notes that the surrogate is likely to feel regret
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Some commentators reject the balancing of losses or psychological
risks as paternalistic. 20 It is no more paternalistic, however, than the
decision to enforce a surrogacy contract in order to protect the emo-
tional interests (not the property rights) of the commissioning party.
Our society restricts many individual freedoms to promote greater long
term freedoms. For example, it may be paternalistic to deny individuals
the right to take drugs or to choose to sell themselves into slavery. But
such restrictions enhance long term freedoms of both the individuals
whose choice is restricted and society as a whole. 21
Surrogacy increases losses to society as a whole by creating a par-
ticular child that one party or the other will lose. The above cost-bal-
ancing comparison of the pain risked in surrogacy contracts argues for
a policy that discourages such contracts. According to Professor Radin,
this comparison is itself flawed. Such balancing represents an accept-
ance of quantification of human emotions. The market model is inap-
propriate for normative judgments regarding fundamentally personal
rights as opposed to property rights.3 22 In Radin's terms, commercial
surrogacy should be rejected not because of a balance of pain and ben-
efit but because of the larger effect of such an arrangement on our
perceptions of our society and ourselves.3 2
C. Commodification
Judge Richard Posner applied the concept of economic efficiency
to child custody and, while not discussing surrogacy per se, advanced
the argument that the sale of babies should be legal. His arguments
apply to commercial surrogacy. Posner stated that "willingness to pay
is a generally reliable, although not infallible index of value, and the
and depression at the time she relinquishes the child.
..0 See Robertson, Embryos, supra note 65, at 1014. See also Frug, Breach Remedy Limited
to Restitution, 119 N.J.L.J. 338 (1987)(arguing that surrogacy is not exploitive of women inas-
much as it "may permit some women ... to use their reproductive functions for their own fiscal
and psychological advantages").
... See LEE, LAW AND MORALS 24 (1986).
"' In her article, Market Inalienability, Professor Margaret Radin treats the broader topic
of market rhetoric and its potential effects on all aspects of life. She asserts that we must reject
universal commodification, because to see the rhetoric of the market, and thus the rhetoric of
fungibility, alienability, and cost-benefit analysis, as the rhetoric of human affairs is to foster an
inferior conception of human flourishing. See Radin, supra note 31, at 1885-86.
... Id. at 1927; see also Eaton, Comparative Responses to Surrogate Motherhood, 65 NEB.
L. REv. 686, 715 (1986)(discussing the nonconsequentialist objections to surrogacy).
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parents who value a child most are likely to give it the most care." '32,
However, an assessment of the emotional costs to all parties in baby
marketing-including the dangers to the living and to the yet un-
born-reveals losses not found in most commercial markets. Can the
seller opt for economic breach when a better offer comes along? How is
the danger of emotional harm to the original purchaser to be evaluated
or compensated in the event of an economic breach by the seller? Like
pain and suffering, the loss of a child can be categorized as an eco-
nomic loss for which there is no market: "A cannot buy B's ears and
tongue to gratify his taste for mutilating people and therefore these
things do not have prices. But they have opportunity costs."32 5 The lack
of a market for suffering notwithstanding, a figure for the loss can be
set.
The usual context for such costs is the assessment of damages in
personal injury actions. There appears to be no reason to refuse to
quantify the unquantifiable pain and suffering of the victim in this con-
text. The process does not create the loss or the pain. The process com-
pensates the victim in the only way it can. The court cannot give back
the severed ear, but it can give money damages in compensation. Fur-
thermore, the pain quantified for compensating a victim of personal in-
jury is useful in "reducing the incentives to avoid inflicting [suffer-
ing] ."326 This does not mean that a defendant could purchase a victim's
ear. A significant difference exists, however, in the context of surrogacy
contracts. Placing a price on a child by contracting either for a child or
for parental rights and custody serves no compensatory purpose. Unlike
personal injury recoveries, quantification in this context justifies the im-
position of suffering, thereby heightening the risk of more suffering by
increasing the likelihood of future surrogacy arrangements. The likeli-
hood that regret and pain will fall on either the breaching mother or on
the commissioning father is very real. Rather than resolving the
problems of infertility, surrogacy will create new formidable problems
with costs so great that both courts and economists should recoil from
the prospect.
VII. CONCLUSION
Our repugnance toward child selling bespeaks not only our general
:24 POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 114 (2d ed. 1977).




regard for the sanctity of life but also our shared belief that the best
interests of a child are not served by a parent unwilling to endure the
inconvenience of childbirth. But many persons who are involuntarily
childless would willingly endure this pain and would make exemplary
parents. The inability to become parents is a tragedy. The involuntarily
childless have always been present in this and other societies. Our soci-
ety has never deemed their needs sufficient to justify the dangers of
marketing children, regardless of their ability or inability to secure
children by adoption, however. The interest surrogacy seeks to serve is
the same interest that would be served by the sale of children. Thus,
the nature of the practices themselves rather than the interests served
must justify any distinction between the two practices.
Whether surrogacy will survive as a reproductive option depends
on our judgment as a society of the essential nature of the arrange-
ment. If it is in essence a sale of a child, the prohibitions against sale
should apply to protect these children as well as living children. All
agree that the interests of children are the paramount consideration.
But how best to serve those interests is a difficult question.
The belief that preservation of the parent-child relationship is in
the child's best interests has profoundly influenced child custody law. It
has created a judicial preference for the legal parent of a child. Until
now, the issue of parenthood has not presented significant conceptual
controversy. Genetic parents were deemed the parents of a child and
thus entitled to a preference when in dispute with a nonparent. But in
surrogacy the issue of parental status is problematic. If the commis-
sioning party does not have parental status, he or she will prevail in a
custody dispute only upon a showing that the parent is unfit, or that the
presumption favoring the parent is overcome. 27 In some cases the com-
missioning party is the genetic parent of the child. It is doubtful, how-
ever, that the genetic relationship can be required as an element of
surrogacy as a constitutional matter. This article has explored three
possible bases for deeming the commissioning party the "legal parent"
of the child born as a result of a surrogacy contract: (1) the contract;
(2) the federal constitution; and (3) future legislation or judicial deter-
minations authorizing surrogacy or parental status based on surrogacy.
... It is unlikely, however, that in a custody dispute arising from surrogacy the commission-
ing party would have custody of the child long enough to become the psychological parent. Any-
one who cares for a child for a long time (not just the commissioning party) could become the
psychological parent and thus be compared to the natural parent. See Mnookin, supra note 49, at
239-40.
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Problems exist with each of these bases.
The contractual declaration is ineffective if it violates public pol-
icy. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that the contract of com-
mercial surrogacy does violate public policy both because of the trans-
fer of consideration and because of the irrevocability of the transfer.
Even a genetic relationship appears to be an insufficient link to
require recognition of parental status. The United States Supreme
Court has evaluated the genetic relationship in the context of parental
rights in illegitimate children and held it insufficient to confer parental
status absent some definite act by the father showing a relationship of
responsibility toward the child. Whether a commercial transaction (an
illegal contract according to the decisions of some states) should be
deemed an acceptable manifestation of responsibility any more than a
fraudulent or coercive contract will undoubtedly be the subject of sig-
nificant debate. From the perspective of constitutional rights, such a
contract has little more justification than does a coercive contract.
The final basis for determining parental status of the commission-
ing party is a decision by the state-made either by the judiciary or by
the legislature-that such recognition of parental status serves the pub-
lic interest. At first blush, this appears to have influenced the New
Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Baby M. The supreme court, how-
ever, assumed that the Uniform Parentage Act adopted by New Jersey
granted parental status to all genetic parents regardless of how that
genetic relationship arose. It did not directly address the question of
whether granting the commissioning party parental status furthers or
threatens the state's public policy.
Surrogacy presents a clash of two fundamental legal concepts: (1)
the right of natural parents to the companionship of their children; and
(2) the right of society to prohibit commercial transactions in children.
Because these concepts never competed before the advent of surrogacy,
their clash now occurs against a backdrop of laws designed to further
both concepts. Laws preventing termination of parental rights without
due process and a compelling state interest serve the first concept.
Laws preventing the sale of one's children limit the rights of parents
and further the second concept. In sum, society rejects the right of indi-
viduals to terminate the relationship of parent and child through a
commercial transaction. Commercial surrogacy furthers the first con-
cept, but it violates the second. It achieves a genetic relationship of
parent and child through an economic rather than personal relationship
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between the biological parents. Proponents of surrogacy don't resolve
this discord; they merely deny its significance. They argue that one
cannot purchase what is already his.328
If the policy against economic transactions in children is a serious
one, however, it should be enforced by prohibitions against both the
sale and purchase of one's children. Courts and legislatures should
openly acknowledge that parental status in surrogacy depends on public
policy. To apply the best interests test to the infant born of surrogacy
without assessing parental status makes no sense, since parental status
often governs the custody decision. Until the question of parental status
in commercial surrogacy is confronted directly as a public policy choice
and resolved, the best interests test cannot protect those most in need of
its protection: those born and yet to be born of surrogacy.
828 See Baby M I, 217 N.J. Super. at 372, 525 A.2d at 1152.
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